





. -� . 
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
' 
· - A CASE STUDY . . ' 
OF INDUSTRIAL.DEVELOPMENT IN.THE PHILIPPINES 
THE CORNELL lJNlvERSITY SOOTHF..AST ASIA PROGRAM 
The Southeast Asia Program was organized at Cornell 
University in the Department of Far Eastern Studies (now 
the Department of Asian Studies) in 1950. It is a teaching 
and research program of interdisciplinary studies in the 
humanities, social sciences, and some natural sciences. It
deals with Southeast Asia as a region, aad with the indivi­
dual countries of the area: Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, a.ad Vietnam. 
The activities of the Program are carried on both at
Cornell and in Southeast Asia. They include an undergraduate 
and graduate curriculum at Cornell whicb provid�s instruction 
by specialists in Southeast Asian cultural history and
present-day affairs, and offers intensive training in each 
of the major laaguages of the area. The Program sponsors 
group research projects oa Thailand, on Indonesia, on the
Philippines, aad on the area's Chinese minor-ities. At the 
same time, individual staff and students of the Program have 
done field research in every Southeast Asian country. 
. .
A list of publications relating to the Southeast Asia 
which may be obtained on prepaid ·order directly from-the Pro­
·gram office is given at the end of this volume. Information 
on the Program staff, fellowships, requir.ements for degrees, 
and current course offeriags will be found in an Announcement 
of the Department of Asia• Studies, obtainable from the 
Director, Southeast Asia Program, Jranklin Hall, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York. 
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY - A CASE STUDY 
. .
OF INDUS TRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Laurence Davis Stifel 
Data Paper: Number 49 
Southeast Asia Program 
Department of Asian_S.tudies 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 
November, 1963 
Price: Three Dollars 
FOREWORD 
Students of the Philippines are aware that the so�iety and economy 
of that country have been undergoing rapid change throughout the post­
war period as economic growth, industrializ�tion, and FilipinizatJon 
have been promoted aggressively by public policies. Central to the 
imag'e held by Filipinos -- elite and proletariat alike -- of the national 
economic developQent to which t}:ley aspire is industrialization. The 
· society derives satisfaction and confidence from·tbe fact that manu­
facturing output is growing faster than .that. of .any other sector in the 
economy. Rapid growth of the·· postwar period is explained for the most 
part by the structure of incentives to Filipino entrepreneurship includ­
ing high levels of protection established by stringent import controls, 
the lucrative windfall in .foreign exchange allocations to import capital 
and industrial raw .materials, tax exemption to "new and necessary 
industries", and re�dy access to subsidized credit to make both peso and 
foreign exchange expenditures. This structure of incentives can be 
criticized on a number.of grounds, but there can be no question that it 
has been successful in stimulating rapid expansion of manufacturing out­
put for the domestic market. 
Our k�owledge of the forced and rapid growth of the Philippine 
manufacturing output, beginning in the decade of the 1950 's, is ·, 
materially enlarged by Laurence D. Stifel's painstaking and perceptive 
analysis of the Philippine textiie industry. Stifel is, above all, an 
economist and is aware of the critically important pragmatic is�ues which 
are central to understanding the processes of economic development --.the 
role of government, the sources of capital necessary to the fruition of 
entrepreneurship, the recruitment of innova·tors and managers, and the 
creation of an industrial labor force. Because he is an economist, he 
constantly strives to assess the economic performance of the emerging 
textile industry and to understand the relevance of his case study for 
the theoretical and policy issues involved in accelerated economic 
development. 
Students of Philippine economic development and social change will 
appreciate the detachment and insight with which Stifel has analyzed 
growth of the Philippine cotton textile industry. The Cornell Southeast 
Asia Program is pleased to help make available widely this provocative 
and significant study. 
Frank H. Golay 
Professor of Economics 
and Asian Studies 
Cornell Uniyersity 
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This is a case study of how an industry was created and grew in an 
underdeveloped country•· the Philippines� During the decade ·of the 1950
1 s 
a series of deliberate ·.efforts· wa-s · initiated to foster industrial growth in 
the Philippines. the objective waso.to wean theon.tin away from economic 
dependence·upon the United States •n<lto·oest�blish an economic viability 
consonant with the political independence of.. -;the youthful republic. Theo· 
growing significance of the manufacturing sector and the proliferation of 
new enterprises in t�e environs of Mart:i:la attest to the efficacy of the 
country's program of accelerated industriali�ation. 
This study focuse·s attention ·up�n one of .the.·industrles · which .  was 
nurtured and developed/tduring this decade •• the cot::ton textile manufac­
turing industry It was felt that an industry study might provide· ··fresh 
insights into the development process in the· Philippines. · Because the 
Philippines is i�eologi�al,ly committed ·to .growth via ·free enterprise, with 
individual entrepreneurso·omobilizing the resources· and rendering the criti• 
cal decisions, a microeconomie·analysis'of the firm or industry would seem 
to afford a more useful perspective· of ·the growth process than a general 
o ·
·, 
,survey of ·national policies and platjs. Private industries merit our study 
because they are the building block�·•£ the Philippine econQIUy. 
. . 
The industrial development of the 19so·•s has been an· abrupt, new 
phenomenon on· the Philippine·scene eonceraing'which surprisingly little is . .: . 
known. ,:The new industries· have little linkage with the past •. They have 





transitionals, motivated by apparently new aspirations. This transforma-. 
1 
� .  
2 
tion requires analysis while the process is still occurring, not only to 
facilitate better understanding for its own sake but to evaluate the 
inducement mechanisms employed for the practical purpose of improving them. 
The social scientists who have studied the Philippines have concen­
trated little attention on the process of industrial development. The 
economists have preferred to analyze macroeconomic problems such as trade 
patterns, for which the raw mater�,1s of analysis, economic statistics, 
were readily available. The sociologists and psychologists have largely 
ignored the urban process of industrialization, in order to examine the 
cultural and social changes occurring in the rural areas. Relatively little 
is known �bout the factory labor force, which is experiencing the most 
d�amatic social change in the country, and only recently has the key figure 
of the industrial entrepreneur come under scrutiny. 
The selection of the textile industry as the· subject matter of the 
study was based on two prfrnai:y considerations. Firstly, the Philippine 
experience in textiles was consi�ered to be of possible relevance to other 
nations desiring to embark on industrialization programs. The textile in­
dustry is generally considered a. natural starting point. It is believed 
to be high in labor intensiveness, although technical employee requirements 
are low, and relatively low in capital intensiveness; the finished product 
is a low-cost consumal,le coo,uodity with an almost universal market. 
The second reason is simply that a textile industry existed ·in the 
Philippines where several years before there had been none. In 1959, at 
the time of this study, the textile industry was one of the· Philippines' 
most conspicuous examples of rapid and forced growth; it had almost reached 
the point of satisfying the national requirements for textiles. The govern­
ment clearly endorsed the industry's success and prided itself on its 
3 
achievements. The industry had received benefits from a variety of govern­
menta,l assistance programs and seemed to afford a good opportunity to 
evaluate their effectiveness in actiono Once the decision had been made 
to study a developing factory industry, one of significant magnitude ando. 
established prestige in the Philippines, then the textile industry became 
a natural choice. 
Since the term, textile industry, embraces a wide scope of activities 
relating to fiber and cloth production, it is necessary to limit the scope 
of thi.s study. The analysis is restricted to the integrated steps in the 
production of cotton fabric. This process starts with the cultivation of 
raw cotton, co�tinues with the spinning of cotton into yarn and the weav­
ing· of yarn into ST•Y cloth; it concludes with the finishing of grey cloth 
into bleached, dyed and printed fabrics. This definition excludes synthe­
tic textile manufacturing which shares a cOD1Bon production technique but 
has certain uni�e problems. It also excludes knitting and ho _siery mills, 
industrial textiles, and garment manufacturers� 
The methodology of the study is primarily �irical and the research 
was conducted in the Philippines on a Fulbright grant in 1959-60. As the 
first industry study of this nature in the Philippines, there were no 
methodological precedents to follow. The principal problem was the 
paucity and unreliability of economic statistics on an industry basis. 
Since there were only 28 companies in the industry, the initial approach 
involved constructing quantitative measurements from data voluntarily 
supplied by the individual firms. The industry entrepreneurs generally 
welc01ned such inquiries, with warm hospi_tality and encouragement, but, in 
spite of assurances of confidence, their responses excluded certain deci­
sive areas of information. The most crucial data for a comprehensive 
4 
industry study could not be obtained· on a wide enough basis for trustworthy 
presentationo•• production volume� prices, coats, financing,,profits. The 
disappointing flUantitative results of this approach were aggravat.ed by the 
apparent agreement of the respondents. to supply the requested data and the 
writer's failure to recognize this as traditionally evasive circumlocution. 
Efforts to obtain flU&ntitative data were· finally shifted to govern• 
mental and private agencies.external to the industry. Statistics from 
these sources were subject to at least three possible errors. Although.. 
finns are re�ired to report statistical data to public agencies for many 
reasons, the means to enforce adherence to these requirements are quite 
ineffectual and reporting is irregular. For instance, when the Central 
Bank's Department of Economic Researcho·s�ates that textile production 
equaled so many million y4rds, it -really meaas_that this
.
is the output of 
reporting firms. Secondly, firms may intentionally misstate information 
in order to enhance their positions with the respective govero•oent agency; 
they may even present conflicting data elsewhere, confident that the lack 
of goveriwental coordination will preve�t detection of the inconsistency. . . 
Finally, 1tatistics are often unrel,iable because of honest reporting mis• 
takes, caused patticularly by the absence of accurate information in the 
firm or ambiguity in the nature of the data requested. The quantitative 
material in this study is �bject to a1·1 of these possible inaccuracies. 
Huch effort has· been devoted to appraising the validity of the statistical 
material on the industry and selecting that which under the .circumstan·ces 
seemed most reasonable, but this process has left room for legitimat.e 
disagreement. 
The inadequacies of the quantitative data compelled shifting emphasis 
to the qualitative approach which is used in this study more than originally 
5 
intendedo The qualitative material is based upon hundreds of-interviews 
in the Philippines with representative•s 0:f the industry, tl:'ade unions, the 
Central Bank, the Departtment ef Labor·, the S-ecurities Exchange Conmission, 
the National Economic Council, the Industrial Development Center, the 
International Cooperation Administration, the Department of Commerce-and 
Industry, trade'. associatiens, financial ins,titutions, political p4rties, 
and many others. The study traces the develQpment of the textile indu,try 
to the end of 1959. The writer has not atteutted to appraise·events in 
the industry- subse4Uent to his departure £rem the Philippines. Although 
there are occasional references;:_ �o events in 1960, the analysis concerns 
the industry as it existed in 1959. 
This st�dy has four p�imary objectives: 
(1) To ascertain the forces which caused the textile industry to 
emerge so abruptly; in the Philippines. The economic atmospher� and his• 
torieal precursors of the industry will be describedo Then the various 
gover,nnental inducement mechanisms will be evaluated in relation to the 
response of the private entrepreneurs who established the industry. 
(2) To weigh the seriousness of three bottlenecks posited by the 
theory of economic development•as impediments to industrialization in the 
·lesser developed nations - the shortages ef capital, managerial resources, 
and a skilled labor forceo The· textile indu�try will be examined in each 
of these three problem are8:s•. 
(3) To evaluate the social and economic contribution of the industry 
as opposed to the efficiency of its operationso Its production costs and 
productivity will be compared-1:oi·i riternaticmal standards, on the one hand, 
.. 
and its significance as an import saver ud labor· absorber will be con­
sidered on the other. Finally, the industry's future prospects and value 
6 
to the Philippine::economy will be appraised. 
(4) To provide a case study of a new industry in a developing country, 
which, as a standard of comparison, might further understanding of the 
growth process and the formulation of economic policy, both in the Philip• 





POSTWAR.PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC SETTING 
The ravages of war were as severe in the Philippines as in any other 
country of So�theast Asia. The archipelago stood on the threshold of in-
dependenc� in 1946 with its capital city and productive capacity substan•· 
tially·idestroyed. The imnediate economic problem was to secure funds for 
the rehabilitation of the country, but a more fundamental-issue in 1946 
concerned the continuation of the highly preferential access to the 
American markets for Filipino exports�· Even before the battle of Manila 
Bay the United States was the principal market for Philippine sugar and 
hemp, but it was during the inter-war pe_ried of ·free reciprocal trade that 
. 
a structural acconm.i,dation of the - economy to Ame-rican coumercial oppor-
tunities occurred. The economy became geared to the production of three 
primary cash cropsi•• sugar, abaca and coconut produc-=s, almost all of 
· . . 
which were exported to the United States.i· The prewar Philippine economy 
. 
.in many _respects resembled a colonial-dependency, providing the mother 
country with raw materials and serving as a market for its manufactures. 
. .. 
American tute·lage and comparative advantage, however, materially benef:i.,ted:
the Philippines, which enjoyed'the highest literacy rate and standard of 
living in Asia during this period. 
The finali,-· crucial years of the CODiibotiwealth Period were years of 
occupation by a hostile force rather than economic acclimation to the 
,.
world scene. In :1946 Filipinos and A:inerieans'debated whether an extension 
of free trade·iwas fn:tperative for postwar recovery, or whether·it would 
' . 
perpetuate a type of colonialism, incompatible with genuine recovery 
through diversified growth. The former argument fCl>Und expression in the 
7 
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United States-Philippine Trade Agreement in 19 46, which with the passage of 
the ,AmeTican Rehabilitation Act of 19 46, represented the principal external 
determinants of the Philippine economy during the following years. The 
Trade Act provided for the gradual imposition of tariffs and declining duty• 
free quotas after a free•trade period of eight years, but this was postponed 
in 1955. The new republic thus emerged in 1946 with a crippled economy and 
prospects of continuing dependence upon United States' markets, although 
this. relationship seemed to provide the most rapid avenue to reconstruction. 
By 1950, generally considered the end of the wartime rehabilitation 
period, it was evident that the postwar import surpluses were not transi• 
tory and the Philippines had a fundamental disequilibrium in its balance 
of payments. This was caused by the "demonstration effect," the emulation 
of Western consumption patterns and the demand for foreign goods, as well 
as the stabilization of the peso at a level above the prewar and American 
price levels. The peso was overvalued·at its prewar parity of two to the 
American dollar. The excess of imports helped bridge the gap between the 
swollen postwar purchasing power and the reduced domestic supply of goods, 
but it strained the comfortable international reserve position built up 
before the war. The relative �omposition of exports changed but the com• 
ponents were the prewar cash crops and they failed to rise as rapidly as 
imports. A drastic fall in international reserves in 1949 prompted -the 
imposition of exchange controls, whi.ch remained in force throughout the 
. ' 
1950 decade and greatly influence its course • 
Foreign trade and the balance of payments were the country's most con­
spicuous economic problems in 1950 because of the unsatiated demand ·dfor 
imports, the secular decline in demand for several exports as well as the 
improved position of competitors, the decline in American rehabilitation 
9 
expenditures, and the anticipated loss of .the preferred Unite4 States' 
market. Nevertheless, foreign trade's relative importance to the economy 
had significantly diminished. The percentage of exports to gross 
national product fell frem 25 in 1938 to 10 in 1951 �d imports droppedi. 
. 1from 22 in 1938 to 11 in 1951. The c�ronic deficits could be immediately 
curbed by exchange control, but it became increasingly.ievident that the 
fundamental problems were internal and more recalcitrant. 
It is cOW1nonly observed that the Philippines is amply endowed with 
basic resources, but its·· level of economic devel�pment is low in relation .i
to its potential. The economy is characterized by the peasant agticulture 
of the provinces, with its small freeholds or tenancies, absence of mecha• 
. .. 
nization, and low productivity. Only a small. fraction of the crops is 
sold for cash, so although the u,e of money is universal its limited 
quantity narrows the market. _Economic activity has been largely extractive 
with emphasis on subsistence farming, plantation growing of cash crops,i. 
forestry, mining and fishing. ·iconspicuous conswnption of a ritual nature 
in the barrios and extension of . prestigioµs landholdings by the·•landlords . ' 
absorbed whatever surpluses were produced and res�ricted more productive 
investment to.foreign capital. 
Prior to 1950 manufacturing activit:y was negligible except fori ··i
handicrafts, some • processing plants, . and gove.r:1anent subsidized mil·ls. 
Free trade, the limited .market, inadequate transportation, high domestic. . . 
labor cost, and preference for foreign goods we�e all obstacles to the ,. 
industrialization considered necessary .for economic independence� 
; 1Amado A. Castro, "T� Philippines:. A Study in Economic Dependence" 
.(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economies, Harvard 
University, 1954) ,. P• 175. 
10 
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The per capita annual income of $200 concealed great extremes between · 
the peasants and the landowners, on the one hand, �d the rural and urban 
areas on the other. The former contrast, accentuated by widespread tenancy 
and regressive taxation, was the basis of the major class distinction, with 
the landlords and hacenderoa occupying the strattDD of peak social and poli-
tical power. The rural-urban contrast contained a difference in a mode of 
life as well as a standard of living, for the burgeoning population of 
Manila was confronted with the non-personal face of the West. 
In 1950 the u�••tisfactory economic situation was being aggravated by 
the multiplying population, which at an annual rate of increase of over 3% 
was to reach 27.5 million by 1960. In the 1930i1 s, as the remaining lowland 
frou�iers were cultivated, unemployment appeared as a problem which was to 
grow to acute proportions afterJthe war. The increasing population has not 
altered the historic ratio of labor ·input per hectare. Population had been 
absorbed by a mitotic growth of similar factor units until the frontier 
ber-ame more impenetrable and increasingly shunted the new workers into 
positions of,underemployment in the barrio or unemplo�nt in _the city. It 
• • 
is currently est1mated_that from 100,000 to 150�000 new workers enter ·the 
. . . 
labor force anm,.ally, and the "p�sses" on under-�d uneJDPloyment range up 
to over 25% of the workfor�.. The ·lack. of- rural opportunities has been ' '\..·" 
pushing job seekers to Manila, the primate city over-�en times the size of 
'its nearest · rival, where the swollen ,.:ranks of the jobless constitute one . ' 
of the c4?Untry's prime problem• .. 
By 1950 production was restored to approx:fmat:ely its prewar level, 
2Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic DeveloPID!nt (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1961), P• 18, _citing The Research Center in Economic 
Development and Cultural Change of the University of Chicago, The Role of 
Fore Aid in the De�el nt of Other Countries (Washington:. U.S.
Go"A=.<aunent Printing Office, 1957 • 
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and rising wages and stabilized prices had begefi�ed the working classes. 
Nevertheless, serious problems existed -- the high unemployment, chronic 
international disequilibrium, rural poverty� and uncertainty whether growth 
rates could be maintained. ; In.that year �he Bell Report of the American 
Economic Survey Mission·warned: 
3 
.
Economic conditions ini·tpe Philippines 
' 
are unsatis-
factory. The economic situation has be�n deteriorating. 
·• • • Unless positive meas'1·res are t�ken to· deal wi"th the
fund�ental causes of these difficulties, !t • may be ex-'. 
. pected that· the economic 
. si tuatioi;i wil 1 d�teriorate further · 
and politi<;:al_ di$order will inevitfibly result. Whatever
is done to'improve economlc conditiop.s•in t:\'le Philippines 
must be done promptly •••• 
Industrializati�n-had long been advocated by Filipinos and Americans, 
but during the next years it received renewed emphasis as a solution to the 
related problems of colQ�ial dependence, disequilibrium, and unemployment. 
The textile industry was among the beneficiaries of the industrialization 
policies adopted durin8 the 1950i1 s. But before continuing with a descrip-
tion of the industrialization program,. three particular aspects of the ·
postwar environment should be singled out for attention -- the socio-economic 
and cultural setting, the emergence of a transitional group of Filipinos, 
and the significance of economic nationalismo 
(1) Socio-economic and cultural background -- The basic characteristic: 
of Philippine society is its familial organiz_ation �which pervades all aspects 
.' ' 
of Philippine life and affects all development efforts. The nuclear family 




group of kinsmeno Interperso�al friendship outside qf the familial system 
is uncommon, and where it develops among adul�s, ritual kinship is used to 
I 
• • 
3Report to the Pres·ident of the .United States by the Economic Survey 
·Mission to the Philippiri.es ·(Washington, n·. C;�-_iOctober·9, 1950), l� 
\ 
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adopt the outsider �s a compadre. The Filipino's social orientation and 
allegiance are directed to his bilateral family rather than to his cormnunity 
or society in general. Religious activity centers on the home; the rural 
production unit or urban corporation is a family enterprise. The duty of 
family support makes nepotism a positive virtue. The family determines 
status, assigns responsibility, gives security, and requires loyalty. Ac­
cording to a prominent anthropologist in the Philippines, if it were 
necessary "to use one phrase to describe the larger Filipino society, it 
4
would be: an anarchy of .�amilies." 
Within the nuclear family is a hierarchical structure based on age and 
generation. But the family is laterally extended to include dozens, even 
hundreds, of kinsmen, and the Filipino's social life can be essentially re­
stricted to them. The group of kinsmen is not clearly defined, for it can 
be expanded outward to an indefinite degree, but it limits the Filipino's 
sphere of confidence. Beyond is the outer world of non-kinsmen where he is 
insecure and without status. In the rural areas contact with non-kinsmen 
can be minimized •d. Where interpersonal relations are necess�ry, one's self . . 
esteem can be preserved by linguistic mechanismswhich superficially bridge 
the social gap, such as euphemisms and circumlocation. The job seekers and 
factory workers in the city, however, are subjected to the cultural conflict 
of frequent interaction with non-kinsmen. 
Leadership traditionally has depended on wealth, as measured primarily 
by landholdings, size of one's kinsmen following, age and- personality. 
Prestige stems from land not only because of the wealth it represents but 
because of the personal power· it affords over those dependent upon it. Land 
4 Robert B. Fox, ''The Study of Filipino Society and Its Significance to 
Programs of Economic and Social Developtnent," Phllippine Sociological Review,
VII (January-April, 1959), P• 6. 
. . � 
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ownership normally implies various reciprocal responsibilities and favors 
between landlord and.tenant or hacendero and worker.d· A,n important aspect­
of this relationship traditionally has been political. Gontrol of land 
involved the control· of votes which _were use_d either for personal political 
ambition or pledged in a mutually advantageous way to another. Political 
power then was perpetuated by a distribution of wealth, largely through 
pork-barrel appropriations and job distribution .• Because the family is .. 
,. r 
bilaterally and widely extended, there �re no fixed leaders and conflicts 
of loyalty are possible in overlapping circles. Leader.ship is personal_. - . ized 
rather than i_deological: parties are fragile and temporary. ·Political 
ambition is widespread among the higher class because of its prestige and 
opportunity for gain, bu.� :success depends on the abilityd. to· distribute 
material benefits to the familial groups allied in one_ ·'s -support. 
The identification o _f land and prestige has c�used a strati'fication of 
society into two distinct classes, with a middle class only reeentlyd·demerg-
ing in Manila. The relat.ionship betw�en the two c\asses was strictly 
maintained by a paternalistic system. �f reciprocal responsibilities, and 
. . . . . 
upward mobility was r.estricted to urban .-oppo�tunities, · facilitated by 
educational achievement·. 
These oversimplified generalizations are pre�ented beca�se of the sig!.. 
nificantly· adverse- effect_d . · upon economic social and cultural factors. may haved
development in thed·dPhilippines. 'Family values are not capitalisticd
.
values. 
Frugality,d. for instance, is considered selfish, and- ritual extravagance and 
sharing are highly regarded. Group responsibility £or family members pro­
vides security at the. expense of initiative�. for· the results of productive 
effort are so leveled that self interest is stifled. The family structure 
. . .
discourages individual decision making and limits economic horizons. A 
14 
family enterprise could not normally share responsibility with non-kinsmen 
investors or professional managers. The attitude toward land limits more 
productive capital formation. These factors are not as readily identifiable 
as the shrinking i�temational reserve or the shortage of industrial engineers, 
but they are considered real obstacles to industrial growth. The developing 
texti'le industry has been able to modify aspects of . th:is social and cultural 
background in certain respects but in others has had' to accommodate itself 
to it. 
(2) The emergence of a transitional group5 -- Prior to the war the wide 
gap between the wealthy landowners and the masses of peasants was filled by 
only a small middle class in Manila, consisting mostly of teachers,d. profes• 
sionals, and gover,ooea.t workers. Conm�rcial interests were largely con­
trolled by the unassimilated Chinese, both in the capital and the provinces. 
The middle class which did exist lacked a middle class mentality. Its frame 
of reference was often the conservative value system of the landed aristoc.! 
racy, which supported this group and was, in tum, represented by it. Open 
educational channels permitted free entry into the middle group £ran the 
lower classes, who viewed it as an escape from manual labor into the higher 
prestige of white collar and office jobs. 
This middle class did not initially originate in an atmosphere receptive 
to economic change, but underlying forces in the economy are gradually weaken• 
ing the traditional value system and slowly transforming the middle class 
perspective. Vast increases in public and private education are augmenting 
the reservoir of the middle class in Manila. The pressures of unemployment, 
increasing monetization of the economy, and improvements in communications 
.5See especially, Thomas R. McHale, "Philippines in Transition, 11 Journal 
of Asian Studies XX (May, 1961), 33 1•34. 
. -� . . . 
•, ·�. ' . . ' . .. . . 
. � - � . .  
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all have drawn or pushed portions of the populace away from the historic 
security of subsistence agriculture ap.d permitted new. identifications of 
interest. This iso·omanifest in the growth'of_ Manila which has·oyielded ex• 
ternal economies of a social character.whi�h reinforce the evolutionary 
process. 
Independence has enhanced the· educated public's· image o_f it1dustriali• 
zation, for it.is increasingly viewed as a_: .liberating force from the stigma . . . . 
..
of colonialism and a panacea for _the problenu� _of poverty and uliemplo_yment • 
The social effect of :J,ndustrialization .is · CUlllUlative·. Wealth acquired in . . . . . 
industry establishes an alternative p�est�ge pattern, . mtt'ch. more open to . 
newcomers, and the interpersonal associati�ns necessary for -its success .. 
are becoming more normal in the social organization of. Manila. 
. 
Many of the entrepreneurs in the' textiie industry have been Chinese 
and this cruc:1,al �hange in attitude .has not been directly relevant to 
. .
them. Nevertheless, the transitional elements in the society explain not 
only the. Filipino entrepreneur but th_e expanding g!"oup_ of Filipinos seek• ..
ing careers in manufacturing management, as well as the forces Qehind the 
growing economic nationalism. 
6(3) The significance of economic natio�al�sm -• Economic nationalism 
is the broad objective of Filipinizing the economy, which has historically 
. .
been dominated -by foreigners. Americans have been the principal exporters 
. . 
from the Philippines, bu.t the Chinese, roughly one percent of the popula� 
tion, have imported the bulk of goods enterit;tg the country and then con• 
trolled their domestic distribution. It: is COD4llonly _believed that the 
Chinese handle 80% of the domestic.ttade, incl�di� practically all of the 
· ·6see especially ProfessoroF • . H. Golay 
I s chapt�r .on "Ec�nomic ijational­
·ism," in The Philippines fyblic Policy and National Economic Deve\opment 
(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell
.,
'Ut;liversityoP�ess, 1961), pp. 312.:.45. 
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country's textile consumption. Economic nationalism is an anti-alien policy, 
but by popular definition alien is equated with Chines�. Although legislation 
cannot single out the Chinese as aliens, discriminatory enforcement is cOUWlon. 
The Chinese have traded aul lived in the Philippines for over one 
thousand years, and Philippine history carries repeated accounts of their 
persecution and the efforts of Filipinos to usurp their economic functions. 
The anti-Chinese policies, however, failed·to halt the vigor of their success, 
which over the centuries has antagonized the Filipinos lacking in the abil• 
ties necessary to duplicate it. Among the reasons for the superiority of 
the Chinese have been their frugality and regular reinvestment patterns, 
aided by effective Chinesed- banking facilities and cooperative associations, 
as well as their diligence and business acume�. 
Economic nationalism directed against the Chinese, therefore, has 
historic antecedents, and it�is not surprising that with the removal of 
American restraints a resurgence of it was manifest in the new republic. 
Nationalism provided the intellectual with an emotional cause, the politi­
cian with a vehicl� for favorable notoriety, and the aspiring Filipino 
businessman with a possible shortcut to weal�h. Its appearance after 1946 
was directly related to the new control which Filipinos gained over their 
. . . . 
economy. Legislation was passed to nationalize the
.d
marketing of agricultural 
products and the retail trade, areas of strong Chinese control, and these 
acts partially stimulated the background integration of the traders. By 
specific mandate the import and exchange control laws were implemented .·to · 
. . 
combine the objective of conserving exchange and Filipinizing the economy, 
and allocations to aliens were drastically curtailed. This also forced 
aliens to shift to manufacturing or purchase exchange _lice�ses ·fr� "duunuy" 
Filipino bu�inessmen. Nationalistic goals are reflected in a variety of
' . 
l? 
other areas such as the exploitation of national resources and the ' se.euring, -
of tax exeniptioti privileges for "new and necessary industr�es.o" 
Economic nationalism .is embodied in diverse ways but it is a social 
reality, transcending the narrow definitions of .citizenship. It' is shared .
by the average Filipino who is ! aw�re of his dependence on the Chinese·omer• 
chant and suspicious that this is not compatible witho·national independence. 
Although freque.ntly nationalism is motivated by the pervasive social and 
political influence of the United States, its economic ramifications are 
,I 
pTimarily directed against the Chinese •·•stranglehold'' on the economy. 
Like economic nationalism, industrialization has a long history in 
the chronicles _of Philippine thought, but formal efforts towards its 
. --
realization have been equally unsuccessful. It is likewise not suJ'}lr�sing 
that as the postwar reconstruction period neared comp�etion, Filipinos 
.. -
looked hopefully toward industrialization for a solution to the nation 's  
conspicuous economic ills. Optimistic beliefs that the Philippines might 
take Japan's place of economic primacy in the Far East were not . materializ•o_ 
. ' 
.' 
ing. Not only was the colonial-type dependence upon a few cash crops re-
stored, but new problems of serious unemployment,) imp�,-rt· deficits, and the 
.. . .. 
·inlllinent cloee of the American market had appeared. Industrialization is 
attractive because it r�presents a neat solution to all of t�ese problems 
simultaneously. 
Like economic nationalism, the objective -of industrialization is not 
officially formulated as a statement of public policy to be implemented by 
a coordinated national �£fort. In the Philippine democracy, with its dis• 
persion of authority and emphasis upon personalities, no such centralized 
planning has been possible. But the goal of industrialization is also a 
reality, socially and politically; it exists in the national consciousness. 
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The efforts to realize this objective are un�oordinated but they have a com­
mon direction. The statement, "the Philippines has embarked on a program of 
industrialization, " means that industrialization has gained suffic·lent 
acceptance for it to be considered a national goal, which a variety of laws 
and gover,Wk::ntal agencies are encouraging. Consequently, it is not possible 
to date the beginning of an industrialization program in the Philippines, 
although it received increasing emphasis as the 1950 decade progressed. 
Autarky is generally considered one of the goals of an industrializa• 
tion program. National self-sufficiency is a political as well as an 
economic objectivei. According to the Director of the Institute of Economic 
Development and Research, University of the Philippines: 
On economic grounds there can hardly be any doubts as to 
the desirability of economic independence ; it is essential if 
the Philippine economy which is highly oriented towards foreign
trade is to remain stable and unaffected by outside fluctua• 
·tions . And on political grounds the justification is even 
greater• • • •  
Even granting a loss of ··spec:lalization and efficiency 
there is the cold dilemma of security vs. great gain: the 
country may prefer a stable income at a lower level to highly 
varying returns. 7 
The emphasis has not been placed upon productive efficiency or costs as 
gauged by international standards. There have been few reliable governmental 
analyse, of the absolute money cost differentials between the Philippines 
and other countries. Autarky, employment generation, import savings have 
been the goals. Filipinos share the American attitude toward low Oriental 
wage_s and their effect upon '-OiUpetition. Filipinos consider their labor cost 
to be high in relationship to their geographical surroundings. This assump­
tion prevents illusions about exporting manufactured goods into the Asian 
market and justifies protection as a necessary condition of self-suffici�ncy. 
High labor costs and these consequences are, however, considered a justifiable 
7castro, pp. 6, 390. 
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price to pay for the count_ry 's- high s·tandard of living vi•s-a-vis its 
neighbors. 
Government support- of industrialization has taken many forms,o·but its 
most deliberate has.been direct participation in manufactu·ring ·on a tempor• 
ary basis to break theo- pathway �or private industry •o. Government corporations 
have engaged in a broad range of activities from actual -productioon in such 
basic industries as steel, .textiles,- and cemel\t to the_ control of utilities 
and transportation companies. and the development of lGWo. cost housing. 
Nevertheless, Filipinos have little faith in state socialismo. There is 
almost universal adoption of the American distrust of governmental efficiency 
and belief in the inherent superiority of private enterprise. The economy 
is essentially based upon private enterprise, and the public sector is rela• 
tively small. Consequently, the government corporations operate in an 
atmosphere of debate concerning their value. Their function is to pioneer 
in essential areas only until _private capital is willing and able to assume 
the responsibility. 
Other aspects of the government's industrializaiion policy have been 
indirect, such as the promotion of financial institutions, and the use of . . . 
Japanese reparations and American foreign aid for the benefit of domestic 
.· .
industry. The most important in the 1950o1s were the related benefits for 
"new .oand necessary industries" -- tax exemption, preference in dollar allo• 
cations, and the import windfallo
.
accruing from the overvaluation of the peso. 
As the 1950o9 s progressed the tempo of manufacturing increased. Light 
industries, some merely packaging plants, skirted the city of Manila and 
accentuated the nationo:•:s extreme urban eentralizationa The diversity in 
production helped turn the direction of trade away from the United States, 
which was still the dominant trading partner, but exports to Western Europe 
20 
and Japan increased substantially. The composition of imports changed under 
the control of the Central Bank as con�imer goods fell and capital goods 
rose in importance. The growing manufacturing sector, however, was still 
small and the structural changes necessary to solve the fundamental problems 
of poverty and unemployment were still awaited. There was faith, but inade­
quate objective substantiation, that industrialization was the final panacea. 
This was the setting in which the textile industry developed. 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT .OF THE INDUSTRY 
: :� It if$· :necessary. tio examine the varied antec�dents of organized textile 
·manufacturing in the Philippines in order to evaluate its modern development 
and problems. This chapter, therefox:e, begins wi'th a description of the 
cottage industry and the market-creating effect of textile imports. The
' ' 
history of public participation in textile manufacturing is traced, and then 
the rapid response of private entrepreneurs to the stimulus of exchange and 
import controls is described. Finally, the Philippines '  ·raw material posi• 
tion is explained and the economic$ of domestic cotton cultivation are con• 
sidered. 
This chapter is designed to serve as an ,�irical introduction to the 
cotton textile manufacturing industry and to the.imore detailed analysis of 
specific aspects of the industry in subsequent chapters. 
Cottage Industry - An Historical Survey 
During the pre•MoJ,.ammedan period, the Filipinosi' simple clothing re­
quirements -- breechcloth and shortsleeved jacket for men and unsewn skirt 
for the women -- were satisfied by the cottage spinning and weaving of 
local cotton, abaca,• banana, and pineapple fibers.i1 SQmetime as early as 
the 13th century, however, production f�r use shifted to production for 
trade •i The specialization of different geographic areas on certain fabrics . 
and styles was stimulated by the growing barter trade with China, and even 
before the Conquest, comparative advantage in cotton production apparently 
.1 ' ' Alfred L .  Kroeber, Peoples of the Philippines (New York: American 
Museum of Natural History., .1943) , pp. 129•137. 
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was centered on the mainland.2 
Early hopes of the Spanish to develop textile manufacturing for �xport 
to New Spain (Mexico) were frustrated by the accelerated influx of Chinese 
cloth and the greater potential of the entrepot trade. The fortunes of the 
Manila community grew dependent on the perilous galleon voyages , carrying 
highly compact and luxurious goods ,  particularly Chinese silks , to Acapulco. 
3 
Although an "Ordinance Forbidding the Indians to Wear Chinese Stuff". was 
issued in 1591 to help halt the decline in local weaving , the Spanish empha• 
sis was clearly upon foreign commerce and religious conversion rather than 
industrialization.i4 Following the example of their national hero, Joze 
Rizal , Philippine historians describe an industrial decline during the 
Spanish period, which they attribute to certain abuses of the colonial 
adminiistration. In textile manufacturing, however ,  these causes were appa­
rently subordinate to the workings of international trade. 
By the 19th century wl-e n Manila was formally opened to world trade , an 
absolute cost difference in textile manufacturing was prob.able because of 
the Philippine 's  specialization in plantation crops and the increasing pro­
ductivity of the organized textile industry in Europe. By the time of the 
first Spanish import statistics available (1894) , textiles were being im­
ported in large quantities,
5 
and no marked increases are apparent in the 
American import records of the 20th century. 
2 .David Bernstein , The Philippine Story (New York: Farrar , Straus ,  1947i, ) 
P• 31.
3william L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: S .  P .  Dutton & Co. , 
Inc. , 1959) , PP• 32-45. 
4Jaime V. Alverez, ''The Philippine Textile Industry" (unpublished Master 's  
thesis , School of Business , University of the Philippines ,  1953) , p .  13.
51894 imports, 33% of total imports , came principally from Spain and the
U.K. Murat Halstead , The StoEt of the Philippines (Chicago: Our Possessions 
a
Publishing Co. , 1898) , P•  105. 
;,�·-·� ·. 
, .. , ,. : : �< '. 
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By the time of the American.dperiod, more accurate custans data verified 
the high dependence upon textil.e . imports •. Per capita imports of c.otton 
cloth, 6.5 square yards, . in 1912 are only slightly below the currentd. esti• 
. . 
mates of total consumption of 7 .3 yards.
6 
In spite of· ·its minor· contribu-
tion to national textile requirements, cqt�age industry actiyity continued 
' . 7
to be prevalent. The 1903 Census listed· 569,906 "spinners and weavers". 
Most agricultural jobs have extende,d interva.ls of. inactivity and 40% of 
haveFilipino workers and farnedrs are estimated. secondary occupations, 
, . ,  . . .  
Butd.dthe crude spindles and 
· to ·d
. . 
in the household unit. 
8
generally performed 
looms had low .productivity and were frequ�ntlyd· idle;·· ·1n a survey of Ilocos·d. 
. . , ' . ' 9.Sur during the American period, two .thirds of t�� 19oms �e•re inactive_. 
There we're secondary �audi:;es of the decline ;n o:ottage' industry prodµction. . . ·d.. 
. . . 
.·duringd· ·the American period, but the nia.jor shift hadd. occurred in prior 
centuries.lo 
.6The data. on i.mports . in Table 1 · indicate over 65
.d
million square yards 
of cotton cloth imports i,;i 19'12, when population was below 10 million. 
See page for current .consump�ion estilll$tes •d. Fu�hermore,  not over 15 
million square yards of cotton clothd'could have· been prod11eed locally in 
1912 , given .. the avail,able sources. of raw �otton and yarn, . thus confirming 
the relative decline of the cottage industry· sector. The assumptions for 
the calculation ofd. cottage indudstry .•prod�ction in 1912 are as follows : . ·
·32 8,000 kilos of raw 'cotton weredimported. and ari estimated 150,000 ·kilos 
of raw eo,tton were , .grown· .1ocally, one kilo of cot,�on can be spun into only ..· ·. 8  of a kilo of yarn becausedof · shrinkage and wastage, 1., 789,000 kilos of 
.yarn were imported, . 80% of to,tal yarn supply ��� .d. utilized for weaving pur• 
· poses, and one kilo of yarn can be woven i.nto ., 8 . 8 : square yards of cloth. 
7Hamilton . M. Wright, A Jlandbook of the ·Philippines (Chicago: A. C. · 
I . ·
- ·. . 
· •
.. .McClurgd. and Co., 1999), p. 388. · 
:




. : 9; Alverez, p .. : ' : .··.
lOcheap Japanese textit�_�:;����t� ,i� · tl;te thirties .caused a fall ind. 
Ilocano cotton cultivation and wea'Cling. Area Handbook; p. 1 702d. There is 
a purported relationship between the decline of Ilocano textile production 
and the cultivation of tobacco in this region which is difficult tod. date. 
And.dearly Americand.WJ:'.iter reportedd·dthat_dIlocanod.cotton production had· de• 
clined because the Spanish authoriti.es preferred tod·�ve the natives growd · 
(continued on p. 24) 
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The sectors of the cottage industry which have survived to the present 
are geographically localized and concentrated upon the production of spe• 
cialized articles such as mosquito netting or blankets or terry cloth. 
Domestic production of standard cotton fabrics resembling the machine-made 
cloth is very smallo. Modern cottage industry suffers from special problems 
such as the high price of yarn, the narrowness of the cloth, inferior dyes, 
monotonous designs, the mysterious fall in local cotton production, and low 
earnings compared to agriculture. Marketing is principally done in the re­
gional areas of pro�uction, but there is some inefficient peddling of wares 
in other provinces; in eitrer case middlemen raise prices to levels which 
are frequently noncompetitive.o11 
After 1946 the new republic recognized the dollar-saving and labor• 
intensive potential of natiove weaving and attempted to encourage home 
industry in a number of ways, including the National Development Company 's  
(NDC) spinning mill in Ilocos Sur, designed to provide low cost yarn for 
domestic weavers.o12 The NDC established a training school for cottage 
textile workers and in 1952 a more efficient loom for home use was intro­
duced, although few could afford the P 100 purchase price. In spite of 
this interest, there are no records or available estimates of production 
and no way of gauging the success of cottage industry, except by varied 
10 (continued from p. 23) 
tobacco but as late as 1958 the NDC partially attributed its low yarn sales 
to a shift of Ilocano weavers into tobacco growing •o.Dean C. Worcester, The 
Philippine Island and Their People (New York: The Maanillan Company� 1899), 
p. 505, and National Development Comp�ny, Annual Report of the General 
Manager for ,the Fiscal Year Ended June 301 1959 (Manila), p. 33. · 
11o·Alvarez, p .  38. 
12A U . N. expert advocated the expansion of home weaving as preparation 
for factory textile jobs; none of the textile mill managers have favored 
such a practice. Lysbeth Wallace, Hand-weaving in the Philippines ( New York: 
I
United Nations Technical Assistance Program, 1953), p. 3 .  





under P 100 for their work. 
statistics showing that the number of cottage industry workers continues 
. 
. 13to be significanti. The 1939 Censµs list�d 91,299 in : weaving, and a post-
war survey indicated ·ithat 44,000 housepolds wer� engaged in some domestic 
produ�tion of fabrics ·or·: wearing apparel ,  with 58% ofi; the· families grossing 
. . 
.
- ·-. United N;ations But a technician reported the . :
, . . . 
.existence of only al;>ou� 4,000 wooden·· looqis · in' - the I locos region and · about 
. : . 15
locatedi· tp.e weaving �£ other14,00.. o looms �lsewhere for fibers.. In addi-:- · .. . 
.
tion to the· home production there a numberi, of small
mills which .. use . the -non�automatic , nativei: ·�equipment'• � · in 1955 · there were 13 
.. 
such enterprisesi· with from 5 to 10 ·workers, 7· . w�th· 11 · to 20 andi· 3 with 21 . . ' . . . 
to 50, although some . of . these groups ·were engaged ini_ipr9ducing textiles 
· other than cotton. 16 
Although there is some idealized nostalgia fori. the . vanished s_tate of 
village self suffi�iency, there· ,is n9 idec,logical coaanltment to . cottage. . 
industry, as therei. is . in India. More cocu•non is ·ithe ·contrary belief that 
cottage industry prod�ction of text.iles is an �ch�onism• in t-he . modern·i
Philippines. · 
Imports and the Creatf:c;,n of a Marlcet 
·Table 1 traces th! imports of •  cotton textilesi. into. the Philippines 
from early in the American period until 1959 and ,hows textiles '  signifi• 
,-
cant position in the tx> tal import pattern; the :- dollar value of cotton 
1�Area Handbook,i. p.i· 1603. 
_ 
14Philippine Statistical Survey ofi. Households ,i. !'Demographic and Socio­
Economic Data, "  No. 2 ,  Vol. l (�nila: Bureau of Census and Statistics , 
May, �956)i, pp� 20�26. 
·1-5wallace , PP• 
. 
4�17. 
, spinning - and weaving are·: _i_
.· 1QDi'rectory of Key Establishments- in;-· the Philippines. in Selected Non­
Agricultural Industri·ep·• . .!·(Manila:i.' Departnient.' ·of:: Labor , ·=_1956) , p.  67. 





TABLE 1 ( l) 
IMPORTS OF TEXTILES INTO THE PHILIPPINES 










Cotton and Manufactures 








Thread (Kgs. )  










264Garments 1 , 183 
· .1,967 17,738 8 Knitted Fabrics & Others 
9 Total : Cotton Textiles 85,651 97,643 
10 Rayon and Synthetics 15,266 11,714 
11 Jute and Other Fibers 6,465 6,798
12 Flax and Linen 3,380 2,307
13 Wool and Others 21,020 27,937
14 Total : All Textiles 137,782 146,400







1 Cotton and Manufactures 
2 . Raw Cotton (Kgs.) 3, 493 
1, 605 3 
2, 688 
916 742 1,913o.Yarn (Kgs.) 
4 Thread (Kgs.) 
Cloth (Sq. Yds.) 
6,975





Gatne11ts 4,427 10,3167 
8 
9 
Knitted Fabrics & Others 13,274 28,469
Total : Cotton Textiles 74,476 137, 221 
10 Rayon and Synthetics 32,053 105,069
.11 Jute and Other Fibers 11,202 13,715
12 Flax and Linen 462 696 
13 Wool and Others 1,908 51674
14 Total : All Textiles 120,102 262,376
15 Total Imports : All Products 712,359 1,136,409 
1930 1925 
p p
1 Cotton and Manufactures Qty . Value Qty. Value
2 Raw Cotton (Kgs.) 18 6 n.a.  n. a .  
3 Yarn (Kgs.) 1,240 1,428 1,340 2 ,455 
4 Cloth (Sq•. Yds. )  84,009 23,289 n.a.  40,298
5 All Others 12,303 n. a .  
6 Total: Cotton Textiles 37,026 55, 196 
7 All Other Textiles and Fibers n.a.  132067 
8 Total : All Textiles 68,263
9 Total : Imports: All Products 246, 186 239,466 
(l) Data for 1959•1940 from records of the Bureau of Census and Statistics 
and for 1933-1912 from the reports of the I�sular Collector of Customs. Miss­










1,019,215 903,271 852,224 
1946 1940 1935 
· 1956 1954 1952 
,.. :e p p" ' ·•
Qty. Value Qty. Value Qty. Value
4,834 7, 162 1,357 2,251 l,34� ·2,213
5,702 16,414 4,266 14,055 1,861 6, 554 
618 3,614 · nc, a. 4, 768 ' n .a .  3,850
















n .a .  
pp p 
Value ValueQty.
1 , 132 454 44 
Value 
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23,227 n .a .  
6a532 11177 91461 
94,476 34, 139 30,509
29,649 8,620
4,461 5,292 n .a .  
228 768 
·31351 · 21864 
132,166 51,684
591,716 269,462 171, 048 








1, 789 912 
65,047 5, 790 
1,477 4,197 1,374 1,161












n .a.  
123,336 
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textiles ranged from 24%· of all imports in 1915 to 13% in 1940, by which 
time the NDC mill was in production. Imports of such magnitude can play 
a significant role in inducing industrial development, as Professor 
pointed out : 
--
Limport§_/ provide the safest, most incontrovertible 
proof that the market is there. Moreover, they condition
the cons•nne� to the product, breaking down his initial 
resistance. Imports thus reconnoiter and map out the 
country's demand; they remove uncertainty and reduce sell• 
ing costs at the �ame tirne, thereby bringing perciptibly 
closer the point at which domestic production can economic­
ally be started.i17 
The early American residents in Manila recognized these possibili­
ties. "One has but to glance at the imports to realize the opportunities 
--
for Ltextil�/ factories,i" reported one observer who argued that locally 
manufactured textiles could be used to "clothe the people of the Philip• 
pines and the millions of poorer folk of British India a�d the teeming 
islands of Oceania. 1118 But although the physical "domestic producti on 
threshold" must have been passed by the turn of the century, factory 
manufacturing did not begin until the late thirties and private enterprise 
remained uninterested until almost fifteen years later. One· of the tasks 
of this study is to evaluate why· the response to theiimport catalyst was .
so delayed when unemployed resources of labor and capital existed in the 
country. 
Some general and preliminary reasons for the indifferent attitude of 
the three principal partic�pants -� Filipinos, Americans ·iand Chinese -­
toward textile manufacturing may be presented at this point. The tradi­
tional value system channeled Filipino wealth into land ownership and 
conspicuous consumption rather than industrial activity. Private American 
. 17Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New 
Haven : Yale University Press, 1960), p. 121. 
18wright, PP• 255, 261 . 
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entrepreneurs were motivated byd.dfree trade with the United States to 
specialize in production areas in which the P.hilippines enjoyed a definite 
comp4rative advantage. Although the soui:-ce �f textile imports shifted 
. . . 
£�om Europe to th� United States after t� islands became an American ter­.
ritory, there is no evidence ·dof American pr�ssure at home to discourage. . .. 
Philippine textile production �n order to retain .a market. The resilient 
Chinese developed and controlled the apparatus ford. marketing textiles in 
spite ofd. the harshne· ss of • intermittent persecution� The logic of compara-. .. .._ . . ' 
tive cost, c01:1pled with free Amex:ican trade, must have influenced them, 
as well as the historical preference o� the Chinese in the Philippines for 
the flexibility of trade as opposed to the precarious long term commitment 
of industry. 
If the Chinese did not push into manufacturing, they did create the 
marketing structure for the distribution of textiles and over the decades, 
and perhaps centuries, they helped create a taste .and demand for foreign 
fabrics. But the .Chinese marketing system. is inefficient and the costs of 
. . .
distributioq are high.d1;1.ccording to Western standards. Textile imports 
come almost exclusively through the port of Manila to the hundreds of 
·foreign wholesalers there, principally Chinese; .they then se1 1 dto provin• 
., �. ·• . ' l, . .  , _  ... . . , ' . . . . 
cial middlemen who job good$ to the small �toresd. or tiendas in the towns 
or barrios. Textiles are sold at regular markets and hacienda stores, as 
. . . 19well as by itinerant peddlers who erect little . booths at fiestas. The 
retail outlets for textiles are marked by their abundance and slow turnover 
of inventory; a 1939 survey indicated 161·,598 r�tail units selling te�tiles, 
. . 
among other things,d. with 513,900 employees .d. and gross receipts per employee 
19Bureau of Census and Statistics, Yearbook of Philippine Statistics, 
1946 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1947), p. · 316. 
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of under P 1,600. The numerous middlemen, high transportation costs, ex-
pensive fees and licenses all mean that textile distribution requires a 
large amount of energy and funds, a phenomenon quite typical of under• 
developed countries. While imports have delineated the demand as Hirschman 
suggests, they have not forced a modernization of the distributive 
mechanism. 
This section will be concluded with estimates of the extent of the 
potential market which textile imports created and an evaluation of the 
size and character of a domestic textile industry necessary to satisfy 
this demand. In 1949, the year prior to the introduction of exchange con­
trol but near the close of the period of wartime rehabilitation, the average 
21per capita consumption of textiles is estimated at 7. 3 square yards. This 
appears reasonable in relation to the per capita cotton textile consumption 
20ibid. 
21cotton available for spinning: 
894,000 - kilos imported
1212600 - kilos grown locally, (NEC, unpublished data) 
1,015,600 - kilos of cotton available for spinning
2031120 - 20% waste and shrinkage in spinning
812,480 - kilos of yarn produced locally 
Yards of cloth produced locally (square yards): 
812,480 - kilos of yam spun locally 
7601000 _  kilos of cotton yarn imported 
1,572,480 - total kilos of yarn available 
'3141496 • 20% for knitting and other purposes 
1, 257,9a4 - kilos of yarn for weaving 
x 8.8 - estimated cloth production per kilo 
11, 070;259 • estimated square yards produced 
Cotton cloth consumption in square yards (1949): 
133,000,000 • cotton cloth imports 
1110703000 - cotton cloth produced locally 
144,070,000 - total cloth consumed 
Cotton cloth consumption per capita in square yards (1949): 
19,234,000 • 1948 population (Bureau of Census) 
577,000 - estimated 1949 population increase 
7.3 square yards• per capita consumption 
(144,070,000 + 19,811,000) 
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in 1950 of 5.2 yards for Asia asoa whole22 and highe·r , - figures for such . .o
countries as .Taiwan (10 · �quare yards), Japan (16 square yards), and the 
· 23 · ·United States (50 square yards). Ass�ing thato- the Philippines can 
absorb 8 square . yards of machine made cotton fabric per capita and �sing
. . . 
the estimates in the footnote below, a cotton textile industry of approxi• 
mately 8 ,500 automatic looms and 394,000 spindles would satisfy domestic 
requirements i� 1960.
24 
The remainder ofo-this study �ill be devoted to an 
. . 
analysis of how this ._ industry has developed in the Philippines. 
History of the Public Textile Mills 
The National Dev�lopment Company, t�e government's principal in• 
strumentality for participation in business, created ambivalent reactions 
among the American officials when it was established in 1919, because they 
.· 
were uneasy about the advocacy of public enterprise. In the Commonwealth 
. .
Period, however, t�e prospects of polttical �d economic independence 
22united NatiQns Depaxtment of Economic Affairs, A Study of Trade 
Between Asia and Eufope (New York: United Nations, November, 195'3), 
quoted _in a privateo·goverornent report.o· 
23sidney L. Buffi� ton, ''First Quarter.ly Report to the Industrial De­
velopment Center and the United States Operation Mi�sion to the Philippines, "  
Develo ent of the Te le ndust in the Phili ines (Mimeographed·, March, 
1957 , P•  14. 
24Total cotton cloth consumption (1960): .
27 ,500 ,000 • estimated 1960 population (Bureau of Census)
�-._... x�8 - per capita cloth consumption (square yards) ....
220 ,000 ,000 • total cloth conSUtnption (square yards) 
Loom requirements: 
26,000 � es�imated yards of output per loom year 
8 ,500 - looms (220 million + 26,_000)
Spindle requirements: 
220, 00Q,OOO • total cioth rewirements (square yards) 
55, 000 ,000 • total cloth requirements in pounds 
14,000, 000 - estimated yarn requirements for knitting and 
other purposes (lbs.) (20%)
69,000 ,000 '• total ya� requirements (lbs.)  
175 lbs. • estimated ·output per spindie_ year
394,000 - spindles (69 million f 175) 
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prompted reevaluation of the NDC _by Filipinos, who strengthened and re­
organized it in 1936. Although authorized to engage "in cnOMo.arcial, 
industrial, mining,  agricultural and other industries which may be 
necessary to the economic development of the country, "  Filipinos do not 
consider the NDC inconsistent with their fundamental dedication to a free 
enterprise society. The prevalent philosophy of its function is well 
stated by a former Economic Coordinator, responsible for the NOC and other 
govE:rum�ntal entities: 
The corporations am pTfmarily designated as initial 
stimuli in vital sectors of the economy where private capital
is incapable, ·dunwilling or hesitant to venture. They are not 
intended to compete. with private business or to engage directly
in enterpr�ses that ordinarily can well be le·ft in the hands of 
private capital, except in c�ses involving the public interest 
for the protection of the masses. 
The new Administration is pledged to adhere closely to 
this policy, to turn ove-r to private operators,  either on sale 
or lease basis, such govE:raaa»e11t enterprises as they ·dcan handle 
and to leave to private investor·s · new investment fields in 
which they are interested • • • •  The economic rehabilitation and 
development of our country is a herculean taskd: which re�ires 
the joint effort of both public and private enterprise •'. 
The NDC acts as a holding company administering gover1™nt investments 
in ventures which satisfy the above objectives. One of the first acts of 
the reorganized company was to establish a cooaoj ttee to study the textile 
industry , and it recooaoended the construed. on of a textile mill for a 
variety of reasons. The first and perhaps principal reason was to supply 
home·dweavers with yarn at a low price to sustain them in the face of the 
inexpensive imports from Japan and China. Although the dependence on 
foreign textiles had been created earlie r and imports were not rising sig• 
nificantly in voJ,m,ed, there was a shift in the origin of textiles from the 
25Administrator of Economic Coordination, Annual Report of .the Office 
of Economic Coordination for thed'dFiscal Year Ended June 301 1956 (Ma�ila), 
PP• 3 -4. 
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United States to Japan an� a significant reduction in per unit import value. 
26 
. .
A 'secondary and complementary reason for the advocacy of a textile factory 
was to reduce unemployment, both by furnishing factory jobs and maintaining 
the cottage workersi. Unemployment, however,· was-not viewed 'in t·his period,i· 
as it is now, as _ one of the country's principal economic problems, for it 
. .. 
was not long before that American officials were debating bringing in -
Chinese laborers to augment the local work forceio . Thirdly,. a textile mill 
was recommended to help meet the loc·al demand for cotton goods . Although 
running an export surplus in its balance-of payments, the country antici• 
pated increasing difficulty in the American market after independence •. 
Rat-her than concentrate on imp.roving the competitiveness of its cash crops 
for the world market, the government was urged to pioneer in the production 
of good-s required for the population ' s  basic needs -- food, clothing, 
shelter. The textile industry was an o¥y:;lous selection for attention, · 
.becauseiits conspicuous place on the import sheet not only verified the 
·extensive market but · substantiated its exchange saving potentiali• ._ A more 
general function envisioned for the public-textile mill was that of train­
ing a skilled labor force and promoting private investment by its successful 
. . 
leadership in industrial enterprise.i· Finally, nationalistic objectives 
have continuously been involved with thei·NDC textile operation. One of the 
initi·al motivations was t:o curb the inroads o-f Ja.panese textile imports and _i
manufacturing. ·A 1931 boycott by thei.Chinese merchants of Japanese textiles 
prompted the Japanese to establish their own retail outlets, 27 but Japanese 
�6Japanese textile imports rose £ran 21% of the peso value of American 
imports in 1929 to equality in 1931, when they constituted 146% of the 
physical volume of American textil� shipments to the Philippines .  C .  B .
Hansom, Trade Conditi0ns in the Phllippine Islands (London: H. M .  Stationery
Office, 1933), p. 17. 
27sansom, p .  17. 
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experience in China indicated that foreign manufacturing was the only 
assured means of retaining a foreign market. 
28 
Consequently, they opened 
a textile mill using imported yarn in 1938, and the Filipinos were afraid 
that Japanization of manufacturing would spread. 
29 
A public mill was not designed to compete with handmade cloth, but to 
supplement the cottage industry by supplying it with yard and producing 
staple fabrics, competitive with the imports of machine-made goods from 
abroad. 
30 
The proposal was accepted and a mill was constructed in Manila in 1939. 
Ten thousand spindles and 104 mechanical looms were installed, but this was 
increased in 1941 to 20,000 spindles, 500 looms, and a finishing plant with 
an annual capacity of approximately seven million yards. 
31 
Ironically, the 
early distribution was in alien hands and the yarn not needed for NDC looms 
was sold to two Japanese weaving mills. 
32 
In 1941, 422,455 pounds of yarn 
were produced in comparison with national requirements of 32 million pounds 
of yarn for weaving purposes. Production was low during the Japanese occu­
pation and well into the pa; tward period. Operations in 1946 were at 25% 
28Fessenden s .  Blanchard discusses this in his The Textile Industries
of China and Japan (New York: Textile Research Institute, Inc. , 1944)i. 
29Jack Shepherd, Industry in Southeast Asia (New York: Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1941), _ p .  177. A more recent example of the Nl>C ' s  in­
volvement in the promotion of nationalistic objectives was the report that 
the public National Marketing Corporation had empowered the NDC to use its 
own tax exemption privilege to import unprocessed cloth to break the alien 
hold of tektile production. Manila Chronicle, June 22, 1958i. 
JOibid. , p. 116. 
31Francisco R. Lopez, ''Textile Industry," Chemistry in the Philippines, 
ed. Amando Clements (Manila : Benipayo Press, 1954) , p. 272. 
32Bituin c .  Masanga, "Prospects for the Philippine Textile Indus try" 
(unpublished Master 's thesms, School of Busire ss, University of the
Philippines, 1951), p .  9 .  
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prewar capacity ando·as late as 1948 only 18,000 spindl.es were operative. 
During the occupation, 17,000 used Japanese spindles were imported 
into the Philippines for use in the NDC plant, and after the war the NDC 
. .
purchased them from the United �tates Enemy Property Custodian for the 
34
nominal sum of one.·dollar. In spite of C{Uestions whether .. this equipment · 
was econo.mically salvagable, 
. 
it became·othe nucleus of a NDC Spinning Mill . 
established in 1949· in ·:11ecos Sur, an important home weaving .area and the 
provincial home of President Quirino.· Production started at the llocos 
T�xtile Mills (ITM) in 1952, and by 1954 1,781 thousand pounds of yarn were 
being produced at the two mills; national requirements were approximately 
41 million pounds. 
T.he neto·oworth of the NDC's total investment in, textiles at this time 
. . 
was P 10. 7 million and factory employees nUJllbered l.;670. The output of 
the mills was beingo_odistributed as follows: 40% to Manila wholesalers, 
31% to manufacturing firms, 14% to government bodies, 6% direct, .and only 
9% to cottage industry.35 
The purposes.for creating a public textile industry did not include 
profit making, but the mills are evaluated to a large extent by their 
•, 
achievements on the profit and loss statement. The NDC mills have several 
formal· advantageso·, ·• . tax exemption, a guaranteed market in government in­
strumentalities, and special import privileges. On the other hand, their 
profitability is impaired by their hig h wage structure , low productivity , 
antiquated plant, inflexible marketing, short work week, and inferior 
33Ibid. ,  pp. 10•13o 
34Lopez, Chemistry in the Philippines, po Z72. 
35Industrial Development Bran�h, Industrial. Philippines, a Cross 
Section� (Manila: Philippine Council for U �S. Ai<l, 1953), pp .. 6-9. . . . 
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quality product; these problems will be elaborated in subsequent chapters. 
�T.hese deficiencies were illuminated by contrast to the developing private 
sector which made it increasingly difficult for the NDC to operate its 
mills profitably. NOC - Manila has consistently operated in the black, 
. ' 
but 'iits 1958-59 net profit fell to P 160,000 from P 1.3 million two years 
earlier • .  ITM has operated at a deficit during four of the last six years 
and in 1959 had accumulated finished good inventory equivalent to seven 
months' sales. 
In 1958 the Cabinet approved the aale of the two textile mills 
through public 'bidding; it was announced that the objectives for the estab­
lishment of the mills had been attained and goverrwent participation was 
36no longer necessary. Disp9sal,·however , was delayed in order to modernize 
ITM and to consider alternative methods of handling the high_-wage mill em­
ployees. The sale was further deferred in 1959 to evalua�e a proposal that 
the employees purchase thei.Manila mill with their termination payments. 
Growth of the Private Manufacturing Sector 
Prior to the war, private factory textile production was of minor sig­
nificance. The principal operation, Philippine Cotton Mills, was established 
in 1906 and operated by a British firm until its transfer in 1929 to a 
wealthy Filipino family, t� Madrigals. About 300 employees operated the 
7,420 spindles and 320 looms of the mill;  its .ioutput of coarse yarns and 
twill was distributed by Chinese wholesalers. The mill is estimated to have 
returned a net profit on investment of 5%, the poorest earning branch of th� 
Madrigal interests, 
37  
so after some �artirpe damage a proposed joint venture 
. •. . ' . ' •,, 
36&nila Bulletin, April 24, 1958, p. 1. 
37Interviews with former management personnel;  most of the firm·•·s
records were destroyed during the war. 
37 
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with Japan to rehabilitate the mill was re"jected and the plant was scrapped. 
There were also the &mall Japanese weaving mills noted earlier,  as well as 
some manufacturers of industrial textileso 
Private textile manuf.ac�uring is essent
.
ially a po.stwar development, 
and it was related to the appearance i� the early 1950o8. s  of mills in two 
related �reas of pt:�uction •• knittingo_ and hosiery. After a single knit•. -
ting firm was est·ablished in 1950, s�ccessive years from 1951 to 1955 
·witnessed the growth -�f that industry from nine to·' -24 firms; by 1956 there . . ' .·., . •' . . 
,
were complaints that the knitting field was overcrowded. The textile 
manufacturing industry proper followed shortly thereafter, with a similar 
swarm of entrepreneUTs following an initial leader in classic Schumpetarian 
fashion� Table 2 ,  automatic spindles and looms installed in the Philippines , 
1954-1959 , indicates the rising number of significa�t private firms, 1 in 
1954, 4 in 1956, 9 in 1957, 13 in 1958, and 18 in 1959o. 
The path breaking success of tq.e initial entrepreneur in the knitting ·
and hosiery field, on the one hand , and textile manufacturing, on the other , 
enhanced_ the attractiveness of investment opportunities in each respective 
industry,  but the clusters of entrepreneurial activity are due largely . to 
the .external stimuli which will ·be analyzed in the two subsequent chapters. 
The principal s�imu-lus was · the implementation of import and exchange 
control in December,  1949 . The imposition of stringent controls is re• 
fleeted in the 38% reduction in total imports and 44%oreduction in cotton .
textile imports from 1949 to 1950, shown on Table 1. Controls encouraged 
the importers to investigate manufacturing possibilities for two reasons. 
Firstly, ao_ cont;rolled 11:1arket mea'Q.t p.rotecti_()n frOlll foreign .competition.. . . . 
381ndustrial Develo�nt Center, Report on the Philippine Textile 
I.p.dustr;y (Manila: Industrial Development Center, 1956); (Mimeograp�ed), 
p.:- 20. 
TABLE 2 
AUTOMATIC SPINDU:S AND LOOMS INSTAU,ED 
IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1954•1959(l) 
1959 1958 
Spindles Looms Spindles Looms
Mills partially or completely
· integrated as of 12-31•59 
with date of first operations 
1 (NDC - Manila, 1939) 20,000 503 20,000 503 
·2 (Nov. ,  1954) . 22,528 11,�08 
3 (Peb., 1956) 20,088 1,032 620
4 (Aprii, 1956) 19,040 600 19,040 600 
5 (Sept. ,  1956) 30,900 1,096 20,800 550
6 (April, 1957) 27,058 450 27,058 450
7 (.Jan. ,  1958) 10,000 500 10,000
8 (Nov.,  1958) 10,080 270 10,08� 180
9 (.Jan . �  1959) 10,000 300
Total 169,694 4, 751 117,986 2,903 
Unintegrated Spinning Mills 
or Divisions of Knitting, 
Thread, or Hosiery Mills 
with date of first operations 
10 . (NDC • ITM, 1951) 17,600 17,600 
11  (Feb., .  1957) 13,950 12,290
12· (May, 19 57) 12,240 10,080
13 (Nov., 1957) 10,220 10,080 
14 (March, 19 58) 20,830 20,160· -.
15 (Feb. ,  1959) 8, 192 
16 (April, 1959) 10,880
17 (Oct., 1959) 5,020
18 (not yet· ,operating) 10;000 
19 (not known) 5,760 5,760
Total 114,692 76, 110 
Unintegrated Weaving Mills 
20 (.Jan., 1957) (2) 1,040 202
21-28 Small Speciality Producers 314 195 
1,354 397 
GRAND TOTAL 284,386, 6,105 194,096 3,300 
.(l)Excludes 3 rayon mills with 16,856o- spiridles and 244 looms at the end 
of 1959. The table is based on compa.ny data. 
; 
C2>Authorized by the Central �ank to divide output between cotton (75%) 
and rayon (251) . 
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1954 195 7 1956 I 1955 
Spindles Looms Spindles Jems Spindles ·Looms Spindles Lomns 
. . 
. . 
20,000 503 20,000 503 20,000 503 20,000 503
ll·, 008 11, 008 11, 008 11, 008 
620 400
8, 960 600 8, 960 200
10,400 550 10,400 550
17, 024 140 
67,392 2,413 50,368 1,653 31 008 503 31,.008 503.· , . .. 








.117 , 582 2, 736 67,968 1,653 48,608 503 48, 608 503 
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which could-not be achieved with tariffs because of the 1948 Trade Agree­
ment with the United States. The rising domestic prices of imported 
products, moreover, enhanced the local marginal efficiency of capital in 
the manufacture of these goods; clothing prices, for example, rose 20 .4% 
in 1950 and 27.8% in 1951. 
39 
The maintenance of the prewar rate of ex-
change of the peso with the dollar made imported machinery and raw material 
relatively inexpensive and further enhanced manufacturing prospects. Sec­
ondly, the reduced volume of import business prompted merchants to explore 
new areas of profit making. The first factor Jerved as an inducement to 
attract potential entrepreneurs into industrial development, whereas this 
second consideration was moreid: a spur pushing the importers, especially 
the Chinese, out of their established sphere and into another. Legislation, 
illustrated by the section of the 1950 control act below, and administrative 
discretion were used to further the nationalization of trade : 
The Import Control Board shall reserve thirty per centum 
of the total import �ota for any article, goods or c01m11odi­
ties for the fiscal year 1950-51, forty per centum for the 
fiscal year 1952-53 in favor of bona fide new importers who 
did not import such items at any time during the years 1946, 
1947 and 1948. To qualify as a _ new importer, one must be a 
Filipino citize� or a juridical entity at least sixt40per
centum of whose stock isi-'iowned by Filipino citizens. 
Import coum�dities were classified under the various cqntrol acts 
according to essentiality, with categories ranging from essential producer 
items to non-essential con8lJJDer items, the latter items being subjected to 
the greatest import cuts. Although the uncertain renewal of each control 
act, the varying amounts of international reserve budgeted for imports, 
the reclassifications of import cODillodities, and the vagaries of the 
nationalization measures all created uncertainty in the business coooounity 
39central Bank, Statistical Bulletin, XI, (December, 1959), p. 210 .  
4C\>hilippines, Republic Act No. 426 (May 22, 1950),  sec. 14. 
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and increased the risks of manufacturing, backwardi_ integration afforded 
great potential for profits, both legitimate and illegitimate. By opening 
a manufacturing plant, the importer could shift his import requirements 
from finished goods to raw materials, a producer classificat:i on, and obtain 
larger exchange allocations, often on the basis of exaggerated declarations 
of plant c•pacity. Enormous windfall profits then accompanied dollar 
licenses because of the marked overvaluation of the peso and the high l�ve1 '
of doniestic. prices. 
The first reaction to this situation· in the textile field was in 
knitting and hosiery, as stated, where �,nne�ous Chinese importers set up 
knitting mills, relyi'llg on foreign yarn. Knitting was preferred to textile 
manufacturing because it was easier to enter, required less capital, in• 
volved a shorter installation period and fewer complications training 
41
workers and supervisors: · all · important factors, because of the desire 
to capture profits and return capital quickly during the uncertain duration 
, . 
of the legislated seller's market. The knitting industry was a stimulant 
to textile manufacturing because it demonstrated the profit potential of 
industry to the imp·orter group, and it created pressure for further back­
wa�d integration into the spinning of yarn for the knitting machines. 
Knitting production was curtailed in 1953 because of insufficient yarn 
.· · ·42 . .
imports; if dollars ceuld not be obtained for cotton yarn, there seemed 
greater possibility of obtaining them for raw cotton itself, as controls 
became increasingly viewed as a means of encouraging the nation' s  indus• 
trialization. 
The nationality and prior textile interests of the entrepreneursi; in 
41Buffington, ''First Quar;terly Report • • •  " .  p .  32. 
,
42Area Handbook, P•  1620. 
. 
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textile manufacturing are shown below: 
Date of First Textile Interests
Operations Classification
Nationality 43 
Prior to Manufacturing 
1954 Filipino None
1956 Chinese Importing, garments, 
knitting
1956 Chinese Importing
1956 Filipino Importing, knitting 
1957 Chinese Importing, knitting 
1957 Chinese Importing, knitting 
1957 Filipino None
1957 Chinese Importing, garments 
1957 Other Alien Importing
1958 Other Alien Thread manufacture 
1958 Filipino Importing, garments 
1958 Other Alien Importing
1958 Filipino Importing,· knitting
1959 Chinese Importing
1959 · Chinese Importing, hosiery 
1959 Chinese Importing, hosiery 
1959 Chinese Importing, hosiery 
1959 Chinese Importing 
The interesting exception to the general pattern is the Filipino 
entrepreneur who led the industry with his 1954 spinning mill, built to 
satisfy the growing �emand for knitting yarn. The follower� were princi­
pally Chinese, and they were involved in textile importing or the manufac­
ture of allied products in all instances save one. The fact that the date 
of organization preceded the date of first operations, noted above, by an 
average of two years shows how closely correlated the appearance of the 
industry was to the imposition of controls and the growth of the knitting 
and hosiery mills. 
An early imbalance developed in the industry with weaving capacity in� 
sufficient to bridge the manufacturing gap between spinning and finishing. 
43.rhis follows a nationality classification drawn upi- by- the National 
Economic Council which has been controversial because it is partially
1>ased upon the ancestry of the entrepreneurial groups rather than their · .
of the Chinese firms current citizenship status. In some cases the owners 
·





The vari0t1s yarn consumers, established earlier, encouraged the spinning 
sector. The construction of finishingo·oplants was motivated by the desire · .' 
to establish facilities with the greatest .-ci:l,spa.tch and minimum ·ocapital. 
The processing of grey cloth shif�ed inipert requirementso- into the producer 
classification, but · did not . . separate the �o�ter very far from the ·
familiar consumer market. The Cent�al Bank, .whic\1 by 1953 had assumed 
c01nplete charge of the administrati�n.of ; exch4nse •.and import control, 
authorized finishing mills if they constittited the first stage in the 
. . .
· ' 
· · 44establishment of a completely integratedopl�t. Because Filipino offi-·o
cials have encountered continuing difficultyo. ·oest.imating the capacity of 
' . 
the finishing mills, the entrepreneurs have often been able to exaggerate . . . 
their raw material and dollar requirements. The build•up of finishing 
capacity was 'rapid and well in excesso- of national re'lUirements by 1958. 
·With th� exceptiono·of r�cent spinning. production data, accurate 
aggregate statistics on the industry's  development are completely lacking 
in the Philippines·. The estimates below do iQ.dicate, however, the rapid 
growth of the industry. 
.o
Selected Statistics on Cotton Textile Production in the Philippoines45 
1959 1958 1957 1956 
No. of Workers Employed 
(average monthly -figure) 14,880 9,897 7,143 3,314 
·Production of.oYam 
'. (1,000 's of pounds) 49,429 26., 888 15, 128 4,700
Production of Grey Cloth) 
(l,000o1 s Qf square yards) 105,000 70,000 42,000 13,000 
4¼bese finishing mills have bee� labeled "la.undry plants" by critics 
who viewedo· their construction as a clever ine·chanism £Qr circumventing 
controlso 
. , 
4Syarn production for 1957-1959
. 
is from ·t�e :c:ecords of the Industrial 
Development Center; all pther figures are estimated on the basis of company 
data. 
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By the end of 1959, 284�386 sp.indles and 6,105 looms were installed 
and in operating condition in the Philippines -- 84% and 72% respectively 
of the est:frnated national requirements calculated earli•er. But the spin­
ning and weaving capacity in the process of construction and pending 
approval by the Central Bank exceeded the country' s needs; in less than 
six years the textile industry had evolved from a status of underdevelop• 
ment to potential over-capacity. 
The growth of the private manufacturing sector has been geographic­
ally concentrated completely in Manila and its environs, in the pattern 
of centralized Philippine industrial development in general. Some mills 
ar.e situated in semi-rural or rural settings outside of Manila because of 
less expensive land or the availability of a more unsophisticated labor • 
force, but all are within �ooauuting distance of the city. The reasons 
given for this localization of the industry are four. Firstly, the bulk 
of Philippine power is produced for Manila consumption and the rates there 
are substantially lower than anywhere else in the country, except near the 
Maria Christina hydroelectric plant in Mindanao, which otherwise . is not an 
attractive location. NDC officials estimate that the power cost for the 
ITM mill in Ilocos Sur averages eleven centavos per kilowat hour or roughly 
double their Manila cost. A random examination of the available operating 
statemeuts of private mills verified that the power cost was significant, 
running from . 5% to 3% of net sales. The costs of internal transportation 
within the Philippines are notoriously high, and the second and third 
reasons for the industry's concentration stem from a desire to minimize 
this expense. Manila locations·iwere selectedi·ibecause of their proximity 
to supply sources, for almC18 t all of the country 's  imports are funneled 
thrO\lgh Manila and much of its manufacturing is there alsoi. Since the 
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local supplies and, · as-there was no difficulty in attracting labor to 
Manila, supply considerations clearly fav�d this central location. As 
a third conside�ation, the market also w.as in Manila, both for the spin• 
ning mills which supplied the knitting trade a�d for the finishing plants , 
which converted grey cloth into finished fabrics and injec�ed them into 
the normal distribution channels ste�ing from Manila. The importers who 
integrated backwards into manufacturing were conditioned to a marketing 
structure ori_ginating in Manila and acconanodate� their operations to it. 
The fourth reason for a Manila location was the desirability of being 
near the governmental sources of power, and soine entrepreneurs stated 
that this r�quirement ·iovershadowed all the orthodox economic considEira-
tions. Because of the crucial .nature of 8overnment relations it was 
imperative for the entrepreneurs to have easy access to the Central Bank , 
Bureau of Customs , Department of Labor and other official bodies. A 
final , informal reason for the gr�wth of the industry in Manila was the 
fact that the entrepreneurs were there , generally found the primate city 
the most attractive place in which to live, and were conscious of no 
strong· reasons for locating elsewhere. The ITM management generally 
feels that its location is inferior to Manila and the possible labor 
force advantage of a provincial location has been largely mullified by 
the statutory minimum wage. 
Raw Materials 
Although large scale production of the highest quality cotton was 
reported as late as 19th century, 
46 
cotton cultivation declined , and by 
46Eufronio M. Alip, felitical and CultRral History of the Philippin�s 
(Manila: Alip and Brion Publications , Inc., 1949).9 p .  340 
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the American period the cottage industry was dependent upon cotton imports 
for its raw materials. Minor efforts by the CODDonwealth Government and 
the Japanese-sponsored republic to revive cotton cultivation
.d
produced dis• 
appointing results. But the modern textile industry has focused attention 
on the dollar-saving possibilities of domest-ic cotton production, and a 
host of programs for cotton cultivation appeared in the 19 50d1 s. Table 3 
measures the lack of their success. ror an industry which bases much of 
its public relations upon its dollar•sa�ing effect , this dependence upon 
imports, for the raw material which constitutes roughly half of its cost, 
is a glaring problem. 
Three private corporations and the NDC have been engaged in cotton 
development projects during the 19 50d1 s, all of which have been unsuccessful 
to varying degrees. Waves of optimism have been touched off on the basis 
of test crops. The 19 57 crop failure did not prevent an enthusiastic 
Filipinod·from predicting, ''The deep south could be turned into the nation's 
4 7
wardrobe if a little push were given to ;its budding cotton indusdtry.d" 
But even in 1958 and 19 59 ,  when production and yield impro,,ed, the Philip-
pine Cotton Development Corporation (PCDS)d, the primacy private firm , was 
suffering large deficits, and the balance sheet of the NDC's project 
listed accumulated losses of nearly one million pesos. 
The more successful harvests of 1958 and 19 59 seemed to confirm the 
faith that the Philippines had once been a fertile source of raw cotton, and 
responsibility for the lack of development became increasingly identified 
with the textile manufacturing industry. The industry trade association, the 
Textile Mills Association of the Philippines (TMAP)d, succeeded in delaying 
4 7victoriano G. Rivera, "Cotton -- The White Hope," Philippine Free 





STATISTICS ON COT.rON PRODUCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 
Production of Industrial Degree of Yield Pe1; 
Lint Cotton Industrial Self• Hectare
Year (Kilos) 
Requirements 
(Kilos) · (2) Sufficiency (3) (Kilos) 
1940 184,872 1,000,000 18. 5  118 
1946 83,500 2,029,000 4.1  119 
1947 71,933 2,829,000 3 . 5  86 
1948 98,267 2,029,000 4.8 98 
1949 121,600 2,029,000 6.0  106 
1950 125,000 2,029,000 6.2 104 
1951 127,000 2,029,000 6 .3  106 
1952 130,o700 3, 760,000 3 . 5  109 
1953 40,900 3, 760,000 1 . 1  82 
1954 63, 503 4,861,000 1.3 
1955 75, 133 4,861,000 1 . 5  29 
1956 43,967 · s, 151,ooo . 8  16 
1957 174,000 10,736,000 1 . 5  60 
1958 62S,700 17,394,000 3.6 215 
1959 656,o167 26,773,000 2.5 187 
(1) National Economic Counci1 (Unpublished data)� 
. 
Lint cotton has been 
estimated at one-third the recorded amo11nts of seeded cotton 
·production and yield is :ln terms of lint cotton. .
(2) Number of spindles x 100 kilos annual raw cotton requirements per 
spindle. This excludes cottage industry requirements. 
(3) Cotton production as a _oo/o of industrial �equirements. 
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legislation in 1959 which would have taxed the industry in order to subsidize 
local cotton production. But the Central Bank resumed the pressure and, in a 
letter to the TMAP, stated the requirement that the industry start growing 
cotton within six months. The TMAP responded with a resolution to adopt cotton 
development as a conmon industry project, and a number of its members made 
investments in the successor to the PCDC. 
Recent efforts to develop cotton have been thwarted by temporary reverses 
such as unexpected pest destructiion, poor seed selection, and extremely adverse 
weather conditions. While recent crops have demonstrated the feasibility of 
growing cotton, the low yields and hig h costs have prevented it from being 
economically practical. While the United States obtains about 300 kilos of 
lint cotton per hectare, estimates of pas sible yields in the Philippines 
ranged from 90 to 140 kilos prior to the 1958-59 performancei. Estimated pro­
duction costs range from P 260 to P 347 per hectare, although the NDC 's 1958-
59 cost was P 372 per h! ctare. Thirty-seven per cent of the NDC 's cost, its 
largest single component, was for insect control, a major obstacle to economical 
production. In 1959 the CIF import price of cotton was about P 1 . 35 per kilo. 
Assuming that the high yield of recent years can be sustained, say 200 kilos 
per hectare, production costs per hectare would have to be reduced to approxi­
mately P 270 in order to equalize the costs of the domestic ard imported cotton, 
ancl Philippine production costs are now believed to have risen consi derably 
higher than this figure. These low yields and high costs have discouraged the 
spread of cotton cultivation, because farmers found other crops more profitable 
in spite of the varied subsidies and assistance offered to them. 
The urgency of domestic cotton development has been minimized by the 
availability of surplus American cotton through United States Public Law 480 
and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954. From 1956 to 1959 the 
49 
Philippines was authorized to import $32.3  million of cotton in exchange 
for pesos, and the in4ustry relied �l.tJiost exclusively on this source. 
Central, Bank aut�orization of new producers made specific referen�es to the 
use of this dollar free source of raw materials. The dependence upon 
Public Law 480 cotton was an obvious exchange risk that the government as­
snrn.=td, and the precariou·s nature of .this · -,upply source was revealed in July 
of 19 59 when a· 25% tax was placed o� �oreign exchange. . .The µnited States 
insisted that theo· peso .oproceeds of cottono: sale.s be based on an exchange rate 
·of 2. 5 pesos to the dollar, ·the rate which in effect applied to coouoercial 
imports, rat'her than an allegedly discriminatory lower rate . This would be 
tantamount, according to Philippine offi¢ials, to a concession that the tax .
was a de _ofacto devaluation, which t11ey insisted it was noto. Surplus cotton 
., 
sales were discontinuedo,. and the Central Bank 'issued .dollar allocations to 
the industry for $1lomillion to import cotton in the last half of 1959. 
The stalemate finally ended in July, 1960• when the Philippines acceded to 
the �erican de1114ndso. The disruption of Public Law 480 cotton sales drama­
tically illuminated the industry 's lack of self sufficiency, and it was a 
major factor in focusing pressure upon the manufacturers to participate ino· 
or aid cotton cultivation. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Althoug h Filipinos CODDllonly agree on the preferability of private to 
public enterprise, this is not equivalent to an advocacy of laissez faire 
in the market. On the contrary, government intervention and encouragement 
are considered desirable becaus e of the industrial infancy of the nation. 
Free and potentially destructive competition is considered an extravagance 
which can be ill afforded. Consequently, gove11nnent is welcomed on the 
business scene not as a participant but as a regulator. 
1 
Industrial entrepreneurs in textile reflect a similar expectation 
toward the government and aversion to unbridled competition. Price decisions 
in a self regulating market are not viewed as binding standards for corporate 
behavior, but as pro12 r subjects for interference and improvement. The 
entrepreneurial and transitional Filipinos are politically active and subject 
to no ideological .restraints in their propensity to alter the economic 
environment for their own benefit. The result, according to one observer, is 
that "business is born, and flourishes or fails, not so much in the market 
place as in the halls of the legislature or in the administrative offices of 
the government. 112 
This attitude toward governmental activities, coupled with a widespread 
faith in the need for industrialization, has caused acceptance of the 
1Sixto K. Roxas brings these ideas out with great clarity in his 
article, ''Economic Ideologies and Theories in the Current Philippine Scene,i" 
Conment (First Quarter, 1958), p. 3-13. 
·2Thomas R. McHale, "An Econecological Approach to Economic Development" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Economy, Harvard
University, 1959), p. 217. 
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proposition that public stimuli and protection are desirable and should be 
awarded to any group providing proper j ustification. Industrialists, 
aggressively seeking positions sh�ltered from market pressures, often con­
sider such protectioni- a.ipre;ogative as well as a privilege� 
The principal govermnental stimu�us to the textile industry 's  develop• 
J,Dent is believed to have been the impositien of impo,;t controlsi· in 1950, 
which was early considered 
: 
a deliberate tool for achieving ind ustrial 
. ., 
development •. Contrci,ls not only isolated the Philippine market /for the 
. .
entrepreneur; but their administrati�n determined the precise direction and 
extent of ea_ch firm's business. Chapter v· will be devo�ed · to an analysis 
of this major a·rea of governmental activity. _  
Th;l.s chapter is focused upon. government tools for the enco.uragement 
. .
of industrial devel9pment whose effectiveness for various reasons has been 
subordinate to the control system. The .tax-exemption law which has greatly 
enhanced the ·itextile manufacturer •s·iprofits is considered superfluous and 
costly as an inducement for development. The lack _of _ tariff autonomy 
·caused byi. thei·Philipp_ines I trade agreement with the United States has re­
duced the significance of this economici
.
tool, but .the .itextile industry 's  
attitude toward tariffs reveals its expectation of governmental protection. 
'
Thirdly, this chapter considers the government ' s  role in national economic 
planning as being largely ineffectual in the textile industry, due to the 
rivalry ·ibetween different planning bodies and an absence of a cent-ral co ... 
ordinating or implementing agency. Finally, the value of the public textile 
mills as a stimulus to in:liustrial develo�nt is weighedi•without any clear 
conclusion whether their net effect has been positive or negativeo 
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2 .8% 
3 .7  
3 .7  
6 .6  
5.4 
The Tax Exemption Incentive 
The two most significant stimuli to the industrial growth of the 1950o1s 
have been the system of controls and the tax--exempt status accorded to firms 
which qualified as "new and necessary industries". The latter policy, 
although a powerful inducement, -. _did not become effective until combined with 
the push of declining and nationalized import licenses and a marked sellero's 
market. The first tax exemption act was passed in 1946 but the response to 
it was negligible until the decade of controls started in 1950. Thirteen 
firms were granted tax exemptions in 1950, 72 in 1951, 48 in 1952. A re-
vised tax exemption law was passed in 1953, which broadened the original act 
and extended the tax free period on a graduated scale to 10 years, and the 
number of qualifying firms jumped to 132 in 1954, 184 in 1955 and 211 in 1956.o3 
The regressive tax structure of the Philippines relies heavi ly upon a 
variety of indirect taxes levied upon business units. An analysis was made 
of a large, integrated textile manufacturer to assay the value of its tax­
exempt status. In 1958 the firm had a net profit of 18. 0% of sales and the 
4
estimated tax savings as a percentage of sales were as follows: 
Domestic Sales Tax 
Advance Sales Tax on Imported Materials 
Compensating Tax on Machinery Imports 
Tariffs and Duties 
Inccxne Tax 
Special Import Tax 12.9 
35. 11 
3Republic Acts No. 35 of Sept. 30, 1946. and No. 901 of June 20, 1953. 
L .  Alarcon Garde, "A Boon to Our Industries," 1957 Progress (Manila: 
Manila Times Publishing CowpAny, 1957), p .  93. 
lvrax savings calculations are based on the firm's actual data,.oalthough
·for tariffs and duties it was necessary to estimate the partially free,
· (continued) 
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As an example, this firm's  tax exemption freed it from the payment of
.
taxes 
t0talling over one third of its grossi- revenue and approximately. double itsi.·
net profit. This does not necessarily indicate that the - firm cwldi. not 
t 
have 9perated profitably ·without tax .. exemption fer much of thei• tax burden 
couid have been passed en in the form of higher pri·ces, but i't does. suggest 
. othe magnitude · ·f this inducement in the. e�trepreneut 's decision making ·
framet.1ork .-· : 
· ivery. ·principal firm listed en Table 2 in -(:hapter III, including the NDC, · 
. . ' . ' . 
has acquired tax exemption for some er all of its manufacturing operati. on:s. 
In evaluating this law in· relationi· te the textile industry, ·two ·iqu�sti·ens 
: '
arise: Has taxi·iexemption been a necessary ·cencomitanti·of controls, or would 
the telllPO and vo)1,me of� · text·ile growth in the fiftie·s have been the same with­
out it? In what -ways have the cenditiens attached to tax exemption affected 
the inaustry's characteristics and pattern of growth? 
. ·M9s·t observers ef the Philippine ecen�ic scene agree that tax exemptf.Clll . .
·was tio� sufficient to induce· the desired response of industrial investment 
. ,
without the aid of 'import controls. . Since· the beginning ofi· controls marks 
the acceleration of indteit.r�al grc,wth in many . fields· including textilesi,. 
there is disagreelJ,lent whether tax exemption was a necessary supplement to 
controls or functionally superfluous.i· Thei- question C$nnot be conclusively 
answered. Aggregate statistics, on the one hand, show impr.essive totals of 
investment. and employment in tax•exemp:t. -industries. Textile firms, . defined·
-.
to embrace a wider ·ran1e of fibers an� products th�n our ind\8 try. classifi-
cation, const-�tute an important -component of tax-exempt manufacturers'" In 
. ... . . . , , , . <'; ' ' ,• . . •'
'(cont Id) -. 
American portion of the imports and to estiimate certain �llowable deductions 
fr.�· gros� sales in calculating domestic sal�s taxo It s-hould be noted that .. ·13. 1% of the tax savings accTU�d from non•recurring imports of machim ry :.. I .and equipmenti. 
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June, 1959, tax-exempt textile firms numbered 65 and were responsible for 
22% of the earnings and 26o/. of the employment in tax•exempt industry.
5 
Others argue that tax exemptions have been an expensive pampering of 
artificial industries. In 1958 when the national deficit ran P 170 million, 
for instance, the amount of taxes waived equalled 17% of total goveitllllt!nt 
revenues. 
6 
Furthermore, to some extent, tax•exempt status has not been an 
objective per se, but a vehicle for obtaining preferential treatment at the 
Central Bank in its allocation of dollars. During the period studied, a 
screening coll4i1ittee made reconnnendations to the Secretary of Finance on 
applications for tax exemption and, although its members included represen­
tatives from the Central Bank and Department of Coll4i1erce and Industry, there 
was no policy coordination between the different govermnental entities. As 
a consequence a firm granted tax-exemption did not automatically receive 
foreign exchange to cover its import requirements. But the firms classified 
as "new and necessary" were frequently accorded dollar priority and they 
sought this status partially in order to fortify their bargaining positions 
at the Central Bank. A third reason for discounting the need for tax incen­
tives is the nature of the textile manufacturing operation itself. It is an 
industry with relatively few hazards because of its fixed technology, simple 
labor requirements , and established market. The sample calculaitions of a 
5Bureau of Census and Statistics. 
6Taxes waived in 1958 were P 125 million, Department of Finance records. 
National tax receipts in FY 1957-58 were 737 million, Central Bank of the 
Philippines, Tenth-Annual Report, 1958 (Manila: ·Bureau of Printing, 1959) , 
p. 87. 
7Benj amin Higgins argues this in his "Report to the Gover,nnent of the
Philippines, " United Nations Technicali.Assistance Administration, December
10 , 1957, pp. 38-39. (Mimeographed. ) 
.
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firm's estimated tax savings shown above, well in excess of net earnings, 
may raise th·e question whether textile manufacturing _would be profitable 
in the absence of tax preference. It is believed, however, that l"ittle of 
.the tax incidence wouldihave been upon thei.ifirm in this period ' s  market. 
If the samplei- firm had borne its poten�ial inccme tax liability, its net 
profit wouldi· still -have been 12. 6% oni· sales, . in-this •.case · 20 o 3% on stock• 
�oldersi' equity; sufficiet1tly high to.-render tax conce�sionsiredundantio· 
The entrepreneur contemplating possib_le·textile·_imanufact�:ring without tax ·, 
·preference· might. have anticipated the developmenti· of a buyer ' s  �r!.tet as 
the industry grew, but by such tirne his own heavy import taxes and duties 
would be substantially reduced. 
In their applications for tax exempt�on, firms were required to state 
the steps which they had already taken towards the establishment of the 
. .
industry in question. The answers to this question give an insight into 
the entrepreneurs • attitude toward tax incentive., pert:ificatesi_iof exe�p-­
tion were secured in the early stages of planning for textile manufactur• 
ing, an average of approximately two years prior to first operations, but 
in most cases dec.isions seem to have been reached prior to the determina• 
tion of tax status. In only two cases on file did the entrepreneur state 
that his plan for textile manufacturing was· contingent upon the ·application's 
approval. · The answers of mo·st connoted ·a determination, if not a conunitment, 
to manufacturing by the steps completed prior to the application , such as 
purchasing land, applying for loans, ·and negotiating for machinery. There 
unquestionably were marginal firms in the business, which in spite of the 
other encouragements would not have entered the industry in the absence of 
. \ 
this tax incentive, but it is believed· that such firms were in a minority 
and that this was an expensive way to induce them past the external margin 
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of production. 
In 1959 article� in scholarly and popular literature reflected spreading 
disillusoionment with the value of the tax ineentive compared to its cost. 
One of the criticisms of the "new and necessary industries" was that they were 
largely finishing and packaging operations with little value added. Although 
the textile industry was not cited as a� example, even as it became integrated 
it was still dependent upon imported cotton as its primary input. Then in 
June of 1959 the tax exemptiono·law was amended to reinstate the full income 
tax prior to the expiration of the original ten-year period. 
Regardless of the economic necessity for tax concessions, the administra­
tion of this incentive could have affected the industry's development pattern. 
The Secretary of F1uance has been able to stipulate conditions which the 
applicant firm has to follow in order to qualify initially and to retain its 
tax exempt status. If a firm violates such a condition it is required to re­
fund all the taxes from whic� it has been exempted; si�ce this retroactive 
imposition of taxes would place the entire incidence on the firm, it could 
serve as a powerful deterrent. The two conditions placed upon applicants in 
textile manufacturing have required the use of local raw materials whenever 
possible and have specified soa� aspects of the firms' integration programs. 
The implementation of these conditions are weakened by the absence of person­
nel to check on actual mill practice and t_he previously noted lack of coordi­
nation with other gove::r1¥-ne11t entities engaged in overlapping activities. 
The first condition concerning the use of local raw materials provides 
leverage to protect the dOUBstic producer of cotton, yarn and grey cloth, 
who can register complaints witho'the Department of Finance. This condition 
has not been frequently invoked, and its value has been hindered by lack of 
price and quality compdrability between the ·imported and domestic product. 
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. . . . . 
• 
• • 
The second condition for tax exemption has concerned the nature of the 
applicants' integration programs. The integration plans endorsed by the 
Department of Finance.idid not always coincide with those approved by the 
C�ntral Bank or the National Economic Council (NEC) . The principal problem, 
however, has been whether to grant tax exemption to f·inishing mills with 
their low con�ribut�oni. to national income. The ·first applications for 
finishing mills were rej ected, · but in 1956 the Secretary of Finance ap• 
,. .• . . . 
pr�ved su�h operations . if they were part o,f ai, fully �ntegrated plan to be 
completed withi� three year�. The Secretary 's  Screening Connnittee observed 
that .full and inn:,iediate integration was pref�rable, but, since finishing 
is th';! ·i1Efi:fst expensive and difficult of the three basic textile operations, 
• •i, , 
investment would be e�couraged by approving backward integration plans. 
In other respects, however, the tax exemption privileges has not been 
effectively used in the textile industry, judging by either its objectives 
.
:
or its potential. According to the tax exemption act, industries are to 
qu�lify only if their iq,ortedi.raw material requirements do not exceed 60% 
of cost, ·although exempt.ion. may be granted if it appears likely that such 
materials will eventually bec811le substantially available  as industrialiia-
tion progresses. The 60% require�ent was the reason for the initial 
refusal to sanction finishing mills� Thei·ireversal in policy reveals the 
. . 
scope of administrative discretion in awarding tax-free privileges. A 
. . . 
nece·ssary industry was defined as one with ''a reasonablie degree of perma-
nency" and tax exemption as , a ''form _of subsidy which, by reducing initial 
production cost, should as a rule enable the indusitry to survive on a 
. 9
cc;mipetit�ve basis . after the period of exemption . .. 
8Republic Act No. 901 (3) . ' .
9Department of Finance, "Regulation for Implementation of R.A. No. 901 
Authorization Tax Exemption to New and Necessary Industries,i" August 20, 
1953; Sec. 2.  
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Although the applicantso' estimated production costs were below the 
landed cost of foreign textiles, experienced analysis would have discerned 
the lack of reality in theseo- projections. Tax-exempt status could have been 
denied the textile industry because of its proQable continuing need for pro• 
tection. 
The tax exemption privilege was of such generous proportions that it 
could have been used more forcefully. In approving backward integration 
plans, the Secretary of Finance appeared to be following the industry pattern 
rather than establishing it. Tax concessions might have been a useful tool 
for coordinating the pJanning of the textile industry perfonned by different 
govern,oent groups but this was not attempted until. the industry was practic­
ally developed. In their application forms firms were required to state 
whether their profits would be reinvested in plant expansion, but this state• 
ment of intention was not made a condition of tax exemption or verified. 
In fine, it is difficult to agree with Professor Higgins �hat the 
10
Philippine tax incentive program actually retarded economic growth, but 
as far as the textile industry is concerned the system does appear to have 
been of·,.-limited . value in relation to its cost and potential. 
Tariff Protection 
From a development point of view, tariff protection has been superfluous 
because imports were effectively controlled through the allocation of foreign 
exchange for the duration of time covered by this analysis. Nevertheless, 
the industry has been anticipating the eventual elimination of economic con• 
trols and has consequently peen tariff conscious. The infant industry argu• 
ment for tariff protection is generally considered relevant to textile 
lOBenjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York: w. W. Norton & Co., 
Inc.o, 1959)o, p. 515. 
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manufacturing by those within and without the industry, with the exception 
of a vocal minority which feels that industrialization has . been too costly 
in terms of the neglecto·oof agriculture. Filipinos feel that production of 
soue sort is essential until the initial period of comparative .odisadvantage 
is overcome. Entrepremuu in. the industry appeared uniformly confident 
that such protection would be maintained; phrases such as "the government . .. 
will have to· take . care_ of -tJs" and '·'the eCl)Untry can't afford to ruin the 
. . ,
· ·industry!' represento. the owners •· attitud�o. And in addition to its economic 
value,·the industryo- does have a special political significance as one of 
. .
several showpieces of accelerated industrial devel�pment , which have been 
·publtcized in the nat�re ef an economic panac�a. "On the other hand, ·o de0 
centrol without the aeceasary safeguards wouldo· ruin infant industries,'' 
waned one text·lte executive, "and this weuld lead to inflation, specially 
to run•away inflation and run-away inflation might lead to radicalism."
11 
The belief that an industry collapse would have dire consequences but• 
) ! 
tresses the industry's own political power and creates pressure upon the 
goverument for continued protection. 
The admission is openly made that the industry �s net currently com• 
petitive on the world market and that it requires protection because of its 
high costs. In a letter to the chairman of the House Tariff Conwtlttee in 
1960, the president of the T.MAP estimated that the domestic production 
cost as a percentage of foreign producticm cost was 241% for yarn, 272% 
for grey, and -290% for finisohed cloth. This marked cost disparity is, 
however , often coupled with references to the protection afforded the 
Amer-ican textile· industry at a similar stage in its developmento F
.
ilipinos 
do not believe that the Philippines will ever be able to export textiles in 
11Manila Bulletin, April 4, 1960, po A. 
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competition with countries like Japan or India because of their supposedly 
lower labor costs, but they do believe that dcmestic costs will decline as 
they did in the United States. They feel that indefinite protection may be 
necessary because of the high internal wage levels, but this is considered 
an acceptable cost of self sufficiency in the basic field of clothing. 
The significance of the Tariff Act of 1909 , which was effective until 
1957, was minimized by the reciprocal free trade policy witho. the United 
States, and.the use of tariffs could not become an important economic tool 
until the duty free entry of Americ� goods was suspended. The 1946 United 
States•Philippine Trade Agreement provided for the gradual elimination of ·
reciprocal tariff preferences but, when it berame apparent the structural 
changes in the economy necessary for international viability were not 
materializing, a revised trade agreement was signed in 1955 which acceler­
ated the imposition of tariffs on American exports and delayed the:n on 
Filipino exports. During the.first period of the textile industry's 
development (1956-58)o, 25% of the Philippine tariff rate was applicable 
to American exports; this rate was scheduled to increase to 50% for 1959-61, 
75% for 1962-64, 90% for 1963•73, and 100'1 in _1974. Tariff protection, 
therefore, became a feasible tool for the protection of the textile in• 
..
dustry, although adjustme4ts were still necessary to offset the American 
preference. 
During 1954 and 1955 a newly created Tariff Cowwission studied the 
textile industry and its rec0t1+oended revisions of textile tariffs were in­
corporated in the new tariff code adopted in 1957. The stated goals of the 
new code includedo, preparing ·for the ultimat� ·eliminatiOn • of ·controls, pro­
tecting domestic industries,  and aiding the economic development program of 
. . .  
the country.o12 Although Professor. Golay 'S  ·· aDalysis indicates that the net 
·12Montano A. Te jam, "Implications of the New Tariff Code,o" Economic
Research Journal, 4 (December, 1957)o, p. 125. 
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' ' 
effect of the new code was a downwardi·revision of ta:riffs inconsistent 




· Philippine Tariffs. on Cot�on Textiles ·
· · (% range of !.!!'. valorp tariffs) \· . .  
c��ton '.l;e!J=�le ltr 1909 Tariff Act 1957.' Tariff Act 
-�w c,tton - none none 
. .
·Yarn 15-25% 35% 
Woven Ftbric.s · 2s-3'% 10-25% 
20-30% · 90-100% 
Knitted goGds · 20.30% 65-70% 
'•. . 
The tariff increSDents are clearly prot�·ctive but they do not app�ar 
. .
adequate toi- shelter the textile manufacturing •itdustry -- spinning, weaving 
. .
and finishi�g ••· in. case of decontrol, although abando�nt of the parity 










_argument largely on the existe�ce of high ·idomestic wage levels. 
. ';. 
Assuming a SOO% tariffi· increase on gre·y sheeting, t� NDC estimated that 
. . 
·its own production cest would still be 10.2% greater than the landed cost 
of American $bee.ting. 
The actual hike in the tariff ond.yarn shown above is offset by the 
s:u,rprising reducti� in the equally vulnei-able field of woven fabrics. 
Professor Golay suggests tha� the latter ean only be explainedi. as a sop 
to consurneri_opin�cm which was, in fact , meaningless because protection was 
14effected by import controls rather than tariff_s. The differential tariff 
. ' \. ·. . 
13Golay, PP•· 174-176. 
lL-:-:ibid. , p. 176.-
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treatment accorded the cotton textile items may be explicable in terms of 
private lobby groups. The garment and knitting industries, which received 
much more substantial protection than the textile manufacturing industry, 
were relatively advanced by the time of the Tariff COD1Dission's study. On 
the other hand, the only weaving and finishing mills in operation at the 
time belonged to the NDC, whose managers have not employed political pres• 
15sures in the same way as their counterparts in the private sector. The 
effect of the 1955 code upon textiles was to prepare the established 
branches for decontrol,  but not to erect a protective field for the still 
undeveloped textile manufacturing. 
By 1959 when the textile manufacturing industry had developed a united 
front for lobbying purposes., its association, the TMAP, began privately and 
publicly to call for higher tariffs. On April 25, 1960,  the Central Bank 
announced a program of gradual decontrQl, and· on the same day the TMAPd. dis-­
patched a letter to Congress urging that the ad valorem tariff on yarn be - .........,,._......,_ 
increased to 150%, on grey cloth to 175% plus six pesoB: per kilo, and on 
finished fabrics to 200% plus eight pesos per kilo. If the recommended 
tariffs on grey and finished cloth are converted to a cx, mpletely ad valorem 
basis, using the TMAP ' s  cost data, they equal 420% on grey and 440% on 
finished goods, the two fields where the integrated mills would be mos� in 
' : .I 
need of protection. Their estimated tariff requirements are based on the 
principle of equalizing the local production cost in the Philippines and the 
production cost in the foreign country, exclusive of the foreign manufacturer's 
profits and shipping costs. The TMAP thus goes farther than the NDC's 
. . . . .
earlier advocacy of a compensatory tariff io equalize the. local production 
15Filipinos generally believe that their public companie s have high 
costs in relation to private companies, and this may have caused a discount• 
ing of the NDC ' s  tariff recooanendation. 
63 
. . . . 
. ' . . \ . . . . . 
cost and the landed import costo The ·effective implementation of either 
principle wouldi. terminate tra4e, and the TMAP's proposal would give an 
absolute peso cost advantage to the industry. Subsequently in 1960, the 
Tariff Commission initiated hearings cjn the need for upward tariff revi• 
. .,.
si�ns to protect n�w industries and the President appointed a special 
. 
· lG"'"' t . . ons. 
Assuming that the textile industry reqQ.ir�s protection, tariffs. are 
co-amitt. • ee o .make· recommenda. t i  · · . . 
. ..
prefe;able to thei·system of control by means of ex«;:qanse licensing. In 
theory it. tnakes. little difference whether piotect::L on is afforded by. tariffs 
. . 
or import quotas, for tbe government ·ican auction off imp9rt licenses and 
obtain revenue� COJ•1tarable to the tariffs. From a practica� point of view,·
such an objective allocation process wGUld be difficult to implement in the 
personalized, political atmosphere of the Philippines. Tariffs w�ld pro• 
vide badly needed revenue to the government and alleviate the very serious 
problems of. graft and corruption shrouding the control mechanism. Tariffs 
could be expected to stabilize internal price levels and reduce business 
risk byi·el�inating : the varying gluts and shortages. created by often arbi­
trary and unbalanced graats of exchange. Continuing tariffs, if not com•• 
p�etely compensatory, would provide limited competition and a criterion of 
cost comparison, encouraging firms toi
.
inc�ease profits through greater 
productivity rather than through seeking ·special gover,nnent favors and 
. . . 
grants. The· danger of · course is that. the tarif,f might be so high or so · 
prolonged that. managerial and.itechnological improvements would be dis• 
1� u. s. Department of C01m1erce, Economic Developments in the Philip-. .
pines, 1960, World Trade Information Service : Part l;
U. S. Govexnment Printing Office, 1961) , P •  s·o 




National Planning for Textile Development 
The road to development in the Philippines has been paved with national 
economic programs and plans, often elaborate in detail, but consistently 
weak in implementatio n. The cotton textile manufacturing industry has 
regularly appeared as an important compo�nt of these plans. 
The first official postwar economic development program, known as the 
Beyster Plan and spanning the period 1947-1951, proposed the establishment 
of NDC's Ilocos mill and five additional, private spinning mills in units of 
50,000 spindles each. It predicted that "once the textile industry fjrinci-
pally spinning/ reaches peak production, the ample supply of textile materials 
at reasonable cost will no doubt make the mass production of finished textile 
products entirely feasible , providing, thereby, Tlurnerous secondary textile 
industries.o" 
18 
The Hibben Plan, covering 1948-1952, reported that management 
and labor deficiencies limited the Philippineso' ability to absorb textile 
capital, but its goal was two spi�ing and two weaving mills, estimated to 
. H0� ofonational requirements. The Rodriguez Po1an,raise production to 5 o·o .
1955-1959, proposed eight m w  spinning mills of 25,000 spindles each, with 
. 20
capital requirements of P 87 million or 7% of all proposed new industry. 
17E.g.  High tariffs are generally held responsible for the technological 
backwardness of cotton textile manufacturing in Mexico. Sanford A. Mosk,
Industrial Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1950), p. 127. · 
18National Development Company, Proposed Program for Industrial Rehabil• 
itation and Development of the Republic of the Philippines (Manila: Benipayo 
Press, 1947), p .  190. 
19Joint Philippine-American Finance Cormnlssion, Philippine Economic 
Development: a Technical Memorandum (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1955), 
PP• 19•20o. 
2�ational Economic Council, the Five-Ysar Development Program FY 1955-




This was followed by the Five-Year Economic and Social Plan ,' 1957-1961 of 
the National Ec9nomic
.
Council (me) , which i� its private investment 
. . · 
21
&dledule· listed P 96 million for cotton �loth production during the period_. 
-A revised plan, the �c• s  Three•Year Program of Econ'1D,ic and Social Develop• 
. . 
ment (1960-1962) , pre$cr.ibed .first priority iri the allocation of foreign 
exchange toi.itextile_ manufactvring and fiye ��her ind.ustries; its manufacc:a, 
tvring
. 
' ptari in�luded inv,.stment in c,t,t9.n teX,tile,s of P 74 inillion 1 esti ... 
. . 
··· · 22
ma_ted to yi�ld· 127 
.. 
million yards of add�t.io_i,.al fabi-ic·s by 1963-64r 
These plan-s, ho,wever, have been practically meaningle·ss to the textile .. 
industry.because ·they have not been translat�d from. paper to reality. When.
.. ,
the pl•nned figures began toi. coincide mo.re closely with reality, this was 
c.aused by £actors unrelated to the national 'planning process. 
From t� very beginning of the COID1nenwealth Per_iod, Filipinos have had 
an un\lsual coP.Jlitme�t to economic planning. There is no need to describe 
the background or the merits and weaknesses of. th:e kaleidoscope of economic 
.. . 
programs , f�r .c:urrent. l�terature perform.s :thi_s , se�vice well. Nevertheless, 
. 
. . ·  
some of the pr�ncipal reasons for the ineffectiveness of such planning may 
..
help to illuminate.iaspects of the economic environment in which the textile 
,.
industry has develop.ed. 
. ' 
First, the gover.,uoent sector is relatively small and so the sphere of 
direct public planning is necessarily r�stricted; private investment can be 
induced into desired patte�s only by pers�asion _an� incentives . Secondly, 
. .
21Natlonal Economic Counci 1 ,  The Five-Year Economic and Social D�vej.op•· 
ment Program for FY .1957-1961 (Manila:' 1957l,
1
appendix 3-03. 
' .  .
22ttational Econ8lllic Council, Three-Year Program of Economic and Social · 
Development (Manila: 1959) , pp. 78•93: 
23see espe�ially Golay, chapte_r ."KV ,  and R •is. -�ilne (ed.) , Planning 
for . · o ess the Adminis ntion of Ecenoinic Plamiin . · in the Phili . ines· 
nila: University of t�e Philippines, 1960 
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some ineffectiveness is attributable to basic deficiencies in certain of 
the plans, which have been i�consistent and unrealistic in relation to the 
capabilities of the country. 
But the basic problem is the confusion and conflict caused by the ab• 
sence of a central coordinating body with a means of implementatidon. The 
NEC is charged with the responsibility for fonnulating economic programs, 
but it has no authority for implementing them and has received very meager 
support from the President and the Congress. The political structure, with 
its weak parties and lack of discipline, makes planning more difficult than 
in most underdeveloped countries. "Not only is the Philippines a democracy, 
which means that slow persuasive methods must be used instead of quicker 
compulsive methods, it is also a democracy based on a system of checks andd· 
balances ( including the separation of powers), which seems to exalt opposi• 
24
tion and tends to defeat attempts at agreement and solidarity. " Many 
governn1ental instrumentalities are concerned with economic development 
policies. In this chapter, for inst.nee, it is.dshown how the Tariff Com•·d
mission, the NDC, and the Secretary of Finance all have power to affect 
patterns of industrial growth. The three principal govexrUDent instrumen­
talities in this respect, however, are the NEC, the Central Bank, and the 
A semi-autonomous department within the Central Bank 
determines private investment channels by its exchange allocation procedure, 
often on either a case•by•case basis or industry programs at variance with 
those of the NEC. The Budget Conmission's Five-Year Piseal Plan, the basis 
for government expenditures, has not been necessarily consistent with either 
the NECd1 s p-rogram or Central Bank practice. This dispersed responsibility 
has resulted in organizational rivalries and piecemeal planning which only 
2'-Milne, Planning for Progress • • •  , p. 185. 
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,:e-eeru:ly are being remedied. The textihl industry h.a:s been the objeet •! 
-a cont,:oversy between the NEC aad the Oe-ntral Bank, but :- at:f.rme .>the latter 
wielded effective ,power 1zy virtue of its e�chaage allocation. mechani• a 
dis.eussion of the dispute ia deferred until the next' chapt-e�. 
The most ��ect m le ef the government in the textidle induetX'f luJ,J ,, 
-,of oou1raei. been as an aotual participant witli its NOO mi1ls. Wbell the 1 9 58 
decision te sell the mills was' announced it was proclaimed that they had. 
pe.rfonned their funct1Ams and were no lODgeli �d. There is re•l uneer• 
taJJtty. haweve-r, concerning the extent te which they actually have fulfilied 
-the, :objectives stat� ill Chapter III. ·
The�e is little ev.bfeace that the pub1ic mills have performed the taak 
fn suatai:Dius. C'� cottage textile industry, for NDC prices are high and 
welat:iv:ely little ef its output goes to hane wet:lvers; home texti¼edmanu­
fact.uring -1.s probably centiauing to decline for reasons uarelated to.ithe 
. ., -- . 
1$C-. !he NDC mills have directly alleviated the country's unempleymenti· te 
only a negligible degree. They have assisted in meeting the demand for 
lo.cal cot-ton goods, but the i.r weaving and. spinning capacity was less than 
25lOt of 1959 requirements. The importanee of alien ewn.ership tn the· in• 
-«iustry indicates that the NDC •s  nationalistic objective� have net been 
realized. 
Nevertheless, the ciueetion which our current persp.ective elevates to 
, , 
gre&tut significance is whether the example and experi�nce of the public 
mills served as a-stimulus te private enterprise in the textile industry. 
251n 1959 the NDC had 37 , 600 spindles and 503 looms (Table 2, Chapter 
III) compared to nation.al requirements of 394,i008 spindles and 8,500 looms 
(Footnote 24, Chapter 111)i. 
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On the affirmative is the fact that NDC's managerial personnel has 
assumed important functions:· in the private firms. Of the 12 top managers 
of the original NDC • Manila mill:ialive in 1959, seven had key positions in 
private mills. The existence of this reservoir of Filipino textile managers, 
limited as it was, has certainly facilitated the establisihment of the pri• 
vate sector. The NDC's high wage structure discouraged the private firms 
from attempting to employ the experienced gover1une4t workers, although some 
specialized personnel was also obtained from this source. The private in• 
·dustry renders mixed judgnie.ct.t on the worth of NDC's vocational school for 
spinning and weaving training, although some firms have considered it of 
sufficient merjt to require attendance of prospective employees. In addition 
to these management and employment eff�cts, the govE:rnwent focused attention 
upon the feasibility of manufacturing textiles in the Philippines. 
The contrary argument is that no such demonstration was required for 
an industry with a simple technology and clearly defined market. The time 
lag between the first NDC operations and the growth of the private �ector 
'" 
indicates the weakness of the causality between them. More important than 
the NDC's  example was some means of protection from the competition of 
foreign imports, and it remained for import and exchange control to accom­
plish this. The NDC's example may even have been a negative one, for it 
illustrated the low profitability of operating in a relatively open market. 
Profit rates should not be considered as a criterion of the millsi' value, 
but their low level may have impaired NDC's ability to function as a stimulus. 
The organizational problemsi·ianct high costs of the mills presented a picture 
hardly instilling confidence in potential competitors. In 1953 an official 
report on the goverawEnt corporations pessimistically stated that, "The fact 
that the government is now engaged in this business has discouraged private 
69· 
enterprise fran investing and developing a local textile industry." 
26 
The private entrepreneurs generally report that they were affected 
neither positively nor negatively- by the existence and permirmance of the 
public mills. There would seem to have been some employment benefits de-
. . 
rived from the NDC mills but they have not been proportionate to their cost, 
and there is no reasGn bl> question the desirability of attempting to trans• 
fer - their - owners�ip to  private han�s. 
' . 
26office of E·conomic Co-ordination, Report on Governmenti. Corpora�ions 
in the OEC Group. June 15, 1954, PP• 3•4, cite'd · by Golay, P• 244. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CENTRAL BANK AND DOLLAR AI,.IDCATIONS 
The textile industry's development hasi;.,been marked by the related 
problems of unbalanced growth and underutilization of capacity. The Central 
Bank, throµgh its control of dollars for plants and raw materials ,  has to a 
large degree been responsible for these problems� Manufacturing facilities 
have all been imported and consequently contingent upon the Central Bank.'.s 
' 
authorization of the required exchange. The 
. 
opportunity which the Central 
Bank had to plan a balanced growth of the industry was delayed until 
development had progressed so far that optimum firm integration patterns 
were no longer feasible. When industry planning did cou1u.ence the industry 
be�ame more confused over the rivalry of the Central Bank and the NEC. 
Plant utilization has also been dependent upon Central Bank allocations for 
raw materials and protection; the fact that industry operations have been 
as low as 50o/o of capacity for extended periods is a measure of the gravity 
of this problem. This chapter is divided, therefore , into a section on the 
allocations for plant and equipment and a section on the allocations for raw 
materials.  It concludes with an evaluation of the significance of graft 
and corruption in the industry. 
Allocations for Plant and Equipment 
The growth of textile manufacturing has been rapid and forced, because 
of the artificially created seller's market and dependence upon goy�rrun�ntal 
authorization for foreign exchange . The Central Bank has been the principal 
external determinant of this growth's direction. Entrepreneurial decisions 
had to be cast to fit the pattern established by the gover,went or entrepre-
70 
• • • • 
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neurial·activity had .to be concentrated upono·al.tering the pattern, and both 
phenomena occurred. As a consequence, the integration method which was 
endorsed does not coincide - necessarily with. those evolved more gradually in . . . . . . .. 
other countries. In Japan,o: China, .and Russi.a it t.ook several d�cades for 
weaving to catch up- with spinning be�4useo, the productivity gap between the 
. .
handloom and. the powero·1oom was noto-as gre�t as �hat bet�eeno.ofactory and ' 
• 
+ . . . ·o
• 
. · 1 . 
• 
. 
• ,. • • • 
.
house�old "Spinning.· · $�h a , prqcedure. was p1recl�ded in.the Philippines_, 
·partly because imports ·had already destroyed· ·mu�h of ·the - cottage weaving . . 
. but· also because of the ur-gency in the pace of industrtalizationo The 
requirement of. ·full int�gration placedo-upono-the finishi�go- mills by the 
. .
Centralo· Bank and theo· Secret.ary of Financeo· eliminatec;l the possibility of the 
independe�t converter, which characterizes the structure of the American 
textile indust;y. · 
The Central Bank made no effort - to formulate an industry integration 
program until late in 19570 · Prior to that time it had been considering ' • •' •• i • 
each applicatio� on an individ�al basis, unrelated to national requirements. 
But as early as 1954 it. · did·.require each firm to integrate itso· own opera­
tions vertically and liber4lized this to permit gradual backward integration 
. . . 
from f_inishingo Although there is lit�le · eqonemy to be derived from c�-
bini�g finishing a�d weavin,S, compare4 to realo· benefits from spinni·ng• 
weaving integration,o
2 .
the Central Bank endprsed fini�hing - in order to induce
. .. 
entrepreneurial coamltments. The c9nsequen�e was over�xtended efforts to 
.
1Abraham S.  Becker� ''Economics of· the .. C�tton T�xti le Industryo· of �he 
U. S.S.Ro , 1928-195.5" (unpublished Pho D. : dissertati�, Depto of Political 
Science, Columbia University, 1959) , pp•.:3-'f-9 and Fe·ssenden S o  Blanchard,
The Textile Industry ofo· ·ghina 1nd Japp .Q1ew· York:o· ' Textile Research ' . .Institute, Inc·. �  1944) ,' P• 23� 
, 2Buffi�gto�, August 20, 1958, PP• 14•15. 
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obtain finishing facilities in order to-dominate the field. The privileged 
position of the finishing mills is illustrated by their reluctance to 
process the grey cloth production of a weaving•spinning mill, because it 
was more profitable to secure dollar allocations and process imported grey. 
The textile entrepreneur justifiably attempted to control his own finishing, 
and by early 1958, according to a Central Bank study, approved finishing 
capacity exceeded domestic requirements by almost 251o. 
But internal balance wa, sacrificed in the efforts to erect finishing -
capacity. According to Buffington in 1958: 
3 
The helter-skelter studies and actions in allocating 
foreign exchange for textile equipment, raw materials, semi­
manufacturers and finished goods have resulted in very un• 
balanced development of tthe industry, excess expenditures of
foreign exchange, inability to operate existing equipment to
achieve the greatest possible savings and reluctance on the 
part of new investors to enter the textile manufacturing
business. 
By the middle of 1956 the Central Bank had authorized nine private inte• 
I 
grated mills. The following listing indicates the degree of internal ;balance . . 
which these £inns had by the middle of 1957 and 1958. Balanced integration 
requires a ratio of apprpyfrnately 35 spindles per loom and finishing facili• 
ties : 
!µdple of 1957 Middle of 1958 
. . . . 
4 *' 'Ctio of Ratio of
Firm No. Finishing Spindles to Looms Finishing Spindles to Looms 
3 yes 0/400 yes 0/620
4 no 22/1 no 32/1
5 yes 19/1 yes 38/1
6 yes 122/1 yes 90/1
7 yes 0/0 yes 10,000/0
8 ••not installed•- -•not installed--
9 -•not installed•- --not installed--
14 --not installed-- no 10,080/0
20 yes 0/202 yes 0/202 
3Buffington, March 7, 1958, pp. 11-12. 
4Piirm numbers coincide with those shown on Table 2, Chapter III. 
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By the middle of 1958, only firm number 5 bad reasonable intemal 
balance of finishing, weaving, and spinning. Firm 4's 1958 ratio of 
spindles to looms appears to be balanced, but much <:>foits yamo-supply was 
intended for its related knitting mill •o .The aggregate ratio of spindles 
to loc,ms of the above mill& j umped fre1a 'Z!J,./1 ia 1957 to 38/1 in 1958, but 
thi� exaggerate·s the balance within this, aectoi-· of the indusotry, for the 
spinners sold much of their output to nen.-w.eaving cons1JJDe,:-s and the weavers 
pref-erred to proceas imported yarns. Foeign raw materials were· used to 
balance the operation, of integrated mills· a·s wei1 as to supply the re• 
4'1iN!lllente of independent we.avers. The Cent,ral .:8ank' s 19 58 integration 
pro.gram· authorized two Filipino spinning mills to integrate forward to 
finishing and thus completed, and temporarily overexpanded, the industry's 
finishing capacity. 
Industry expansion, with the indispensable sanction of the Central 
Bank, was concentrated primarily on finisohing and secondarily on spinning 
facilities to provide yarn for the earlier developed knitting and hosiery 
sectors. Weaving, the manufacturing gap between the two ,  was left un• 
bridged. After deducting 20% of all spindles for nonweaving purposes, the 
ratio of spindles to looms jumped from 38/1 in the middle of 1957 to 47/1 
. . . . 
in 1958. If the spindles and looms under construction ·in June, 1958, were . . . .· 
. .
included, the imbalance persisted at ap.pro:Kiroately 47/1, , and to tal �Olldllit• 
• ,✓ • • • .. � • • 
ments for spindles equalled 86% of our estimated national requirements and 
looms only 58%.
5 
Imbalance, therefore, existed not only within the indivi-
dual firms, but for the indus try as a whole. 
The growing size of the industry, awareness of this im�alance, and the 
..
potential savings afforded by greater use of American surplus cotton all 
· :•
:. 
·osAs of June , 1958, 119 ,240 spindles and 2 ,020 looms were under con­
struction, NEC records. 
. ··o
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prompted a more comprehensive evaluation of ·the industry than had been felt 
necessary earlier. Criteria were also necessary in considering pending 
applications for textile mills. Consequently, the Central Bank and the NEC 
both formulated industry integration programs in the middle of 1958. The 
two plans were made up independently, and a controversy ensued all through 
1959 over the differences between them. Although the Central Bank agreed 
that its function was to inq)lement the policies established by the NEC, it 
argued that detailed firm planning constituted implementation within its 
authority. Justifying itself with this argument and fortified with its 
control over the allocation mechanism, the Central Bank continued to effect 
its own plan. In September, 1959, the Monetary Board formally adopted the 
Central Bank plat\, including the proposal that integrated mills be per­
mitted six months within whic� to apply for expansion of facilities in 
conformity with the plan; applications for independent spinning mills for 
knitting and other fields were to continue receiving attention, but no 
consideration was to be given new integrated mill$ until �tional demand 
had increased. Nevertheless, the controversy between the two govetmnental 
groups raised economic and political questions, some of which
.
captured tne 
headlines of the newspapers, and both entities endeavored to reconcile 
their differences. 
Economic nationalism was responsible for the most politically explosive 
issue between them, and the problem centered on the method of defining a 
Filipino as opposed to a Chinese firm. The NEC classified firms into three 
categories:  Filipino, Chinese, and others. Table 4 shows the nationalities 
of the stockholders of the private mills under the NEC �lassification. 
It is evident that Chinese citizens have very little equity in the in• 
dustry, even in the so-called Chinese firms. The NEC classification is 
75 
based largely on the 0W"1Eirsi1 national ancestry rather than their current 
citizenship status in the Philippines, in spite of constitutional restric­
tions on discrimination between native born and naturalized citizens. The 
NEC classification is based upon the implicit and correct assumption that 
the'imajority of the naturalized Filipinos are, in fact, Chine se, who ac-­
quired citizenship f0r reasons of political and economic necessity rather 
than personal convicti�n. 
6 
The NEC integration program was formulated oni·ieconomic rather than 
political grounds, but· disagreement between the NEC and the Central Bank 
involved planned capacity for firms which happened to be Chinese and this 
sparked one facet of tl'e dispute. The Chairman of ·the NEC wrote to the 
Central Bank that: 
7 
Even with the implementation of the balanced integra• 
tion plan, Filipinos 0• including the gover,mient 00 will
still share less than 50% of the total facilities of the
local ,textile in4ustryo Such would imply the predominance ·
of aliens, specifically Chinese, and such a predominance ef 
alien� in a basic: industry such as textiles poses a very
grave ec·onomic problem which should be· remedied imnediately 
.and at once. Any deviation therefore, in favor ofithe alien 
from the approved NEC integration plan, could but only
aggravate the already minority position of the Filipinos in 
our textile industry. 
The Central Bank demurred on this point and continued to implement 
..
its own plan, although it apparently agreed to reserve the opening of 
future mills for native born Filipinoso The issue was still in abeyance 
at the end of this study, but its attention illustrated the significance 
of non-economic factors in the indust.ry·'s development. 
61n this study the NEC classification. is used when reference is made 
to Filipino or Chinese firms. Although the naturalized Filipino-Chinese 
bitterly criticize this categorization, Filipino citizenship is essentially 
a legal technicality for a group which culturally remains Chinese. 
7 . . . . .Letter from Jose c. Locsin, Chairman, NEC, June 4, 1959. 
. 9  
TABLE 4 
NATIONALITY OF STOCKHOLDERS a, PRIVATE TEXTILE MJX,IS 
IN THE PHILIPPINES , 1959(l) 






















Filipino u.s. Chinese Other 
. 3% .1% 
60.0 
51. 2 ·. 8% 4. 9% 6. 8 










Chinese 11. 7 
. 
72. 0  15. 4 100. 0 
Chinese 57. 0 11. 0 18. 0 14. 0 100. 0 
Chinese 25.5 9. 2 25. 7 6. 6 33. 0
<2> 100.0 
Chinese 22�6  3.2 27. 5 8. 0 38 . 1<
2> 100. 0 
Chinese 27.9 40. 3 31·. 8  100. 0 
Chinese 13.3 67. 7 19. 0 100. 0 
Other 100. 0 100. 0 
Other 46. 9 50. 7 . 7  1. 7 100.0 
., 
Other 12. 3 .4 87. 3 100.0 
1central Bank recotds. 
2owned by Filipino corporations. 
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The economic aspects of the two plans reveal the different approaches 
to the problem taken by the Central Bank and the NEC. In weaving, the 
total estimated cotton loom requirements are reasonably close -- 8991 for 
the NEC, 8530 for the Central· Bank, and 8500 for our estimates in Chapter 
III. Disagreement concerns the apportioning of looms among firms. Since 
weaving expanded less rapidly than the other two sectors, the issue was 
whether to balance looms with finishing facilities or with spindleso. The 
Central Bank, took the former approach and based its integration program on 
the finishing capacity ef existing and authorized mills. Since this capa­
city exceeded national requirements, 75% of it was established as a national 
production goal and was allocated in proportion to the finishing capacity 
of the authorized integrated firms. Looms and spindles were balanced to 75% 
of each firm's finishing capacity. 
The NEC argued that technical considerations made it essential to com• 
bine spinning and weaving in the same factory, although a similar combina• 
tion of weaving and finishing �as n�t neces_sary. The NEC, therefore, 
balanced spindles and lo�s without regard to the firmso' finishing abilities. 
The economic argument was left unchallenged,- but the Central Bank defended 
its plan on the basis of equity. · · Since backward integration had been 
approved, they deemed it only fair te permit each firm to enjoy comparab.
. . 
le 
balance in this integration. The preblem_owas that the Central Bank failed 
to study the industry as a whole early enough to realize that it was author• 
izing overexpansioa. A withdrawal of the most.recent integrat�en authoriza-
,-
tions, no doubt, was discouraged by the fact that the entrepreneurs cencerned 
were native born Filipinos.  
The number of installed looms almost doubled from the end of 1958 te 
. .
the end of 1959 , when 6 , l0S loGms were in •feration fer weaving cotton, and 
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2 ,736 additional looms were either being erected or authorized. Thus suffi-
ciency had been reached and apparently exceeded in weaving, and the balancing 
necessary for optimum efficiency would mean over-capacity of the entire 
integrated industry.o9 
A similar situation existed in the spinning sector, although it was 
complicated by divergent views on the requirements of the non-weaving yarn 
consumers. Estimated spindle requirements for cotton, therefore, vary from 
the Central Bank 's  figure of 503,128, the NEC's of 420,818, and our estimate 
of:·o394,o000. At the end of 1959 there were 284,386 spindles in operation, 
133,382 under installation or on order, and an additional 69,152 authorized 
·by the integration plan. 
10 
The total spindles exceeded all but the Central 
Bank's requirement estimate and left little margin, .if any, for balancing 
economically undesirable conditions. 
In April 1960, the Central Bank and the NEC announced an accord re­
garding the policies �o be used in the programmtng of the textile industry. 
Conmittees were to be established to translate these policies into concrete 
plans, but these efforts occurred after the completion of the study.o
11 
Allocatioons for Raw Materials 
Quarterly raw material allocations are authorized by the Monetary Board, 
the governing body of the Central Bank.1 2  The continuing expansion of the 
textile industry has prevented the use of recurring grants and necessitated 
( Ste�tral Bank records. 
9creater exactness is prevented by the lack of agreement on capacity
data. 
lOcentral Bank records. 
11xanila Bulletin, April 11, 1960. 
12with the exception of cotton which is'oallocated at irregular inter­
vals. 
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quarterly study of the needs of each firm as well as the ancillary - textile 
sectors. Textile operat:l. ons depend up·on the availability of adequate ex-
change for their own imported inputs and restrictions on the licensing of 
imported materials competitive with their outputs. A non-integrated spin° 
ning mill, for instance, would require specific grants for raw cotton 
. 
dyes, and spare parts each (during the suspension of Public Law 480 sales) , 
.. 
. 
quarter. But it would also require Central Bak protection from imported 
yarns, which the independent yarn censume,;s generally consider superior in 
price and quality to the dc;,mestic product. 
· Theo·ocentral Bank has attempted to equate supply and demand at each 
stage of the �ntegrated textile process by allcwoing s�fficie�t input for 
pl•nt utilization, without depressing prices a�d discouraging local pro­
duction. Various factors have greatly complicated this procedure . At each 
level of production there are secondary sources of supply and demand, which 
are difficult to  estimate. For instance some textile goods are supplied on 
the 'll)arke. . . .t .from barter transactions without the use of dollars, and demand 
includes a wide but uncertain range of cottage industry requirements. But 
secondly, the requirements of even the major firms are subject to contro­
versy. Foro-the textile and knitt�ng industries, the Central Bank staff 
estimates dollar requirements for each firm, broken down into component 
import categories; they detennine spinning capacity, for example, from 
firm reports or plant visits and base calculations upon what are believed 
to be average industry costs and input-output data. But other groups, 
private and public,- often dispute the validity of the bases of such calcu• 
lations. Estimates of finishing and knitting capacity, made by the NEC, 
� . \ � . . . ' . .. . . . . .. � . .. " ..... .... .. . �.
hav� · sometime's been a't great variance with those of. the Central Bank, and 
there has been no primary agency to reconcile or verify the data. The 
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Monetary Board makes alle.cation decisions on the basis of the recouunenda­
ti ons of its own Import-Export Conmittee, as well as the representations of 
interested private and public groups such as the TMAP and the NEC. 
The lack of reliable statistics is a critical deficiency because of the 
dynamic nature of the industry. Requirements in recent years have been 
shifting continually because of the interaction of variables which the 
Central Bank cannot possibly comprehend with the tools currently at its 
disposal.  The Bank 's task is further burdened by the propensity of some 
firms to exaggerate their material requirements in order to obtain extra 
exchange allocations. The Central Bank does not have adequate engineering 
staff to conduct regular technical audits of the industry, and it does not 
cooperate in this function with the textile engineers associated with the 
NEC. 
The allocation process is complicated by the fact that the possible 
objectives to be used by the Central Bank as guid elines may be partially 
contradictory. Nevertheless, if one ass,une� that an important objectives 
should have been the encouragement of full utilization of installed textile 
capacity, Chen the Central Bank has frequently failed. The curtailment of 
plant operations has been often attributable to either the insufficiency of 
the raw material input or excess competition for the output, caused by 
imported conmodities . An attempt will be made to illustrate this in the 
cotton spinning sector, chosen because it is the only area for which 
reasonably reliable production statistics are available. 
Table 5 presents statistics on cotton spinning activity and yarn pro­
duction for the period 1957•1959. Mill production has been intermittently 
curtailed during these years, because of either inadequate raw material 






STATISTICS ON -COTTON SPINNING ACTIVITY 
AND YARN PRODUCTION 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reasonable End ofo.oQtr. Endo<of.Qtr. 
Minimum Actual Yarn.Inven- Raw Cotton. 
Average No. 
of Spindles 
Production Production Prod. as CZ tory per Inventory
Spindle (a) : (1000o1 s of 
lbs.)  (a) Operated (a) 
(1000 1 s of 
(b) 
of Reason- (lbs . /installed) 
(lbs.) spindle) (a)- lbs.) · able Prod.-
1957 
l.st Qtr. 3,479 77,040 - 6, 140 56.7% 3.8 108.. 7 
2nd Qtr. 3, 708 91,376 6,580 5. 3 93. 2  56.4 
83.3 
3r. d Qtr. 3,831 lOJ,456 6,770 56.6 .




1st Qtr. 5,252 129, 136 9,040 58 .lCZ 6.9 70.5  
2nd Qtr. 6,138 8,650 156,496
166,2�6 9,200 81.3 5.4 50.8 
174,991 11,010 
71.0 6.2 86.6 
8.019
3rd Qtr. 
4th Qtr. 72.8  s.o· 59. 7  
1959 
1st Qtr. 9,382 218,223 12,010 78 . 1% 4.0 50.6  
2nd Qtr. 12,021 253,207 16, 030 75. 0  4.5 68. 7  
3rd Qtr. 14,163 265,014 14,630 96.8  3.5 69.8  
4th Qtr. 13,863 270, 169 14,910 93. 0  3. 7 100.9  
(a) Industrial Development Center, Manila. 
(b) Number of spindles x estimated reasonable production per month based on 80% spindle efficiency 
and varying with the actual average yarn count for the quarter. Sidney Lo Buffington, "Development of 
the Textile Industry in the Philippines, " Fifth Quarterly Report to In�ustrialo·Development 9enter and 
U. S.O.M. to the Philippines, (March 7, 1958), p. 210 Median spinning efficiency in 1959 was 78.o5%, 
chapter IX. 
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reflected in a low relationship of inventory to spindles, column 6, and a 
decline in plant operations. Column 4 which indirectly measures the per­
centage of plant utilizations by comparing actual production to an esti­
mated reasonable minimum production, will be used as an indication of the 
opportunity costs of unsatisfactory allocations.13 The depressed effect 
of large yarn importations might be either a reduction of plant operations 
(Column 4) or an accumulation of finished goods inventory (Column 5). The 
effect also might be declining prices and margins but such data are not 
obtainable. 
Much of the effect of raw cotton allocations upon production is 
disguised by the aggregate form of Table 5 but the relationship is evident 
even on an industry basis. In the third quarter of 1957 raw cotton inven­
tory declined to 55 poµnds per spindle compared to an estimated average 
14
requirement of 70 pounds. Operations were curtailed in at least four 
mills in the fourth quarter and industry operations fell to a low of 50% 
(Column 4) , although the cotton position was built up by the end of that 
quarter. Cotton inventory was maintained at satisfactory levels until Sep­
tember, 1958, when it fell to 51 pounds per spindle and caused operations 
to fall in the final quarter. Low raw materials continued to restrict 
13-rhe increasing actual production as a percentage of estimated 
reasonable minimum production may stem from increasing efficiency as well 
as greater plant utiliza�icn. This hypothesis is questionable for two 
reasons. Half of beginning 1957 1 s spinning capacity belonged to the NDC 
mills, and their efficiency is not believed to have improved. Capacity
increments accelerated in 1958 and 1959 over the 1957 rate, so there was 
more new capacity in 1959, the year of the highest percentages in Column 
4.  It is  assumed here that Column 4 reasonably approxfrnates the percentage
of plant utilization. 
l�he following analysis of the relationship between spinning capacity 
and cotton and yarn importations is, unless noted to the contrary, based 
upon information in Sidney F. Buffington' s  reports to the Industrial 
Development Center and U.S.0.M. to the Philippines on "Development of the 
Textile Industry in the Philippines" (March 1, 1957, to January 31, 1960). 
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production through the first quarter of 1959, although yarn demand imprc,ved 
and fi�ishec.t goods inveutory fell. Not until the fourth quarter did new 
cotton supplies completely alleviat� this. problem. These variances between 
required and actual r�w materi-als s�pplies • are d,;ie te · the Central Bank's 
faulty knowledge of individual firm's positions, the· irregular �iming of 
g�an�s,i. and the lengthyi- lead t:fme r�quired between the pur�hase and delivery 
of cotton •i. 
A similar relationship can be traced betweeni·iproductien and yarn in-.. 
ventoey, on the one hand, and the yam market as determined principally 
:, , .
by the ·quantity of imports, on the ot�r, .  altho,gh statistics on yani 
imports arei·inot available on a qu�rterly b•sis. Th� yam market in 1957 
and the first half of 1958 wasi·igenerally cl.iaracterized as poor by the in• 
. . 
dm try • . As early as February, 1957, the '!'MAP ••s c'-lling for complet.e 
· . · 15 
. ' 
bans cm cotton yarn imports, but secondi-semester allocations were main• 
t•i�d at earlier levels. Table 5 shows that production increase4 during 
this period, but plant operations as a percentage of capacity declined and . ... 
inventory rose. The ·Industrial Development Center reported . that ·interest 
.,
in new: textile manufacturing investment disappeared. Althqh much of the 
excess yarn imports was attributable te _ispecial and semetime8 improper
. .. . 
importing mechanism, not requiring formali'iexchange grants, the Central 
Bank was- considered respensible by the ind"QS try fGr not cutting alleca.., 
tions to reduce the supply· on . the market. Then in July, - 1957, the Central 
Bank decide� to reduce quotas on cotton knitting yarn by 25% each quarter
. . .
16 · .·in 1958. This stirred a controversy between the. yarn producers and the 
yarn cons�ers over the adequacy and quality of domestic production, which 
. . . . 
··15Man11a Bulletin, Feb:ruary 21, · 1957. 
16central Bank tiles. 
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was complicated by the diverse capacity and requirement estimates fur­
nished by the interested private and public gro�ps. The dispute continued 
through 1958 and 1959. 
The : yarn market in the fir1t half of 1958 continued to be poor and the 
.chaiman of the NEC warned that "a crisisois fast appearing in the textile 
17
industry that may weaken and undermine the economy. "  In July, 1958, the 
president of the TMAP renarked, ''We find that the price of yarn is dropping 
day by day if not hour by hour. The spinning mills can only take so much. 
Very soon all spinning mill•• • •  might collapse and a collapse of .the spin• 
ning industry will mean not only its collapse but also that of the banks 
18
and institutions which £inauced it. '' It was obvious that the industry re• 
quired protection in order to raise production over the curtailed levels 
prevailing at the end of 1957 and the beginning ef 1958. 
Reduced importation.a during the last half of 1958 and 1959 improved the 
yarn market; prices roae anl collectioon periods of accounts receivable de­
clined. New production peaks were reached in the second quarter of 1959 
.'
although capacity was re1tricted by raw cotton shortages. The last half of 
1959 is the most favorable period recorded on Table 5 although di.agreement 
still prevailed over Central Bank policy. In response to a Central Bank 
inquiry, the TMAP in August unanimously resolved that yarn importations 
should be banned, but within eight days three members withdrew their signa-
19
tures foro-various reason•• Nevertheless, the Central Bank approved over 
$2.2 million for 4th quarter yarn imports but resolved to permit no further 
20
grants in 1960. 
17Manila Bulletinot May 17, 1958.-
l�inutes of a meeting at the NEC, July 16, 1958. 
19TMAP files. 
20central Bank, Monetary Board Resolution No. 1631, Dec. 4, 1959. 
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The Central Bank has been buffeted by a host of pressure groups.:,, each 
,•. 
armed with its own stat.istical supperto Without an adequa�e staff of its 
own, the Bank has had to reconcile not only divergent data but inconsis­
tent ob�ectives. A mot'e stringent policy on yarn impoi-ts would have 
raised theo·odomestic yarn price and placed pressure on the yarn censuming 
. . ;
industrieso Nevertheless, the t,xtile mills are considered by Filipinos 
as national assets which should not be wasted. The low operations indi• 
' , .
cated on Table 5 reveal that the mills have peen underemployed; during the 
period 1957•1959, 91.4 million pounds ofo·yarn have _been produced compared . ' 
.. 
to a conservative estimate of possible production �f 1230 1 million pounds. 
This loss, due largely to poor import· allocations of yarn, as far as ,the 
industry alone is concerned, is equivalent· to approximately $15.8 million 
21
in foreign exchange ando·38.9 million man•h0t1rs of lost employmento 
T�e procedure for the allocation of dollars for grey cloth and finished 
.. 
fabrics created experiences parallel to those described above for yarno 
The TMAP, whoseo·members'· finishing capacity exceeded their weaving capacity, ' 
I •• 
urged greater allocations for grey cloth and restrictions on. c011ipetitive 
imports of -finished fabrics; it alleged that the finishing operation added 




Contributing to the Central Bank's difficulti�s were the garment 
makers,d- who preferred imported fabrics and, as one of the few Filipino 
controlled industr:Les,o·enlisted nationalistic sentiments in their behalf. 
.
.' .
21.rhis est1Nte is basedoon a method u�ed by Buffington, March 7, 1958, 
p. 25. Cotton yam, �cmservatively priced at $. 50 per pound x 31. 7 tnillion 
Opoun� �oss due to curtailed operations $15 . 8  million; this is almost a·
·complete : savings :i.n exchange because. raw cotton was available at no cost 
in dollars µn�il the th:ir d quarter, 1959, when actual and possible produc• 
tio� were close. 31 � 7  million poun4s t 175 pounds estimated spindle output 
per yearo• 180,000 spindles required to produce the estimated quantity lost. 
Buffington estiuiat:ed that · in an eff•icient mill each spindle requires ap•·
proximat'ely 216 man-hours per year. 
86 
The IDC's textile consultant,iargued the procedural point that the grey �loth 
division amo�g firms was ineffUitable and that grey importations, far from 
inadequate as argued by the 'J.'MlP, were so excessive as to stifle weaving 
development. It was estimated that the weaving sector could have produced 
at least six million additional yards during the last quarter, 1957, if the 
. 22
market for grey had not been . so depressed. Be urged restrictions on grey 
cloth imports, in order to accelerate development of weaving capacity. 
Presurnahly, this curtallmeut of weaving� caused similar losses in dollars 
and employment to the country, although the data are not available as they 
are for spinning. 
A double price system prevailed during these years on semi-manufactured 
textile products. Yarns and gi-ey cloth acquired through Central Bank allo­
cations were effectively lower: priced than the domestic product. This 
encouraged excessive importing for either use or re-sale and was a deterrent 
to the use of the domestic product or backward integration. The local mills 
apparently preferred to- curtail operations and accumulate invento ry rather 
than reduce prices of their outputs, yams and grey, to levels competitive 
with imported goods. At one point, the knittingi_trade, anxious not to 
damage its claims on �rted yarns, created an informal association to 
clear the market of domestic yarn- by quota absorptions assigned to each 
23
participant. 
The pressure upon the Central Banlt for greater raw matert�l allocations 
has been intense. The spinning milla wanted prote·ction from imported yarn, 
but the knitters and weavers were concerned with acquiring largei- grants. 
22Buffington, December 7, 1957, 7. 
23Buffington, June 7, 1957, 16. 
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The IDC 's textile specialist h'as stated the reasons candidly: 
24 
Allocations of foreign exch.,ange f'or the impor.t of 
. material for supplying the ope rat ions of the textile in• 
dustry are the controlling factors in the operation ofo_ 
most textile factories in the Philippines. lit many cases, -
the import allocation for materials is more important to 
a manufacturer than the actual operation of his factory.
It is possible to make profits of greater magnitude and in 
shorter t1rne periods by obtaining import allocations for 
material than in pushing plan.t 0perations. 
The finishing mills have fought • gainst the importation ef finished 
fabrics; but _their greatest concerno· has focused o� seurces of imp�rts not 
requiring dollar grants. These courses have included tax free textiles 
imported by the Naticmal Marketing Corporation, barter transactions in• 
volving textile imports, entry of Japanese fabrics under the reparations 
agreement, lack of c�trol over remnant imports, and the entry of materials 
in the guise of personal effects of returning residents. 
Anema.lies 
..
"Anomaly" is a Filipino euphemism which embraces a wide range of ir• 
regularities such as corruption, nepotism, and fraud. Although anomalies 
. . . 
are apparently accepted as chronic defects in the fabric of Philippine 
· 25society, subordinate to problems such as unemployment or inflation, they 
can have a demoralizing impact :upon the country ·as their exposure spreads, 
and they have figured as predominant issues in several elections. Anoma­
lies receive remarkabl� publicity in the Manila press, because their ex­
posureo- does serve as a powerful tool in the continuing struggle between 
economic and political factions. Although widespread in the Philippines, 
24Buffington, March 1, 1956, 5. 
25Professor Carlo'oLande conducted a survey :i.n 1956 which revealed th�se 
attitudes, "Politics in the Philippines" (u11published Ph.D. dissertation,
Dept. of Political Science, Harvard University, 1958), p. 260. 
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the center of anomalies shifted in 1949 from the disposal of wartime 
equipment to the adminisitration of import and then exchange control. 
Because of the textile industry's dependence upon the control mechanism, 
it has necessarily become involved to some extent in the anomalies pervadingi. 
this system. There is clearly no way of quantifying the degree of graft 
and corruption in the indusitry, for opinions are widely divergent and only 
one major scandal was exposed. In 1958 the Central Bank canceled the 
allocations of the Roxas-Kalaw Textile Mills (RKTM), a joint venture of 




firm failed to answer the charges leveled against it which included: 
1) Overpricing and undershipment of imports -- RKTM controlled a 
. . .
foreign supplier in the United States which allegedly misstated the invoice 
values and quantities of shipments to Manila, in order to accumulate dol­
lars at the preferred ratei-unlawfully outside the co untry. The charge 
concerned imports of grey sheet!ng and spare parts, the invoices of which 
were often not itemized. 
2) Misrepresentation of factory operations -- lU.CTM purportedly 
exaggerated its mill capacity and level of operations in order to increase 
·its dollar allocations. A mill inspection revealed that most of the plant •s 
equipment was inoperative, non-existent, or uninstalled, and the warehouse 
contained imported finished goods; only 13 of an alleged workforee of 154 
were on the premises. 
3) Misdeclaration : .-of imports --· The Central Bank charged that RKTM 
used its raw materials quota to import finis hed goods, principally textiles, 
26mc.TM is not included in Table 2, Chapter 3, because it was princi• 
pally a rayon mill. 
27Records of the Central Bank and the Philippine National Bank. 
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in the guise of grey cloth. 
Not surprisingly, the RKTM managers justify theiro_obehavior by allega• 
.,
tions that su:ch practices are prevalent throughout· the industry and state 
that they were arbitrarily singled out �or punishmento. Some outsiders 
agree that RKTM' s  practices were not extraordinary and that the exposure 
of their anomalies was due to personal. antagoni� and poor political rela• 
' , 
tions. True �s they may be, it seems that RKTM is atypical because early .·
in its -inception the �ecision apparently was made to concentrate not upon 
legiti�t� business operations in spite of the great ·profit potential, but 
to manipulate. its allocations as its primary source of profit. Although 
many and per�ps most of the �irms in the industry have engaged to some 
28
exte�t in the three practices charged against RKTM, .it is.believed that 
such behavior was considered a· source of income supplemental to their pri• 
mary and long term focus upon manufacturing. These special sources of 
income have decreased the payout period and enhanced the_ attractiveness of 
investmep.to. �n all industrial lines during the 1950 decade. . 
Pr�sident Qu�rino . ·:, · permitted the administration of controls ta be 
' .
transferred to the Central Bank in 1953 because of 
.
the rampant venialities . 
in the import Control Commission. At first there was a marked improvement, 
but accordi�g to the Business Editor of the Manila Bulletin, "Politics 
eventually contaminated. the Cent�al Bank, and with it the undesirable of­
ficial and political meddling and influence peddlingo_othat in no time gave 
this monetary institution an unsavory name.•� As an analogy to the 18th 
Amendment to the American Constitution, he concluded, ''We can never remove 
! 




· Overvaluation of machinery and equipment was probably mo.re general
then for the more. standardized raw materials; in an informal industry., ' . 
survey, it was estimated that the former imports were overvalued from zero 
to 200%, with an average overvaluation· of from 10% to 35% for all firms� 
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use of this exchange. " In spite of the prevalence (?f this viewpoint, 
no attempt has been made to fathom the operations of the Central Bank for 
improper motives. It is assumed that allocation decisions have been made 
upon honest and objective bases, although not necessarily correct ones. 
With very few exceptions it has not been possible to trace the accusations 
of Central Bank favoritism into the actual decisions approved by the 
30
Monetary Board. Many of the anomalies are _identified with the Customs, 
for it is there where imports which may be overpriced, understated, or 
m_isdeclared come into the country o 
It is generally felt that the Chinese have been responsible for a major 
source of the graft and corruption, particularly since the establishment of 
the new Philippine republic and then the upheaval on the China mainlando. 
They have supposedly become increasingly dependent upon unlawful business 
practices in order to defend their socio-economic position. 
31 
The applica-
tion of declining quotas too.the Chinese textile importers clearly illustrates 
the pressure placed upon the Chinese by the doctrine of ''Filipino First". 
Nurnerous anomalies have centered on these importers, who have used Filipino 
duownies in order to secure textile imports. Nevertheless, there is no good 
evidence that, once the Chinese have engaged in the manufacturing of tex­
tiles, they have been guilty of anomalous behavior to any greater extent 
than the Filipinos or other aliens. The contrary opinion is, however, 
widely held and propagated by some Filipino textile manufacturers. 
29Bernardino Ronquillo, "BusinessdViews," Manila Bulletin, (February . ..
22 , 1960).
3�eedless to say, the coincidence of an accusations of favoritism and 
the specified decision is not necessarily anomalous. 
31See especially George R. Weightman , ''The Philippine Chinese: A 
Cultural History of a Marginal Trading Coo■ounity" (unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Department of SocioloS,, Cornell University, 1960), PP• 203•4. 
CHAPTER VI 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE SOURCES OF CAPITAL 
The activities of the Philippine textile leaders basically cannet 
be identified with the functi(l)ns (l)f the entrepreneur describedi·by 
economic theory - the roles of the capitalist, the innovator, and the 
.. 
manager. Although the textile manufacturer has marshalled family re• 
sources, the availability of debt funds has permitted extensive trading . -
cm the equity and the subordination (l)f the capital supplying function. 
Risk bearing is shared with the state, which has endorsed the industry's 
essentiality and is cemmitted to its success. The entrepreneur has not 
been a technical innovator, f0r textile man�facturing has been trans­
planted intact with ne effort to adapt it to local conditions. Rather 
than co(l)rdinate and supervise productive resources, Filipino entrepre­
neurs have imported their management, as well as their technology, and 
most have delegated operating authority to a foreign staff. 
The rapid development of the industry has been in response to an 
abrupt economic disturbancei•- the imposition of controls and the conse-
.. 
quent hike in the marginal efficiency of manufacturing capital. The 
salient characteristics of the entrepreneur in the textile industry have 
been the adaptability to shifting political forces and the ability to 
influence their direction. The function of the Philippine entrepreneur, 
therefore, has been to coordinate capital ·supplies, known technology, and 
foreign management in accordance wi.th the new petentialities in the exter­
nal enviromnent. Although it is net possible in this study to determine .. 
why the reactions of similarly situated t�xtile importers varied, with ne 
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entering manufacturing and another purchasing import allocations from 
Filipino "d,umnies" , some characterization of the entrepreneur is possible. 
Affected by the nature of the development stimulus, enterprises have been 
started on a larger scale and entrepreneurs have come from a higher 
economic stratum than their h:lsttt:orical antecedents. 
Manufacturing has been introduced on a large scale factory level with 
no evolutionary bonds to the traditional cottage industry production of 
textiles. The entrepreneurs have not been craftsmen, whose forte has been 
the combination of new technical procedures and persistent expansion of 
1
their enterprises , although this describes early European development and 
is relevant to an earlier period of Philippine history. The existence of 
an advanced technology which could be borrowed from the industrialized 
countries permitted the Philippines to skip over the laborious and hap• 
hazard process of gradual technical development. But prior to 1950 the 
Philippine entrepreneur was an artisan, fashioning his own techniques in 
accordance with local conditions. Of Filipino entrepreneurs employing over 
100 workers in 1961d, only 6o/. of those who entered business in the decade of 
controls began as craftsman compared to 55% priortto 1945 . 
2 
Controls 
stimulated the entrepreneur to utilize the available fund of technological 
knowledge to a degree previously unrealized. This was true because the 
gov�r,nnent unofficially endorsed the advanced technology with> its scale 
implications, dollars and windfall profits were obtainable for such purposes, 
1 see especially Bert T. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic 
Growth (Glencoe, Ill., :  The Free Press, 1960), pp. 151-53. 
2John J. Carroll, S.J.d, from a draft for an article ''Filipino Entre­
preneurship in Manufacturing, "  for Philippine Studies (Manila: Ateneo de 
Manila). It should be noted that Father Carroll's study embraces only 
Filipino entrepreneurs and excludes the Chinese and other alien groups 
which predominate in the textile industry� 
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and plans of wide scope were necessary to insure a port,ion of the limited 
market. The entrepreneur in the textile industry tn the 1950i1 s could be 
characterized·, therefore,. by his use of modem technelogy en a relatively 
large scale. 
The textile entrepreneurs have not been "new men" cm the Philippine 
' . 
scene . viewing busines·s success as a meansi·ef
. achieving socioeeconomic 
mobility� o,;i:�:the contrary� entrepreneµrship has·· been . a means of preserv•i. . . 
ing or .·iconsolidating a reaiized upper· stratum position.i· At the 11ame time, 
the J>Oliticaii· iand economic power steamlng from such a� established positien 
has endowed the entrepreneurs with the force aal skilli. necessary te operate 
during·. the era ci,f c�trols. Before 1945, ealy 23%·. of Filipino entrepre• 
neurs were in the upper stratum (over P 15,000 per year) when they founded 
their establishments-, but since 1950 79% ef them were already in the upper 
3
stratum. 
·iHowever, the textile entrepreneurs have not originated £ran the high­
est class, the landed aristocracy of Filipi�os or meztisos. There are only 
, . .five Filipino-led firms in the industry and, although smne of these entre• 
preneurs had substan
.
tial land holdings, all
.
_had participated in coo,oerce· 
or manufacturing prior to textile manufacturing. They were established 
businessmen, already ''transitionals" in their economic perspective, willing 
. . 
to convert assets from prestigious real property into C(!)lilio�rce or manu• 
facturing with its �pecial risks and prospectsi_ of gain. The Chinese and -· · 
other alien entrepreneurs have been established as merchants or manu• 
. ' 
facturers of garments before 1950, so their membership in a deviant class 
. .. 
lallation ef their. �ntry into textiiiedoes not seem to be a useful expi-
,, 
' - , 
manufacturing in the 195�i1 s. Rather, it appears �hat fer the alien grou_ps 
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import controls provided more of a push and fOT the Filipinos more o,f a 
pull into manufacturing, but in either case it was necessary t� be equipped 
with the position and ability to cope with the gover:1uuental environme·nt. 
It should not be inferred from this that the textile entrepreneur was 
not confronted with risks of great magnitude. His uncertainty, however, 
.was not primaiily in relationship to objective marketiphenomena -- price, 
cost, and �ema�d data. His risks existed vis•a-vis the government and 
centered on such questic,ns as the duration of controls, the recl�ssifica­
tion of imports, the quarterly grants for parts and materials. To face 
contingencies of this nature special skills and tempe�aments, not normally 
associated with Western or even earlier Philippine entrepreneurship, were 
essential. 
The textile entrepreneurs have organized their firms exclusively in 
corporate form, partially for tax purposes, partially because of a belief 
this was most convenient for securing dollar allocations. The corporation 
has served principally as an instrument for organizing family rather than 
public finances. Ownership has generally been restricted to family and 
kin, both because of a reluctance to admit outsiders to membership and 
public suspicion of equity investment without representation. The non• 
family members are frequently textile importers, who want to assure a 
. 4Isource of domestic supply like the American textile merchants in the 1830 s, 
or Filipinos welcome for their value in external relations ; those whose 
investment is significant usually participate on the board as will be dis­
cussed in the following chapter. In 1959, two related firms had listed 
their coumon stock on the Manila Stock Exchange and had ownership lists 
4tance E. Davis, "Stock Ownership in the Early New England Textile 
Industry,i" The Business Review, XXXII (S1101oer.·, 1958) , p. 218 . 
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totaling almost 400 owners each. Stockholdings were much less dispersed, 
however, among the �ther firms, ranging from 5 to 135 with a median of only 
.
13 shareholders per firm. 
5 
The entrepreneiur is thus principally a family 
leader directing an enterprise owne d and controlled by one of several 
familial groups. 
The distribution of owneirship by nationality, presented in the prior 
chapter,. exaggerates the diversity in the shareholder group, for there may 
be two or thre� nationalities within a single family in the Philippines.i· 
Filipino and Chinese elite frequently have American citizenship, and many 
Chinese are Philippine nationals. The alien capital is largely resident 
. 
capital, not indicative ef a true lnternational joint venture. 
6 
Total 
foreign investment in newly established businesses declined continuously 
- 7 .- .· in the Philippines since 1951, presumably due to the pattern of control 
implementation, and a similar.itrend is evident in the textile industry. 
The share of native born Filipinos in the industry's total paid-up capital 
rose from 41% in 1957 to SOo/o in 1959, whereas American participation fell 
2% and Chinese national. by 4%. Naturalized Filipinos retained about 33% . 
of the ownership during these years, 
8 
but ethnically thes� were principally 
Chinese. If ·the ·veil ofi·inationality can be pierced, the eighteen private. 
firms appear as fatn.ily 8110\IPS, ten Chinese, ;five Filipino, one Swiss, 
Lebanese, and British. 
5central Bank records. 
6A proposed Philippine--.Japanese joint venture·, involving 30% parti­
cipation. by a Japanese textile manufacturer, failed to mat�rialize in 1957 
because 'the Japanese were st.ill not permitted to. engage in ·ibusiness in the 
Philippines. "Joint International Business Venture, in the, Philippines,'' 
A Research Project of Columbia University (New York:i September, 1958, · 
mimeographed) , p. 9_3. 
7Ibid. , P• 57. 
8central Bank records. 
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The Filipino and Chinese families are efficient means of mobilizing 
funds, but the limited scope of their resources requires heavy reliance 
upon debt financing and, secondarily, retained earnings. Analysis of the 
1959 balance sheets of the private firms indicates the .degree to which 
borrowed capital has been used. The ratio of fixed assets ·to net worth 
ranges from 510% to 68% for the firms in the industry with a median of 118%, 
which shows that equity investment has generally been insufficient to 
finance fixed assets. The ratio of : total liabilities to net worth varied 
fran 27% to 568% with a median of 83% in the industry. 
10 
No specific data are available on payout practices, but indirect evi­
dence indicates that earnings are being reinvested .  Although not formally 
required, retention of earnings has probably been due to the pressure from 
the Central Bank to fulfill integration plans and the availability of 
revenue sources outside of the books of accounts. In order to ascertain 
the extent of reinvestment, -the change in the net worth position at the 
beginning and end of each period was compared with firm earnings. The in­
crements in net worth might be due either to retained earnings or to addi­
tional investment in the enterprise , so if the increment exceeds 100% of 
period earnings it would indicate a net capital inflow regardless of the 
divide�d practice. Substantial additional investment is suggested by the 
· 9Analysis of firm financial statements is based on data available at
the Central Banki. There are several irregular omissions due to firmsi' 
failure to report to the Central Bank ; the small specialty weavers (Table
2, Chapter III) are excluded. 
I ••
lO•'What· is a reasonable relationship between debt and equity in a new 
industrial project? There is no rigid rule. In a capital-rich country
such as the United States, where many industrial firms �ve no long-term 
debt, a ratio of debt to equity of l:3 is regarded as indicative of a 
fairly heavy debt for an industrial company • • • •  In underdeveloped countries 
such standards cannot be expected, even in sound atd well-established con­
cerns. A debt-equity ratio of 1: 1 in such circumstances is often regarded 
by lenders as acceptable if everything else is sound and the project is not 
unduly risky. "  Murray D.  Bryce, Industrial Development (New York : McGraw­
Hill Book Company, Inc.,  1960) , p .  254� 
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fact that private firms' equity positions have consistently risen faster 
than net annual earningso For individual firms,ithe median percentage of·i
the equity increment to net earnings was 152% in 1957, 134% in 1958 andi. 
134% in 1959 ; only one firm in each of the three years had a percentage 
below one hundred. The significance of retained earnings is revealed in 
the comparison of total earnings for the three year �eriod, P 51 million, 
to total net worth at the end of 1959, P 98 million. ·i
Heavy reliance has been placed upon debt financing, which various 
governmental agencies have made available either directly or indirectly . 
Debt financing to the textile industry can be divided .into liabilities 
stemming from dollar obligations, on the one hand, and peso obligations, 
·
on the other. 
11 
The principal sources of dollar financing for machire ry and equipment ·i
and the total credits granted to the textile industry are as follows: 
The Export-Import Banki•- $ 11,456,000 
Industrial Development Center (IDC) Dollar Aid -­ 10,784,000 
Central Bank 5 Year Dollar Loans -- 14, 213,000 
Japanese Reparationsi••i. 1,504,000 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development •• 1,038,000 
Total $ 38,995,000 
Some of the exchange necessary for machinery importations came from 
direct applications toi· the Central Bank for nonrecurring grants, but the . . 
. _
llnata on debt financing comes fromi� variety of sources including
the Central Bank, the Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of 
the Philippines, the Industrial Development Center, and various private 
banks. The data is incomplete but the following paragraphs represent an
effort to piece the information together to obtain their aggregate formo 
Effort was devoted to a survey of the commercial banks to quantify their 
loans to the i�dustry but there was not sufficient cooperation to make 
the results meaninfftit·. . ., . - .. . .,,... , •.. '1, • ••• � \" ,,. • . . • • .• . . . . ' • . . ' . • .,;_•·;'li,..,. ;· .. . ,.i,:'-"'" ,.' 'R�i¼i.:�. 
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above sources account for the bulk of the dollars used for this purpose.  
This is indicated by a comparison of the above total financing, $49 .0  
million, to the total undepreciated book value of machinery and equipment 
for the industry of P 87.5 million,  or $43.8  million at the official rate 
of exchange. 
Foreign aid from the United States has supplied a major portion of 
the dollars necessary for plant and equipment in the textile industry, 
which has been the principal recipient of American industrial financing 
in the Philippines .  The Export•lmport Bank has extended to the Central 
Bank and the conmercial banks a series of dollar credit lines which require 
preliminary approval by the IDC and the NEC; the five year loans to the 
textile industry under this program constituted 37.8t of all approved 
Export-Import Bank projects. The IDC, a joint project of the NEC and the 
American goveruni.=nt, is responsible for making the initial recommendations 
on the lending of a special dollar fund, separate fran the international 
reserve, which is created by the Central Bank in an amount equivalent to 
the dollar value of surplus cOiiillodities from the United States; IDC dollar 
· • . 
aid is repaid by the borrowers in pesos which go into the counterpart fund. 
The textile industry ranks first among the recipients of aid from this 
source, foilowed by the plywood and veneer, cement, and paper industries;  
the $10.8 million aid from this source is 31.4% of the total Dollar Aid 
approved by the IDC. The IDC evaluates applications for Export-Import Bank 
financing or Dollar Aid according to the projectsi' contribution to economic 
development. The textile industry has, theref�re, clearly enjoyed the en• 
dorsement of the Philippine gevermnent as well as the American foreign aid 
administrators. 
The peso financing for local requirements has also received heavy 
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governmental support, both from the IDC and· two ·- government banks , the 
.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development. Bank of the Philippines 
(DBP). At the end of 1959 , the textile industry had the following out• 
standing loans involving governmental assistance : 
IDC Approved Special.Peso Time Deposit P - 7,875 ,000 
IDC Approved Guaranteed Loans : �, 700,000 
Philippine National Banko- . .  
Short Term Loans P 20 ,- 661,000
Long Term Loans · ·a14341000 29 ,095 ,000 
Development Bank of the Philippines 1.200,000
47 ,870 ,000 
Less: Loans Appearing in Two Categories . 4,100,000
P 43 , 170 ,000 
The textile firms in their 1959 report on operations to the Central 
.· .
Bank listed total peso borrowings of 37. 6 .� million, consisting of P 23. 3 . ' 
million in loans, P 9. 1 million in overdrafts, and P 5.2  million in other 
.
funds. The discrepancy between reported berrowings and estimated total 
loans may be due to both the lack of complete reporti·ng and failure to 
utilize all the peso credit approved by the IDC, but the above relation­
ship does suggest the relative signif,icance of the various governmental 
sources of peso funds and their absolute importance in the total financ• 
ing pattern. 
The two peso financing programs administered by the IDC involve the 
use of counterpart funds for industrial loans. Under the Special Peso 
Tlme Deposit Program, -the IDC provides funds to the commt:rcial banks at 4% 
interest for the purpose of long term re�ending to industrial firms. The 
CCl••aoercial banks have ·be•n:' reluctant to enter into long term loans, due 
partly to their inexperience in evaluating industrial loans although much 
of their 1041:1 portfolio is extended via overdrafts, and the IDC time 
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deposit is a means of providing more long term capital through the estab­
lished financing channels. Under the Industrial Guarantee Loan Fund the 
IDC does not actually supply pesos, but it guarantees up to 80% of the 
approved loans of financial institutions in order to encourage them to· 
liberalize their collateral require�nts and grant longer terms. The 
textile industry has also received a large portion of the total assistance 
granted by the 1DC under these two programs; 26.5% of all Peso Time De­
posits and 3 7.8% of the IDC guaranteed loans have been for the textile 
manufacturing firms. 
The princi pal source of peso ·d ebt financing has been the Philippine.
National Bank, whose loans have ranged from mughly one third to one half 
of .the total portfolio of the entire domestic banking system. In 1955 the 
PNB initiated a P 50 million loan program, for the purpose of providing 
long term capital to new and necessary industries. Many of the textile 
mills, including the ill-fated Roxas•Kalaw Textile Mills, obtaine·d · tong 
term capital from this source. The industry received P 2 .0 :million of 
loans in 1956, P 5 . 7  in 195 7 and P 4.4 in 1958, the last year of the pro­
gram. Short term loans, carried over from year to year, have been the 
single most important source of peso funds. 
The textile industry has been a rapidly growing star of the Philippine 
drive for industrialization and as such has benefited greatly from govern­
mental financing programs. This heavy use of debt funds· has permitted 
max1mlD1 expansion and profitable trading on the equity, since the cost of 
long term mouey in 1959, for instance, was 7-8% and the average rate of 
retum in the industry was 24.2i. In its efforts to expand, the industry 
has strained its financial resources to the maximum and allowed little 
margin of safety. This is revealed in the weak .current position ratios 
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which follow: 
MEDIAN �FIRM's  · 
Acid Test Ratio Current Ratio 
1957 . �s,,�- · 1 1�4- - - 1 
1958 .4 - 1 
1959 .6 - 1 - 1�5 - - -.1 
According to Mr. · Bryce, .American st·andards of liquidity cannot be 
expected ·otn the underdeveloped countries; the common American minimum cur-,. . . 
. ,· 12· rent ratio of 2 : 1  should be lowered to, perhaps,o· 1.5 : 1. · It was not until 
· ·1959 that the median of textile firmso' current ratios reached this minimum 
·acceptable level, and even the·n half of the firms had lower current ratios. 
Firms with technically insolvent positions have been able to meet 
working capital requirements temporarily by overdrafts and reinvested 
eamings. But earnings ·and new equity have not always kept pace with 
plant and inventory requirements, and the high ratio of liabilities to 
net worth has been an obstacle too·osecuring additional debt • 
. Lastly, the questionoof the adequacy of capital both for textile .o
manufacturing and industry in general requires consideration. It is (re• 
quently asserted that the problem of capital forma.tion "is at the very 
13
centre of the problem of development in economically backward countries," 
and Filipino economists often citeo·othi• as a serious bottleneck. Accord­
ing to one, "In the context. of the Philippines, where the deficiency of 
..
capital is apparent, any increase in saving, public or private, will 
. 14..readily find investment opportunities. 
12Bryce, p. 129. 
,, . ,, '\ 
. 13Ragnar Nurkse, :Problems of Capital Formation· in ·underdeveloped
Countries (Oxford: Basil Bl�ckwe}.t·�& Mott, Ltd.,  1953),o.p. 1. 
.
.
14Augustin Kintanar,o "An Anal�sis of the Effects of Certain Modifi• 
(continued) 
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Nevertheless, there is impressive evidence that the lack of capital 
has not been as serious a deterrent to development in the Philippines as 
other factors • .  Large amounts of peso credit have been available through 
institutional credit creating agencies, interest rates have been : olow, 
and banks have carried substantial excess reserves. Some say that the 
effective restraint has been exercised by the limited foreign exchangeo,_
but this is inconsistent with the unused portions of the Export-Import 
aank dollar credit line and the prevalence of imported luxury goods in 
Manila. • Credit for industrial projects has been greatlyo.oeased by the 
American foreign aid program's direct supply of dollars and the use of 
counterpart funds to overcome the con•oe�cial banks' traditional preference 
for trade. 
Generalizing from observation of the textile industry, .it would seem 
that two related but more significant obstacles to industrial development 
are the ·inability to mobiliz� large amounts of risk capital and the limited 
number of sound industrial projects. The textile firms are undercapital-
ized because of the limited re•ources of their family entrepreneurial groups 
and this restrains their ability to expand via debt , which would otherwise 
be available. The corporation form is ineffective for broadening the equity 
base, because it is still largely considered a personalized vehicle for·d
familial business purposeso 
A second restraint on the Philippines' temp� of industrialization is 
its "absorptive capacity,o" it• ability to utilize capital constructively. 
The IDC rejects almost aa many applications for dollar aid or peso loans 
' .
(cont'd)
cations in the Tax Structure on the Rate of Economic Development in the 
Philippines, "  (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, 
Yale University, 1960), P• 6. 
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as it approves , not basically from lack of capital, but because of the 
unsoundness of the proposed projects... When the successo· of textile ventures 
seemed assured, textile projects ·. multiplied far in excess of national re­
quirements and disapprovals. were prompted by reasons unrelated to capital 
. .
availability. A number of other industries have experienced similar 
vogues, with clusters of entrepreneurial enthusiasm carrying t�e industry 
past national needs and stopping the flow of credit·. Poorly planned and 
naive. proposals reflect an absence of. technically tra_ined businessmen 
15.capable of u�ing capital itt an effective fashion. In this purportedly 
''capital-poor" country , capital is thus paradoxically abundant compared 
to the supply of individuals with the ability to combine it productively 
with other factor inputs. 
lSAn example of naivete is the followingd. letter of inq�iry addressed · 
by a physician in 1957 to the IDC: 
''Dear Sir: 
A corporatiea we· are now organizing intends to:• engage in the 
manufacture of textiles. With an estimated capacity of 16 to 20 .
million yards of finished product, may we requesto•your office fero· 
such technicai aeaietanced. cov.aring the· following:d. 
1) Sugiested p4id up capitalization.
2) Number of spinning spindles and where to buy them. · 
Number of weaving looms and where to buy them�. 3) 
Approximate area reciuired for the site · of the plant 4) . .
aad othe-r desirable features of said site. 
5) Other essential iafo1:1Dation as personnel requirements. 
6) Status ef the availability of raw mat•e.rials . "  
CHAPTER· .VII 
MANAGEtIENT 
The economic controls which have accelerated the growth of the 
industry have at the same time diluted the urgency of management develop• 
menti. The focus of management attention has been external because profit 
potential has been greater in increased dollar allocations than in higher 
operating efficiency. The entrepreneurial groups have considered effort 
at the Central Bank as important as at their plants, and the result at 
each level of the organization has been less concentration upon man�gement 
development than would seem necessary in a period of decontrol. 
Top and middle management is either imported or corresponds to the 
familial entrepreneurial groups described earlie r. The Philippine and 
Chinese managers reflect a high centralization of authority and paternal• 
istic concern for subordinates, traditional characteristics which are 
considered impediments to efficient industrial administration by Western 
standardsi. 
Management deficiencies have been partially concealed by the facility 
with which a textile mill can be established and put into initial operation. 
It has customarily required only three or four months to erect machinery, 
select supervisors, train a rudimentary labor force, and start production. 
1 
The factory from its initial runs is deceivingly impressive in its modern• 
ity. RowJ of new spindles, busy workers, and comfortable profits divert 
attention from management deficiencies. A competent and adequate staff is 
1E .g. Re. Riverside Man-,ifacturing Corporation, "Production started 
last November, three months after installation of machinery started.i" 
Manila Bulletin, April 2, 1958, p. 37. 
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not required to operate a textile mill. The inefficiency caused by manage­
ment shortcomings becomes apparent only when productivity is analyzed and 
compared to other couatries as is done in Chapter tx. 
Management will be examined in this chapter at various levels of the 
organization : the board of directors, top and middle management, foreign 
management, and the foremen. The unique problems of the government mills 
will be discussed, as well as one functional area, personnel management, 
which illustrates peculiar Philippine problems. Finally, the vigorous 
institutional response too·o
, .  
managemento·oneeds will be described. 
The Board of Directors 
The boards of directors are principally small �nside ·groups, revolv• 
ing around the .family e>f ·the entrepreneur· ·a�d bound together by financial 
. , '; 
interests. All the textile firms are in corporate :form and legally re­
quired to have boards of directors. These boards, howeverot infrequently 
function in the orthodox manner as a policy making mechanism; more often 
they represent a perfunctory compliance with the corporation law or a means 
of providing representation to e·quity groups reluctant to delegate author­
ity or control. 
Table 6 analyzes the boards of directors of fifteen firms, represent• 
ing 79% of private textile employment. The differentiation between inside 
and outside groups does not follow the.oAmerican definition, but classifies 
as insiders those who are corporate· man.agers, fmnily members, or both. 
Group I firms are those in which the board is exclusively a legal 
requirement rather than a functioning level, of management. The directors, 
both full time man_agers ·�nd . members ·o� the controlling family, are in 
, ' 








CLASSIFICATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF 
PHILIPPINE TEX?IIB MANUFACTURING FIRMS -- AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF EACH BOARD 
Inside Group Outside Group 
Directors Directors
who are both Directors who are Directors Directors 
Type.of Corporate from Corporate Total Representing Representing Total
Company Managers and Family Managers Inside Large Nominal Outside 
10pe.rati pn_ Family Only_____ Only Directors .Interests Interests Directors 
Group I: 
1. Integrated 100% 100% 











6. Integrated 25% 38% 25% 88% 12% 12% 
1. Integrated 46 82
8. Integrated 
27 9 18% 18
75 25 25
Spinning 40 20
10. Integrated 20 
30 40 4060
40 60 30 10 40 
5025
Spinning 14 57 4311. 




13. Spinning 25 50 38 50 
6212 37 12 5014. Integrated 
15. Spinning 18 18 36 · 18 46 64 
Average For 
Group I 88% 12% 0 100% 0 0 0 
Group II 34 15 11 60 19 21 40 
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no need to sit down formally as a board, and the meetings, which are seldom 
held more than once a year, make little contribution to canpany progress. 
The firms in Group II have ownership and board membership more widely 
dispersed. An average of 60% of the directors is from management and the 
controlling family; on the average, the r�ai..ning directorships·· are evenly 
. .
divided between directors representing theiro.oown substantial financial 
interests and directors with only naminal interests. Many of the former 
group are textile importers who have joined the company promoters in order 
to insure participation. in the textile market as manufacturing replaces . .  
importing. These directors duplicate ·the eooNO-e-r:cial experience . ·of the in-. . 
side group and share their inexperience in manufacturing; they are concerned 
with guarding their f:fnancial int·erest's
.
cd obtaining their share of the 
·co.11pany '·s p_roduction t� market through thei� · own wholesaling firms • .-
. . . 
rhe unreliability· of disclosure requirements, t�e lack of safeguards 
·i 
for investor interests, and the potentials for inside manipulation combine 
. .
to prompt each interested party to secure an overseer position on the board. 
.. .
One integrated firm has sold stock to "respected Filipino interests" each 
of wh� i:s represented oa ·the board. ·Among the Group.II firms, the number 
of directors average 8 .5  per firm:occ,mpared to 5 for .the Group I firms, and 
the meetings are monthly er C1uarterly. ·But because of the above motivation 
for membership positions, there is an uncertainty in most companies as to 
the proper use of the boards. 
With few exceptions, the outside directors with enly nominal interests 
are not manufacturers or engineers capable of rendering judgment on tech-
. .
nical questions. They .are generally either kinsmen of t�e entrepreneur, or 
lawyers or bankers with external prestige. In one firm, for example, a 
board executive cowwwlttee with two insider$ and three outsiders has 1'een 
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created "to assist and advise the maugement. " It is significant that the 
outsiders, native born Filipinos in a firm of naturalized Filipinos (Chinese), 
have the following qualifications: bank president, former member of the 
Central Bank Monetary Board, and executive vice-president of an insurance 
group·. Well adapted to the task of cementing relations with financial and 
governmental bodies, they exemplify the external perspective of the top 
executive group. 
Top and Middle Management 
In spite of the industry's size, indigenous management is basically a 
family affair. Of the 29 top executives of the Group I firms in Table 6, 
22 are family members, only four are Filipino or Chinese non-family members, 
three are foreign technicians. Group II firms are also family managed but 
to a somewhat lesser degree. The network of family relationships throughout 
the organization of most firms illustrates the significance of familial 
solidarity in the Philippines. The background of the entrepreneurs and the 
variety of unrelated experiences of their family members have not been 
directed toward industry. But the kinship and emotional ties which bind the 
family participants in a sphere of confidence afford security from discharge 
and discourage initiative. The consequence has been a conflict between the 
•real demands of family responsibility and the objective standards of an in-
dustrial society. 
The problem is accentuated by the hierarchical structure of both the 
Filipino and Chinese family. A marked generational respect assigns author­
ity to age within the group, with the result that the eldest is frequently 
·the president or chief executive although not necessarily the most competent. 
The textile entrepreneurial and management groups generally represent 
what we have called earlier the "transitional Filipinos". They recognize 
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the demands and value of the traditional system, but attempt to reconcile 
them to the exigencies of the business situation. Frequently family 
members are placed in sinecure's with title and salary but little real 
authority. In one company, for instance , the four sales executivesd; .=cm·t-­
number the sales force; the top two are family members ·dand the bottom two 
perform the actual marketing functions. In several cases family assets 
were not commltted to manufacturing untild-the senior member died and his 
absence permitted sons to as,:111me initiative.d· In other cases, there is 
proper deference to older family members but a tacit understanding that a 
son is chief executive. However, even among this transitional group, the 
support of nonproductive managers is a heavy financial burden and hierar­
chical control restricts the scope of action of younger family members. 
The owner-managers are confronted with a void between their own 
' 
; 
highly educated , top level group and the mass of workers in the factory. 
They are generally cognizant that their principal management problem con• 
sists of bridging this gap with qualified technical supervisors. Most have 
developed organization charts based on Western patterns, but which contain 
empty boxes indicating future personnel goals. The boxes often have not 
been filled because there has been little pressure to improve efficiency 
and because qualified candidates were scarce or unobtainable. Wide spans 
of controls andd_overlappiag 4uthoritY. in unstaffed areasd·dhave been the 
result. 
This organization void is partially caused by a comparable phenomenon 
in Philippine society between the educated and professional elite, on the 
one hand, and the unskilled laborers, on the other. The· prestige accruing 
to professional statusd·dand white collar, positionsd·has diverted the ambi­




There are generally insufficient middle managers, with technical 
training and industrial experience, to translate the directives of top 
management into operating results. 
3 
The flow of technically trained personnel 
is expanding, but in the fdh!rim reliance has been placed upon an inadeqµate 
number of foreign technicians or nationals, who received their training either 
in foreign enterprises located in Manila or with the goverm1�nt textile 
mills. Higher salaries and greater opportunities have been used to attract 
such experienced Filipino managers. Many lawyers have sought industrial em-
., 
. .
ployment at the middle management level because of the degree of competition 
in their professional field. 
Nontechnical managers are also employed, especially by the non-Filipino 
firms, as political emissaries similar to some of the outside directoors. 
One has a vice president in charge of political affairs, a prominent news­
paper columnist, who is alleged to spend half of his time at the Central 
Bank. 
The vacuum at the middle management level is being filled by a remark­
able variety of programs, public and private� which are described at the end 
of this chapter. In spite of their short supply-, men with engineeri�g train• 
ing have been more easily found than managers capable of supervising others, 
and much of the recent empb.asis has been upon adminisotrative techniques. 
2In 1950, there were 3,524 physicians, 3,896 lawyers, and only 64 in­
·dustrial engineers in the country. Facts and Figures about Economic and 
Social Conditions in the P.hilippines ·, 
1
(Manila: Bureau.. .  of Census and Statis-' 
tics, 1950) , pp. 1-2. 
3As phrased by a prominent Filipino economist, Mr. Sixto·K. Roxas, to 
a graduate class in managanoent engineering, "In choosif.ng management enginee11-
ing you have, I believe, hit at the point where the greatest bottleneck 
exists. Management skills are the scarcest ingredient of progressoin our 
country, a cormnodity more scarce even than capital or dollars." ''The Full 




Authority has been husbanded by top management, partially in accordance 
with social tradition and partially because of a lack ofo'omiddle management 
capable of assuming responsibility ; theo. elimination of the latter defect 
is no.w .coming onto the Philippine horizon. 
Foreign Management 
The management of production has in all cases required foreign textile 
specialists, called technicians, and frequently recruited
.
by the foreign 
firm supplying the capital equipment. The textile firms have used techni­,
cians in two distinct ways. In some companies, they are the direct line, 
operating managers with full authority over the mill or department, whereas 
in others the line supervisors are Filipinos and the technicians serve as 
staff advisors. The number ofo.otechnicians employed varies greatly among 
firms from several with single foreign operating managers to one with 17 
4
Japanese advisors. 
In those firms using technicians for operating heads, the top Filipino 
executives have frequently delegated full internal authority 
. . 
to them, in 
. 
contrast to their reluctance to delegate authority to Filipinos. This bas 
permitted top management to - concentrate on. external affairs and to neglect 
the .odevelopment ofo. production management. Where the nationals have divorced 
themselves from manufacturing operations ; the techniciano: : has become indis­
peneable•• replaceable ·only by another ..foreign technician. The technician 
-manager is generally responsible for training understudies,o· but the demands 
of daily production almost always overshadow such long range problems. At 
4Pirms -prefer American technicians, but their annu
.
al cost is approxi­
mately double that of a European and four times that of a Japanese 
technician. Non-American foreign technicians seldom speak English well 
enough to assume line authority. 
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least five mills rely upon a single technician, overburdened with physical 
duties. According to the International Cooperation Admintstration technical 
advisor, ''The most glaring shortcoming relating to the foreign erectors and 
5
supervisors is that there �as not been enough of them. "  
How long will foreign technicians be required? Estimates among firms 
vary from three to ten years. Although the cost of technicians is substan• 
tial, it would appear that the present need is for an expansion rather than 
a diminution in their number, for low productivity indicates substantial 
potentiality for improved efficiency. One economist has estimated that 
nthe cost of imported experts per year would probably be much less than a 
quarter of what the plants would lose annually if operated at high production 
cost and substantially below capacity." To some extent management in the 
Philippines , is, therefore, an imported factor, molded into an English, 
German, o� American framework. The wider use of technicians at. the present 
would permit them to spend more time on management development and less on 
operations, thus accelerating the emergence of a true Filipino management. 
The Foremen 
The forema�, sometimes called an overseer or incharge, who supervises 
the workforce one level below him, merits attention as the probable manager 
of the future. The source of foremen has been practically identical in all 
the private mills. A group of young men was hired in each to erect the 
new textile machinery under the supervision of its foreign._ st·aff. It was 
customary for the technicians to select those whom they considered most 
·c•pable to servei, as fore�n_,:wQ.�n- pi;-oduction. started• . Thei. c;;,:-iteria used 
were generally personality, mechanical aptitude, education, and English 
.5Buffington, ·March 1, 1957, · P• 29 . 
6Bryce, p. 16 7. 
. : . � ' . 




. .. . 
fluency; the last · being . weighted heavily by the Englisho- and -Americans. 
Since the turnover of foremen has been small, ito· is essentially . this • same· 
group currently holding the foremen.: jobs. The foremen group iso• marked by 
its youth. For mos.t ..,this was a first jobo. and ages averaged· 25 or 26 in 
1959, compared .. to the average age of department heads which was generally 
·oalmost ten yea�s older. 
- ,.. · The foremen ·. have thus, been sele.cted· by vague standards : and endowed 
with the status of authority over inon•kinsmen. . This ·has creat_ed problems • 
of interpersonal relationships which have frequently prevented the foremen 
' ... . . . 
from functioning in the pattern outlined by the foreign technicians.: Self 
,..... . , . 
•, : ; . .·. ·. . 
esteem or hiya "is one of the most important �oncepts in the social 
. . · . • .· ·, , : ·  . .  : 7 ' . ,.psychology of the Filipino. "  ''The Filipino does not distinguish, in 
.. , ,.,... . . ...:. . .. ;.
general, the person from the role he is playing. Hence, the criticism of 
. t.. , ,• ·. -�- ' • 
a man 's work as such is taken as a criticism of him 
' .. • 
as a person, reflect• 
.t ' • '! • ' : . � ' ' .. .., . ..! 
ing -upon hi,s family as well. "'
8 
Direct discourse, blunt or authoritarian 
. '• . : . : 
language from one with the arbitrary status of a foreman can, therefore, 
.
' .. . . . '• . ' ' , . · . ; ., .
be considered a personal and dangerous affront. This phenomenon is con-
tinuously manifest in the reluctance of some foremen to assume direct 
' .. 
responsibility and the violence which is directed toward others outsi'de 
.. . . 
of the factory c001pound. 
9 -
Social pressure thus often forces the foreman 
: � . 
I � � • • i . : . . ' 
into a pattern of subservience or, as an alternative, militant and rigid 
: .... 
7Aread-Handbook on .the. Philippines� P •  431. 
,' 
8 .Ibid., p. 435. 
. ·9Two incidents _.ocanobe' u�ed · fO . illustrate this problem. A Filipino 
foreman advi�ed an �rican weaving technician to discharge an operator 
for
.
incompetence, but urged the·oAmerican noto· to inform the worker of the
for:ernan 's  reeoumendation. In anoth�r case, a Filipino foreman, confronted 
by an American technician with faulty practices in his department, shrugged 
h_ia:a shou1ders aJ;J.,d .re�pond':!d � �'but I ��lained _to them �ow to do �t. '' 
: "I •' . 
. ;- . • . ., 
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authority, neither of which is consonant with the normal requirements of �h� 
position. 
Much effort is currently being directed to the training of foremen in 
technical skills, but less emphasis has been placed upon the development of 
supervisory authority and human relations, areas where even greater defi­
ciencies exist. The problem has been aggravated by the Filipino ma�agement ' s  
vacillating attitude toward the foreman ' s  authority, as well as the foreign 
technician ' s  misunderstanding of Philippine mores. 
Management in the Gover1maent Mills 
The mills of t�e National Development Comp4ny have been the highest ·icost, 
least efficient in the country, losing money even in the protected 1958-59 
market. Their poor performance has been partially due to the straight jacket 
within which management tries to function. Problems stem from the conflict 
of objectives of the textile operation, the centralization of authority, 
and the political character of much of the decision making. 
The N.D.C. can not focus upon the single objective of profit making as 
can the private mills. Instead, we have seen that they were established be­
fore the war to satisfy varying objectives, often susceptible to conflicting 
means of implementation. The goal of training textile .workers for the in­
dustry can impinge upon the firm' s  ability to provide low cost yam for the 
Ilocano weavers. The restrictions against underselling the private mills 
have caused bodegas (warehouses) to fill with inventory, losses to rise, and 
layoffs to become necessary, although a cardinal objective is the creation 
of employment. Although the criterion of performance app�ied to the N.D.C. 
is customarily that of profitability, in fact, it is a political institution, 
which attempts to satisfy conflicting obj ectives simultaneously and, in the 
process, has created an attitude of resignation and sometimes indifference 
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in its management. Both mill managers are competent and diligent, but pes­
simistic about improving efficiency as long as government control exists. 
Because of these attitudes, as well as their underlying reasons, none of 
the complex of objectives for which the mill·s were established is well 
satisfied. 
The members of the Board of Directors are presidential appointees, 
none of whom has had prior textile experience. Nevertheless, the Board 
maintains control over a wide area of operating problems, which could be 
better solved closer to their area of origin by trained personnel .  For in• 
stance, sales contracts exceeding P 10,000 require approval by the Board 
and referral to the General Auditing Office, causing a de_lay during which 
textile prices fluctuate .in the local market. Depending on market condi­
.tions, private mills vary their terms, sell on consignment without security, 
and grant rebates. On the other hand, the Board of the N ,D.C. has fixed 
the credit period, required surety bonds or domestic letters of credit, and 
must approve all price changes. 
Operating management, hindered by its exclusion from many of the essen­
tial decision making areas, is also adversely affected by the political 
character of the Board's dictums. The decision to construct a mill in !locos 
Sur was motivated more by pork barrel considerations than the economic ge­
ography of the site. An initial conmitment was made at the !locos mill to 
hire workers recommended by the sellers of the land upon which the factory 
was constructed; the rate of exchange was one hiring per 1,000 square meters 
sold. Political favor has been sought by the Board by granting wage con• 
cessions coincident with national elections; hours are shorter and wages 
higher than in the private mills. Political staffing seems in some cases 
to have lowered efficiency. 
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N.D.C. management, as distinct from the Board, reflects two attitudes 
generalized in the Philippines. Firstly, a previously noted faith in the 
inherent superiority of private versus public enterprises; secondly, an 
acceptance of the reality that the political power accruing to important 
institutional positions will be utilized for the furtherance of political 
objectives. This mental framework may contribute to an unimaginative ap• 
proach to management problems based upon an acceptance of the status quo. 
Personnel Management 
Personnel management is the internal functional area which has been of 
greatest concern to top management, while areas such as quality control, 
production planning, and cost accounting .are relatively undeveloped. The 
emphasis upon industrial relations, particularly hiring, although factory 
oriented is motivated principally by its external effects. 
These external effects are derived from the premium attached to full­
time employment and the interdependence existing between the company, 
government officials, and the masses of underemployed people. Hazarding 
oversimplification, this interdependence will be described. 
Personal relations in the Philippines are marked by a benevolent 
paternalism between members of the upper and lower classes. ''When a man 
from the lower class asks a gift from one of the upper class, the individual 
in the upper class does not deny the requesti. To refuse to offer a gift 
would be to cast doubt upon one 's ability to bestow the favor, and would 
call the whole system of status into questioni. The poor as well as the rich 
expect to play the roles that are suitable to their social positions. 11
10 
Various systems of mutually supportive services maintain this status 
lOAlviniH. Scaff, "Class Stratification in the EDCOR Conmunities,i" 
Philippine Sociological Review, II (1954), p.  8. 
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hierarchy between groups. Politicians in the upper classes, dependent upon 
the votes of the barrio people for continued power, reciprocate by means of 
pork barrel outlays and a wide spectrum of personal favors, particularly 
job reconunendations. Barrio people, therefore, naturally approach local 
politicians for employment, rather than the employing enterprise itself, 
and it becomes imperative for the politician to satisfy a reasonable portion 
of such requests. 
The manufacturer's reliance upon the national government has been 
emphasized especially in connection with exchange control. It is also im­
portant-to maintain favorable relations with local govermnent officialsi_iin 
order to obtain the benefits of flexible law enforcementi.iand to insure the 
maintenance of peace and order in the mill area. Thu-s, an interdependence 
of company, politicos, andi·ipeople is created, partially boundi·itogether by 
the scarce component, jobs , with the politicia�s providing the distributive 
mechanism. 
The hiring process in every private mill, with some few exceptions for 
experienced workers and engineers, is shaped by this interdependence. Re­
cruitment is unnecessary as supply far surpasses demand ; in spite of the 
low labor mobility in the Philippines, mill owners estimate that ther.e. are 
five to ten applicants for each job opening. Hiring, therefore, is an 
allocation process, and a wide variety of external demands exists to be 
satisfied. Perfunctory screening is ordinarily done by a personnel depart­
ment, but the actual selection is made by the top executive or family group.i11 
11Each prospective employee carries letters of recomm.endati. on from 
politicians, the form of which indicates the extent of the recommendor's 
interest. A typewritten note manifests routine approval, but a handwritten
letter reveals personal concern, meriting special at_ One letter tention.
of recommendation which I saw for a sweeper's position was from the 
President of the country, but it was typewritten. 
1 18 
They may ration jobs among govt:Inmental agencies or concentrate upon a 
particular geographic area, either the mill location or the home of the 
entrepreneurial group. Effort is made to obtain the maximum return from 
the process, although opinions differ among managers as to how this is best 
done. At least two ill effects may be caused by this practice: the line 
supervisors seldom participate in the selec�ion process and the highest .
quality workers are not.inecessarily hired, an4 top management effort is 
absorbed in an area -of de·cision making,. which ·by Western standards should 
be delegated to a lower level of the organtzation. 
Top management 's involvement init� hiring process is also due, par­
tially, to paternalistic concern over the ent�ants to the company family. 
Especially in Philippine firms, effort is made to recreate the�·itraditional 
social structure of the family or hacienda, with its system of authority 
and reciprocal services. 12 Consequently , management reflects non-objective 
solicitude in various aspects of its personnel �elations. Fringe benefits 
are high, family loan funds are established, corporate· counsel is provided 
for employees in legal difficulties. Since the foremen and middle managers 
have not been able to bridge the gap between the top and bottom of the 
factory hierarchy, requests for favors and grievances are typically directed 
to those holding the reins of centralized authority. 
12''Even as the more benevolent landlords assume responsibility for the 
special needs of the tenants, so do many industrial corporations attempt 
to alleviat� the lot of their employees. • • .  In saying that this system is 
·compatible with Filipino tradition we·. might point to the provisions of the 
civil code which give legal recognition to the subparental type of authority 
exercised over apprentices by the directors of trade establishments {Chapter
6 ,  Article 349 , Sec. 4, Civil Code of the Philippines, _Republic Act No � 386) . 
This article is in line with the pattern in which the authority of the father 
is transferred to the employer and wor�rs are regarded somewhat in the 
category of �pendent chil4ren.i" C. L. Hunt, et. al. Sociology in the 
Philippine Setting (Manila: Alemar's, 1954), pp. 336•337. 
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The employees in turn may render allegiance to the
.i
company by acquiesc-
ing to membership in a · company union or convincing their kinsmen to vQte for 
13 ..the political candidates rec0t1une11ded by the companyi. Owners stressi. that 
workers willingly embrace voting suggestions in order toi
.i
express their 
gratitude to the co1npany. And "1orkers who successfully deliver votes may 
be given prizes or the privilege of recoouoending �riends for employment. 
The above observations concerning management paternalism, based upon 
a system of recipt'ocal favors, may . seem inconsistent with the union activity 
. : . . . . 
in the industry •i. A mixture o.f causes may �:lCPlain the j.uxtaposition of these. . 
two phenomena -- paternalism and unions • Firstly , legitimate union activity. . 
appears to be grea,test in the. Chin�se. firms. whe.re personnel relations can• 
not easily assume a traditional structµre. Secondly, impersonal factory 
. . . . . . . . . ' 
relations in the industry are new re lat.ions for all participants , workers 
as well as managers. Just as we termed the ent�eprepeurs members of a . . . . . 
tx-ansitional class , so must the whole sc�pe of. industrial relations be con­. .
sidered a nov�l and perhaps transitional experience, concerning wh.ich the 
traditional concepts cannot have universal application. Thirdly , the unions 
. . ... 
in the industry are not .organizedi. from within by workers, representative 
of a rebellious spirit within the £inn. On _the contrary , union leadersi·iare 
outsiders, entering the strai�e4 social re,�ations of the abruptly new mill 
situation, who may successfully transfer employee allegiance away from the 
owners and establish themselves as the authoritative source of benefits. 
·13.rhe following story of the 1959 national electionsi
.
has been verified 
by a number of personal informantsi. The controlling family of one firm
had conspicyously supported· the losing presidential ticket in 1957 •nd had
subsequently not received anticipated dollar allocations. Through kinsmen 
of its 1 , 500 employees , management believed it ·could control 20 ,000 votes
and agreed to use them to support one of the administration 's senatorial 
• f
candidates. In November the candidate was defeated but the delaye�- exchange 
grant was awarded. 
�--
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Finally, the Philippines has historically been·imarked by agratiian unrest 
and physical uprisings, which, in some ways analogous to union organization, 
have been exceptionsi-to the rule and have not destroyed the persistent 
validity of the above generalizations concerning pat�rnalism from above 
and submission from below. 
Institutional Response to Management Needs 
The management d�fictencies discussed should not obscure the significant 
trend, which is occurring •in the Philippines, toward greater emphasis upon
' . : 
indusitrial management in • general and specialized textile training in partic­
ular. This remarkable response to management needs is attributable to public, 
foreign, and private initiative, each of which will be briefly described. 
The earliest attempt - to meet the need for trained textile personnel was 
made by the N .D.C.,  which in 1955 opened a vocational school on its premises 
to provide free spinning and weaving instruction for prospective textile 
workers. Some 15,000 have been given certiticate and grades for canpletion 
of the course, which terminated in 1959 due to a slackening of demand. 
N.D.C.  has no current records of these graduates, and it is apparent from 
the number involved that many are not employed in textile mills. 
Much of the Philippine government's activity -in this area has been in 
conjunction with the American foreign aid agency, ·the International Coopera­
tion Administration (ICA) . An example of a successful joint prqject has 
been the Industrial Development Center (IDC),. which has a textile consultant 
on its staff and provides a rangei. of training opportunities, from executive 
development programs to technical courses in cotton classifi�atio�. Eleven 
of the 19 largest private mills have enrolled .employees in IDC supervisory 
training courses and almost all have had more specialized assistance . ICA 
is also contributing to a proposed textile research center at the College 
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of Engineering of the University of the Philippines, and it has various 
programs to send Filipino textile· personnel to the United States for obser-, 
vation tours and formal textile training. 
But the institutional response has been in large- measure . due to the 
functioning of the market in the private sector of the economy •i. Private 
universities in the Philippines are pr�fit making en_terprises, sensitive 
to variations in demand, and it is significant that curriculums are being 
altered to include more engineering courses, in addition to the tradition­
ally popular professional area. Education in the Philippines is the most 
feasible means of social advancement and young Filipinos reflect an aware• 
ness that a career in business �nagement may be a desirable alternative ,.· . .14
to law or medicine. Textile engineering curriculums were started in 1958 
and 1959 in two universities, ·and by the end of 1959 there were over 300 
night students working for textile degrees. 
Harvard Business Schoo1·•s Advanced ·Management Program in the Far East, 
sponsored by various local groups, and the Industrial Management Center, 
Inc. ,  a competitor of the public IDC, are important examples of this pri­
vate response. 
Finally, it has been necessary for the mill owners, themselves, to 
recognize the need for trained managerial and technical employees, for it 
is their endorsement of these programs-which has stimulated their growth. 
14in a prestige evaluation of 30 occupations i� the Philippines,
manager of a bu·sinessccompany ranked 7th after the professions, congress­
man, university professor and priest and before officer in the armed 
forces. However, the manager position ranked first ai,nong respondents 
earning overi� �OOiper J]l�th and. lowest among_ thos� with the lowest in­
comes, indicating that the traditional prestige pattern is changing'imost
rapidly at the higher income levels. Edward A. Tiryakian, "The Prestige 
of Occupations in an Underdeveloped Country: The Philippines, " American
Journal of Sociology, (January, 1958), p.  399. 
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Although family and ki�sme� were often selected for the most attractive 
training assig,nnents, by 1959 an appreciation of the objective techniques 
of scientific management was becoming more widespread. Job evaluations 
were introduced in several c01npanies ; cost accounting consultants were em­
ployed in others. The competition stemming from expanded capacity, the 
prospects of decontrol, as well as the increasing sophistication of the 




. Since the majority of jobs in the textile mills requires no· prior 
training or skill , a labor force could be assembled and put on the job 
in the matter of several months. Theo·oworkers selected were young, single 
Filipinos , often separated from their_ provincial homes, who were willing 
to accept the legal minimum for their first wage employment. With no 
differentiation as to title or compensation, theyo- were abruptly ushered 
into the new world of the factory. But the new responsibilities have not 
furnished financial independence, for earnings have beeno·too low to satisfy 
the needs of senior family members. and the maintenance of one's own home • . ' 
The low wages , novel personal rectuirements , and the objective social 
environment have made the workers susceptible to the advances of ambitious 
union leaders who have found the large mills to be fruitful sources of 
support. 
This chapter will describe some of the characteristics of the Filipino 
textile worker , then evaluate his compensation in relationship to his 
needs, and finally analyze the phenomenon of unionism in the indus�ry. 
Characteristics of , the Labor Force 
Three factors appear to have interacted to shape the particular 
characteristics reflected in the labor force•• national legislation, the 
special nature of the textile manufacturing operation�o· and the socio• 
' 
, . I ' • ! : . .I .
economic forces already noted on
.
the Philippine scene . 
. .
A system of welfare legislation with extensive fringe benefits stands 
in paradoxical contrast.to the extreme 'inectuality of wealth and power in 
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the Philippines. The pressure of American demands and the rivalry of in­
ternal interest groups in a functioning democratic political system have 
combined to prevent the exploitation of child and women labor, as well as 
to prescribe a variety of benefits for factory laborers. The concentration 
of workers in the lower age categories of the distribution below , while 
directly affected by the Child Labor Law, is also shaped by other in• 
fluences. Older, experienced personnel are unavailable , and many managers 
prefer tQ have· a young labor force , malleable in respect both to physical 
performance and psychological attitude. 
Age D�st�ibution of the Labor Force ini·the 
Private Mills at the Time of Hiring1 
Male Female Total 
18-20 years 9.4% 12.5% 10.1% 
21-25 years 44.8 58 .0 47. 8  
26-30 years 28. 6 22.7 27.3 
31-35 years 1 1.6 4.5 9.9 
36-40 years 3.2 1.7 2.9 
over 40 years 2.4 � 6  2.0 
100.0% 100 . 0% 100.0% 
1statistics on the characteristics of the 15, 711 employees ,in the in•
dustry, presented in this section, have been collected from the application 
forms prepared by all workers prior to employment. Although the fonns 
vary , the information required of applicants is almost iden�ical ,  but sub­
ject to two possible sources of inaccuracy . Firstly, firms normally do not 
verify the facts presented by the prospective employee and applicants can 
present incorrect information in order to enhance their positions. The
second weakness is an absence of definitions of the terms appearing on
the employment forms. The job seekers must state the number of their de• 
pendents , for example , but they may have differing opinions as to what 
constitutes a dependent. _ No sampling was done , but statistics are pre­
sented for those firms willing to collect these facts from their records. 
Coverage as a percentage of the entire industry work force is 92.9% for the 
age , sex, and civil status of employees and 50.4% for geographical origin. 
All statistics refer to the time of hiring. 
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Laws concerning the employment of women, particularly maternity pro-
2
tection, have made femal� workers more expensive than men and discouraged
' 
their use, even on jobs where they have an inherent superiority. Managers
. . . • .  
prefer the manual dexterity of woxnen, butd_ contrast these characteristics 
with the high cost of repeated pregnancies and legal restrictions against
' 
_d The conflict is ;reflected in .the fact that 24.6% of 
the work force is female as opposed to 67.4% of the prewar Soviet work 
discharging workers. . · 
3
force in textiles and 42.4% in American spinning mills. Data on the civil 
status of the private work force also reflectd- a.dbias against married women 
prompted by the maternity leave provisions.d, While 65.4% of the males are 
unmarried,d_ 77 .6% of �he females are unmarried; national statistics, on the 
' 
. .
other hand, i�dicate that· 66.1% of the males and only 43.5% of the females 
. 4
between the ages of 20 and 25 are single. 
The characteristics of the personnel at the NDC's Manila mill are 
markedly different because of the longer _dduration of operations there. A 
much smaller fraction of the government workers are under 30 years of age, 
24.4% compared to 85.2% in private employmentd,' and 34.8% are over 40 as 
5
opposed to 2 .0% in the private sector of the industry. The number of 
, 
2rhe law provides that pregnant women are to be granted six weeks 
leave prior to the expected delivery date and eight weeks leave after de­
livery, with compensation of not less than 60% of their regular wage. 
Republic Actd
. 
No. 679 ,  April 15, 1952• .  
3walter Galenson, Lab�r Productivity in Soviet and American Industry 
( New York:  Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 200. Philippine textile· 
engineer, Francisco R. Lopez, suggests that 66% of the work force should 
be fernale in an optimum plant. Chemistry in the Philippines, p. 2 78. 
4Philippine St1t.istical Survey of Households Bulletin, Series No. 3 
Vol. 1,  "Labor Poree" - (Manila: .Bureau of Censt1s andd· Statistics, May, 1956), . . .. .. , .
Table 3 ,  P• 15. 
5.rhere is some inaccuracy in this comparison due to the fact that the 




single women workers, 40.3%, is lower in the public mill but disproportion­
ately high vis•a•vis the national figures , which suggests that the urban� 
factory environment discourages female marriage , and responsibility cannot 
be placed on welfare legislation alone. 
The textilei. entrepreneur's external orientation because of heavy re­
liance on govera■1oe,i,t support is reflected in the nationality and some 
aspects of the geographical origins of the workers. In spite of the extent 
of foreign ownership, only . 2% of the work force· is alien, and these few 
are found in two Chinese firms. Although unemployment is not as great a 
problem in t�e foreign com:nunity, there would be a natural tendency among 
the Chinese to hire more non-Filipinos if it were not for counteracting 
forces -- the fact that the goverumeut requires lists of alien employees 
and the belief that an alien workforce might adversely affect a firm's 
ability to gain government privileges, as well as the political value em­
bodied in the allocation of jobs to Filipinos. The work force is then 
basically FilipinQ, although aliens are more numerous in salaried positions , 
five fold greater in number, due to the presence of foreign technicians 
and the foreign entrepreneurial groups, especially Chinese. 
Analysis of the geographical origins of the work force , presented 
below, presents a mixed picture of labor imnobility and abno:rmal concen­
trations , partially explicable in terms of hiring practices discussed in 
the prior chapter : 
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2.9 
Provincial or Family Home of Textile Hourly Workers 
(% of total employment) 
Luzon: 












12 .6  
4.8 






Quezon 2.2. .  
·Pangasinan
Other Luzon Provinces 30.2· s . 1  
Mindanao . 7
Visayas 9. 9 
lQ0. 0% 
Although 40% of the labor force comes· from non-mill areas, this does 
not necessarily reflect high labor mobility in a classically free market. 
Much of the migration is due to regional hiring by the entrepreneurial 
group, in accordance with the pattemidiscussed in the prior chapter; such 
wholesale transfers of workers may perpetuate the paternalistic relation-, 
ship of the province, or aid in the creation of pelitical power, or simply 
reflect the hiring of kinsmen. It is· not possible to gauge precisely the 
extent of this practice, but observati�n coupled with an analysis of the 
statistics reveals some striking examples. Almost half of the workers from 
•' 
' 
Nueva Ecija, for instance, are employedi.PY a firm whose owner's son-in-law 
is attempting to gain a congressional seat in that province. A single firm 
. .
emp·Ioys 62% of the workers from Batangas, and another has 352 workers from . . 
Masbate, 90% of the workers from that island and 49% of the workers from 
·the whole Visayan region·. It may. be argued that such geographical 
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concentrations within the labor force are not incanpatible with factor 
mobility, for they may be caused simply by hiring preferences in regard to 
the reservoir of unemployed urban labor; ·workers £ran all provinces are in 
Manila seeking employment and mill owners may be hiring workers who have 
already migrated. However, although not subject to quantification, at 
least somei- portion of the labor force which has journeyed to MaQ.ila for 
jobs came because of �promises and offers made in the provinces beforehand.  
!'he-:sources of ·imigration have not peen proportionate to the dispersion 
of the population. The Visayas and Mindanao are significantly underrepre­
sented, andi�the Tagalog areas of Luzon are overrepresented. Closer proximity 
to Manila affords-greater knowledge of employment opportunities in the city, 
as well as ease of a�cess. But the Tagalog provinces are also the scene of 
the most extensive tenant poverty and underemployment. To the extent that 
labor mobility exists, workers are not pulled from the countryside by the 
•prospects of jobs, but they are pushed toward the primate city by the J.n• 
creasing population density in these areasi. llocos Sur, on the other hand, 
does not have Manila's unique urbanization problems, and the mill there has 
few employees from outside of the province ; 82% of the work force is from 
the ]J1.ill town and 87% from the province. This has been caused by the un­
usual hiring procedure described in the prior chapter, and the fact that 
Filipino workers are not geographically responsive to employment opportunities. 
Although working conditions, load, and hours are comparable to the 
American pattern because of national legislation, the worker enjoys neither 
high prestige nor ample compensation.
6 
The single workers living in the mill 
60,f 30 �ccupations in a job rank evaluation in the Philippines, "factory 
worker" was ltsted 23rd in terms of prestige after fisherman, construction
worker, and farm tenant. Edward A. Tirakyian, "The Evaluation of Occupations 
in an Underdeveloped Country, The Philippines" (unpublished Ph.D. _ disserta• 
tion, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 1956)i, p. 114. 
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area reside with parents· or kin, whereas those from the provinces may live 
in boarding houses or with kinsmen. In e·ither case, much of their salary 
goes directly for family as opposed to personal uses. 
Textile employment for most workers is an introduction to the imper• 
sonal atmosphere of the factory with objective obligations and a money 
wage. They receive little indoctrination in the �esponsibilities and re-. . 
qutroements of their new way of life. Af�er a several week on-the-job train• 
ing course without pay, the successful are added to the payroll as regular 
employees. In their early· stages of factory employment, the workers attempt 
both to retain ties with their rural kin and to discover a counterpart to 
the traditional system. The former creates the need for financial contri• 
butions to provincial kinsmen and involves ·the absenteeism prompted by 
fiestas, funerals, or marriages in the provincial home. The latter causes 
the worker to seek paternalistic advice, status, and secutity from either 
his employer or union leader. 
Compensation of the Work Force 
Although the existence of textile jobs helps alleviate unemployment, 
the compensation of the work force is inadequate when contrasted to the 
urban cost of living or Manila wage levels. Consequently, when an indivi-
. .
dual wage earner must support a large family, as is - frequently ·the case, 
. 7
the group is _not economically far above the situation of the tenant farmer. 
w·ages •re supported by the Minimum Wage Law of P 4 .00 per day for in­
dustrial employees,o8 a law which is widely broken especially in small firms. 
There is, however, gene,;.:al. agreem�nt in the -industry that adherence to the · 
7Filipino families as a rule are large:o. 62% of urban families have 
over five members. Philippine Statistical Survey of Households Bulletin, 
Series No. 4 Vol. 1, ''Family Income and Expenditures" (June, 1958), Table 
II, P•  28 . 
8Republic Act No. 602, April 6, 1951. 
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law exists, prima�ily becamde the size of mills would make violation too 
conspicuous and unions, to the extent they are independent, would expose 
any breach. With the exception of permitted sub-minimum wages for appren­
tices, a wage floor of P 4.00 per day is operative. 
The average daily wage rate for October, 1959, was obtained from 14 
of the large private mills, and the range was from P 4.10 to P 6.32, with 
a median of P 4.47; the average daily wage rate- at the NDC mill in Manila 
was P 6.63, reflecting its longer duration of operations and the political 
character of wage determination there. On the basis of industry practice 
and legislative requirements, the estimated cost of mandatory fringe 
benefits is P .23 per worker-day and the estimad�ed actual average cost of 
9
fringe benefits is P 1.02 per worker-day. For the most part, however, 
9 
Estimated Annual Cost of Fringe Benefits Per Employee 
(Based on wage rate of P 4.47 and 300 days per year) 
Minimum Benefits Actual Average
Required by Law Frinl£ Benefits 
a. Social Security. Required by law, 3% P 40.23 P 30.23 
b. Sick and Vacation Leave. No legis­
lative requirements but collective 
bargaining agreements indicate an 
average of approxirnat.ely 15 days 
for both. 67.05 
c. Paid Holidays. No law but average
of approximately 2 .  8. 94 
d. Night Prerni1DD. No law but average
of approximad�ely 15% for 8 hours. 67.05 
e. Medical and Dental. Minimum services 
required by law, although frequently 
increased. Examination of 41 finan­
cial statements, with this cost seg­
regated in manufacturing overhead,
indicated a median cost per worker 
of P 30.44- 25.00 35.00 
f. Break r1me. No law but estimated 
average of 20 minutes per shift. 55.88 
g. Bonuses. No law but the I'llnuher of 
firms· granting bon�ses increases each 




these fringe benefits do not increase the worker's  take-home pay, and in-
. . . . . .
dividual cash earnings of ·appr·oximately P 1 , 340 . per year (300 days x P 4.•47 
- · 10
per day) are not much in excess of the minimum wage. 
. ' '
Although urban earnings are higher than rural earni�gs, the cost of 
living in the city is higher and probably in excess of the average textile 
worker' s  earnings. According to one study, the average propensity to con­
sume in metropolitan Manila for families with annual incomes from P 1 ,259 
to P 1 ,499 is 1.13, and the breakeven point is an income of over P 1, 750 
..i .11per year.i And in response toithe s��ey question, ''How much do you 
think an average familyi•• man, wife, and three children -- needs in order 
' '  ' 
\
to live just comfortably?" 79% of the urban respon4ents answered, income 
·




the rural respondents believed an income in the P 1, 800-3,600 category or 
higher was necessary. The higheri
.
cost of urban living is due to the worker 's 
(cont 'd) .
s to fac · and
they ranged from a mean of P 11.77 
to 345. 50 per worker, with a ftrm 
bonuse· tory workers, ·
..median of P 29.35. P P 30.00
h. Other benefits reguired by law� such 
· as maternity leave; termination pay, .
workman 's  compensations, etc. 3. 00 3. 00 
Total Estirnatedi. Annuali:Cost of Fringe 
Benefits per Worker 68.23 307.15 
Estimated Cost of Fringei·Benefits per : · ·.
Worker per Day 1. 02 
10varying degrees of sophistication are ' e*ibited in the wage struc­
tures of firms in the industry. A spinning mill, , for instance, with an 
·average daily wage of P 4·.12 hires all · except a. few skilled workers at a·i
standard P 4.: 00 regardless of : position. Other firms which ini-tially
hired on a similar basisi- have introduced differentials as incentives or
in accordance with the technicians•· it:ifot:JD41 job evaluation •i. 
11Kintanar, P• 71. · .  · • 






14Ph�lippip< sw.,i,tis.,l ?Suryey_ of -�-e}4@, Seri�s No. 4, Vol. 1, 
changing consumption pattern, higher prices, the remittance of money to rural 
kinsmen, and the higher rate of d�pendency because employment possibilities 
for wife and children are reduced.13 Although many of .the mills are situated 
on the outside rim of Manila in settings bettero· cla$s·if�ed as semi-1l'l.lral 
than urban, a significant portion.of the labor force ·is- urban and particularly 
subject to this squeeze between income and costs. 
The average· textile wage of P 4.47o·per day (P 'l,340o;per year .. oroP 112 
per month) com:p11res ! unfavorably not· only with ··f-111ily -income requirements, 
but also_ with prevailing family income and wage ·1evet·s in manufact�ring in­
du; tries. Firstly, average family income in March, 1957, was P 4,255 in 





family, . odepending upon a textile mill employee for sdle support, would rank 
in the bottom fifth of Manila families by income class, although a similar 
urban family outside of Manila would rank slightly below the middle in a 
distribution of families by inccne class.o15 
The data on gener4l wage rates presented · by di£ ferent goveriunental 
agencies are not consistent because of deficiencies in statistical accumu­
lation, but all data point to the fact that textile wage·s are relatively
. . . 
low ccxnp•red to the rest of industry. The Central Bank reported that in 
October, 1959, the average wage rate o� ca1Uocm labor�rs in industrial 
establishments in Manila and suburbs was P 5.31, or a�ost 20% higher than 
the average for machine . operators and workers of varying skills in the 
·13pro�essor B.  F. Ho
.
selitz discusses this in his chapter "IJ'rb-.nization 
and Economic Growth in Asia," Soci ological ·Amcts of 1·conomic. Growth. P• 233. 
·''Family Income and Expenditures" (J,me, 1958) ; P• 4.:
15tbid., pp. 23-24. The comparison to urban figv.�es, exclusive of
Manila, is'o relevant ·because the workers of the many mills on the outskirts 
of Manila stand. somewhere between the incc:,qae-e:xpenditore p_atterns of the 
·primate city, on the one 
.
hand, and the traqitt· onal barrio, 
· 




it was not· possible to match textile jobs to the 
occtipat ions included ·in the Central Bank report, with the exception of elec­
trici,an which received P 8.40 per day, as opposed to P 6. 60 per day in six 
textile mills from which information was available. The Journal of the 
'' 
Bureau of Census and Statistics indicates an average monthly wage in June, 
. .




The earnings of factory workers in the Philippines have been rising 
during 
' 
this last decade of industrial development ;- from an index of 87. 7, 
- .. 18
average earnings of manufac_turing wage earners rose ·to 105.2 in 19 59 . 
Wages in the texti le mills also reflect increases from year to year , but 
. ,
the industry is still too young for any reliable trends or levels to be 
established. 
Unions in the Textile In�ustry19 
Although labor unions have existed stnce the turn of the century and 
16central Bank of the Philippines, S!;atistical Bulletin,i•
.
XII, No. 4 
(December, 19 60) , PP• 260�261. . 
_ _i17Bure�u �f Census_ �d S�a�is�i�� , Jf?!!El&� of Ph,iligp�tiei. ·s�atist�cs,
XI!I, No. 1-3 (Jan.-M.arch, 1960) ,· P• 51 • . In the prece�ing nµmber of the·i· 
i!µEPfl , average earnings in · tax-exempt manufacturing· industries are pre• -
sented for February, 19 59 . The average monthly earnings for the textile 
classification was P 131, but ' this w•s based on 65 report.ing establishments 
and does not, therefore, coincide with the definition of 'the industry in 
this study; average earnings -.in this textile category ranked 
• 
13th out of 
I
17 industry groups and were higher only than tobacco products, garment 
·manufacture, wood products, and leather products.  Ibid�, XII, ?-To. 10-12
(Oct. -Dec.,  19 59) , P• 65. 
... 18central Bank of the_ Philippines, News Digest, nI, No·. 14 (April 5, 
, 5 I 
19 60) , inside front cover. . 
-19In 19 53 Republic A�t 875, the I_nd1,1strial Peace Act patterned a:fter 
the American Wagner Act, established colle,ctive bargaining in• the Philip-
- I
pines; for the evolution and evaluation of. this legislation, see Cicero D. 
-Calderon, "From Compulsory Arbitration to Collective Bargaining in the
Philippines," ·iInternational Labor. -Review, LXXXI, No. 1 (January, 19 60) , 
pp. · 1-25. Professor David D. Wurfel has written an excellent historical -
account of union development. ''Trade Union Development and Labor Relations 
(continued) 
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are stronger in relation to the political elite than in the West at a 
similar stage of economic development, unionization has not had great poli• 
tical force because of the continuing fratricide caused by the character of 
the movemeut's leaders and their objectives. Organization is practically 
devoid of ideological content, and, on the contrary, depends upon the fluid, 
personalized leadership of individuals who vie atllOng themselves for the 
allegiance of any group of workers, organized or unorganized. Although 
unions are·inot political, there are political unionists, principally law• 
yers, "ambitious persons who without any particular interest in either 
worker or the advancement of the labourer will set themselves up in unionism 
as a business, get a registration and engage in union agency practice as a 
professional activity."
20 
The measure of their success is the power depen• 
dent upon the size of. their following, and the consequence is the dominating 
influence of inter-union rivalry. 
Briefly tracing the activities of a union organizer in the textile 
industry will illustrate the extent of multiple unionism and how issues are 
·subordinated to the shifting coal it ions of personalities. Because he 
started as a production worker, Vicente Arneigo is not a typical union 
leader, but he helped organize the National Textile Workers' Union (NTWU) 
at the NDC•Manila plant where he worked, and election to the union presidency 
ber.ame a springboard to wider horizons. He affiliated with the Congress of 
Labor Organizations (CLO) federation until it broke up in 1951, and then 
joined with some of the old CLO members to form a new federation, Philippine 
(cont 1 d)
Policy in_.tq.e · Philippin�s," IQd1:strial and Labor Relations Review, nI, No. 
4 (July, 1959), pp. 582-608. 
201ntemational Labour Organization, Report to the Goverruuent of the 
Philippines on Labour::Mfnagerneut Relations ·(Geneva: Iriterriational Labour
Organization, 1959), P• 35. 
. ' • '  •· .  . . . . . .... - . . . --- � 
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Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) , of which he gained the presidency 
largely because of the size of his textile union. In 1953 , a dispute in 
PAFLU prompted Arneigoo1s expulsion, and he led his NTWU off to form a new 
federation, Philippine Labor Unity Movement (PLUM) , in 1954. In the same 
year, PLUM, PAFLU, arid several other federations formed a confederation of 
federations, Philippine Trade Unions Council (PrUC), but within a year the 
two former federations left the mother union because of its alleged com­
petition in organizing. Although there are some contradictions in testimony,
) . 
about this time Arneigo lost control of the NTWU, which joined a rival 
federation, the National Labor Union (NLU) , and in 1956 he was able to 
form a new federation, Confederation of Unions in Gover1unent Corporations 
(CUGC)o, which included the !locos textile mill union among its members. 
In 1957 Arneigo was invited to assume a vice presidency of the P'rUC, but 
he left the next year to form the Textile Workers Federation (TWF), with 
the express purpose of capturing control of the Universal Textile Millso' 
Union, the largest in the industry. TWP,  aided by PAFLU, charged that the 
NLU union was company dominated and attempted to win the workers' allegi-
ance for a certification election. The ensuing battle at Universal Textile 
Mills was ) protracted and bloody, but Arneigo lost and TWF, with exhausted . . . . . 
resources , was dissolved. In 1959, he retreated to the CUGC to plan future 
strategy to capture control of the textile industry. At the same time, at 
least two other federation presidents were laying similar plans. In con­
clusion one must note the widely heralded 500,800 member Katipuna.ng 
Manggagawang Philippine (KMP)o, a confederation formed in 1?59 which many 
believed to constitute a final reconciliation of labor differences. Every 
one of the above-mentioned federations joined, but "tne dominance of 
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personalities rather than ideals foreshadowed the turbulent times ahead , "
21 
and within three months the principal members had seceded. 
The textile unions illustrate how the cultural patterns and objectives 
of a society sh4pe the behavior of economic organizations. In the Philip­
pines, wh�re prestige depends on the size of one's personal following and 
political success is the highest achievement, it is not surprising that 
union leadership is used as a stepping stone to personal power. Although 
all the union leaders in the textile industry proclaim the need for unity, 
no one ev�dences willingness to subordinate his own interests to achieve 
this goal. Just as textile management has the focus of its attention on 
external relations rather than internal operations , so do the labor leaders 
concentrate to some extent upon recognition and publicity , rather than the 
concrete problems of member benefits. Of the 90 strikes in the country in 
1955-56 , for instance, 38 were caused by the recognition issue and only 16 
by demands for wage increrne�ts. 22 
The high degree of unionism in the textile industry is shown below: 
ixtent : of Unionization in the Textile Industry (1959) 
Number of % of Total
Employees Employees 
Unions Affiliated with 
Federations 13 9,467 60. 3 
Independent Unions 6 3 , 632 23.1
Unorg•nized Firms 6 2, 213 14. 1
Union Status Not Known 4 399 2 .5  
Total 29 15, 711 100.0% 
. . . 
21Flerida Ruth Pinedfi, ''Unity is PI Labor 's Outstanding Problem, " 
Manila Times, (A,pril �O, 1960) , p.  8-A. 
.22A�u�i Report of the Bureau of Labor Relations for the Fiscal Year 
1956°57 (Manila: Bureau of Labor Relations) , (typewritten), Table II. 
23ni,e NDC miils have separate unions and are included here as two
industrial firms. 
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24 
Although membership in many firms is a shifting phenomenon, at least 
• # 
• • .... 
•. •
• 
82% of the industry was unionized at the end of 1959, and this is high in 
comparison to estimates that approximately 25% of non-agricultural workers 
are union membersi. Textile unionism appears relatively strong when the 
collective bargaining agreements in the industry are compared to-those 
which happen to be filed at the Bureau of Labor Relations ; for example, 41% 
of the collective bargaining contracts in textiles include a union shdp­
requirement as opposed to 14% in the Bureau of Labor Relations most recent 
compilations. 
It is an unfair ·'labor practice for managanient to "initiate, dominate, 
assist or interfere wit h the formation or administration of any labor 
organization, " but it is not possible to tell to what extent the indepen• 
dent, or even the federated unions, may be "company unions". The presi• 
dents of the federations strongly contend that company unions have been 
prevalent in the industry and still continue in numerous cases, especially 
among firms controlled by those of Filipino ancestry. Of the six firms 
. .
classified as Filipino by this standard, the two smallest appear to have 
been bona fide independent unions, whereas two with 1, 600 employees were 
. . ,.-
unorganized, and two with 1,800 employees had controversial independent 
unions. The following excerj,t from one of the latter two independent con­
tracts suggests paternal authoritarianism :  
All employees shall devote themselves diligently and 
fai_thfully to their assigned tasks. Manag�ment abhors 
laziness.
All employees shall perform their duties in a competent . · manner. Management resents malfeasance.
All employees must carry out �he instructions of super• 
visors. Management detests disobedience. 
24Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor Relations for the Fiscal Yeari· 
1958-59 ," p. J -2 • 
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This lends some weight to the hypothesis of the last c�apter that unions 
have been weakest in Filipino firms where the management has been most 
successful in establishing a superior-dependent relationship, with authority 
centralized in the traditional pattem. It is believed that the strength 
of unionism in the ali�n sector of the industry is principally due to the 
forces working on the two participants: management and union organizers. 
Management, with its attention focusedi. outside of the factory, has not 
matched the zeal of the federation presidents, who have seen the labor• 
intensive textile plants as rich opportunities for expansionio 
The achievements of the textile unions are mixed and difficult to 
appraise. On·the negative side, some argue that contract gains are largely 
illus9ry or insignificant. In the area of wage provisions, for instance, 
8 of the 17 con�racts studied were either silent, or specified either the 
minimum wage or discretionary increases over a contract life varying up to 
five years;
25 
in the remaining contracts, the wage increments were small in 
relation both to the contract life and the level of prevailing industrial 
wages. Some unionized firms ignore the unions by granting unilateral con­
·cessions to employees without consulting union leadership,. The grievance 
machim ry is often vague, reflecting an attitude that bargaining will con• 
tinue during the life of the agreements, arid the steps in the grievance 
procedure are used for processing cases to the top levels of the company 
and union, where authority is centralized. On-the other hand , many of the 
benefits not required by law are certainly attributable eithe·r to the 
actuality or potentiality of union bargaining. 
Perhaps unionism's greatest effect will be upon the socio-economic 
perspective of the worker. Although few of the union leaders have risen 
2Sone four-year contract calls for an increasei� P 4�00 per day, the 
miJ'limnm wage. 
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from the ranks and members have �ad little democratic opportunity to 
participate, the existence of a uniono- necessarily means a new class rela• 
tionship and a realignment of obligations based on non-traditional, economic 
interests. The Fi:.lipino does not easily envisage himself as a member of an 
impe.rsonal interest group , and this accounts for the non-ideological 
character of unionism and the shifting loyalty to different leaders. Never­
theless, unionism can be. expected to help crystal:lize the st·atus of the 
worker as a "transitional Filipino, 11 dependent upon money wages to secure 
what in the traditional system: was the function of family and kin., ·
CHAPTER IX 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE INDUSTRY 
Although an industry 's economic performance has many dimensions, the 
focus of this chapter is prima�ily on only twoi•- production efficiency 
and prices.
1 
Production efficiency is considered from the point of view 
of the industry 's cost structure, labor productivity, efficiency of machine 
utilization, and, secondarily, the quality of the industry 's output and the 
scale of its operations. Prices are evaluated by examining industry profits 
in order to ascertain the margin between average costs and average prices. 
Performance is meaningful only in relation to normative standards. A pri­
mary norm for efficiency is the ability to produce textiles at a money 
cost equal to that of other producing countries. Money production costs 
are the primacy standard for evaluating production efficiency, for the 
other aspects of efficiency - labor productivity, machine efficiency, scale 
-- contribute to the height and structure of costs. The conclusion of this 
chapter is that the Philippine textile industry can not satisfy this norm 
of efficiency except at a highly devalued exchange rate of the peso. The 
pr1ma� norm for pricing performance is the absence of excess profits in 
the industry. This chapter indicates that excess profits have been higher 
than seems justified by their function as an inducement to development. 
1An alternative d1mension of performance is the degree to which pl�t· 
capacity is utilized. Since this is determined principally _ by the Central 
Bank 's allocations for raw materials, the industry ' s  performance should not 




The fundameutal raw material foro·economic analysis, production cost 
data, is the most difficult informat�on to obtain with assurance of vali• 
.. 
·dity in Philippine industry. Few textile managers have actual cost 
accounting figures by product line, and most plan on the basis of esti• 
, 
mated or standard costs, prepared with varying degrees of sophistication. 
Managers are generally reluctant to disclose the cost _information which 
they do possess, and it is difficult to evaluateo·otbe accuracy of figures 
which are revealed.  These problems are circumvented by dealing with 
aggregate cost and production data for each firm where they are available� 
thus sacrificing precision in the hopes of increased reliability. This 
method based upon total costs and production is most applicable to cotton 
yarn manufacture, because the nonintegrated spinning mills eliminate the 
difficulty of distributing fixed costs between yarn, gray and finished 
output. Ta�le 7 presents the yarn manufacturing costs of the firms for _
which this information could be obtained.o2 
2costs for one firm have been omitted because they seemed unrealistic 
and because of the eon,p�nyo1 s reputation for unreliable reporting. There 
is no indication that Table 7 costs are not repre$entative:,of the ·rest of 
the -industry, although the integrated mills are underrepresented. The 
.Integrated mills ·might enjoy lower fixed costs per unit but this is not 
true of the one such mill in Table 7. The two firms which started opera• 
tions in 1959 � numbers 2 and 5,  have the highest manu·facturing cost. This 
suggests that high initial manufacturing costs can be reduced in a short 
period of time, but ·there is no evident relationship between the costs of·
the other four firms and the date of their first operation. The number 
of firms is too small, the time period too brief, and the other variable 
too numerous to generalize concerning potential cost reductions over- time.
If the newly established firms, 2 and 5, are excluded a rough correlation 
between average yarn count produced and manufacturing cost is evident. 
Output quality corresponds closely with that of the industry as a whole.o: 
The averflge count of the private firms in Table 7, weighted by the number 
of spindles per firm, was 22.5 compared to the average yarn count spun in 






1959 COST OF COTl'ON YARN MANIJFACTUREoIN THEo
1
PHILIPPINES 
(Peso cost per kilo) (a) 
I II III IV V 
Nature of Av�rage �w Direct
Firm's Count Material Labor Over•
Operation Produced Cb) Cost Cost head 
Private 
Companies 
1. Spinning Mill 17 1 s P 1.4605 p .2826 p .4342 
2. Spinning Mill(c) 19 1s 2 .6080 . 4019 .9232 
3.  Spinning Mill 20 1s 1.9627 .3360 .2713 
Spinning Mi11 21d1 s 2.2347 . 2253 .5514 
s. Spinning Mill 22 1s 2 .1440 . 1349 .9360 
6. Spinning Depart• 
ment of Inte-
grated Mill 27 1s 2 .0206 . 3071 . 6472 
7. Spinning Mill 29 1s 1.9703 . 4336 
Median for Private 
Companies 21 1s 2.0206 . 3071 . 5514 
Public 
Company 
8. ITM Spinning Mill 12 1s 1 .6958 . 6254 1 .0106 
(a) Obtained by dividing total cost categories from the 1959 �inan­
cial statements by the year's  total yarn producotion. Data from the 
Central Bank and Department of Finance. 
(b) Yam count, a measure of the size of the cotton strand, is the 
number of hanks per pound of yarn. Increasing yam count, therefore,
indicates increasing fineness of the yarn. 
(c) First eight months of operation. 
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. 2. 3664 
(d) Excludes non-recurring expenses such as organization 
cost and special compensatio.n in · the form of bonuses and com­
missions where they could be distinguished. ·· ·o
(e) Total long term liabilities plus total equity, multiplied
by six per· cent. 
(f) Total cost less raw material cost. 
(g) Estimated allocationo. 
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Since Philippine cotton yarn manufacture is currently dependent upon 
importation of raw cotton, the primary economic justification for the 
industry must rest upon the processing cost differential in the Philippines 
vis-a•vis other manufacturing countries. A money cost comparison of this 
nature was impair�d by the overvalued official exchange rate prevailing in 
1959 , and uncertainty whether the free market rate out�ide of the country 
was a reasonable indication of the rate which might be established in a 
period of decontrol. Since the rate of P 2 = $ 1 could only be, �aintained 
with import or exchange controls which were considered temporary expedients 
throughout the 1950 decade, long term industry planning had to be founded 
upon a more realistic rate ,· estimated in 1959 at from P 3 to P 4 to ehe 
American dollar. 
The processing cost of the private mills, ; as indicat�d in column X 
of Table 7, ranged from P 1.20 to P 2. 13 per kilo of yarn in 1959, with a 
median of P 1.42. Table 8 presents the margin between the cost of the 
imported cotton requifed t� produce one kilo of yarn and the cost qf the 
imported yarn itself. If the processing cost is less than this margin due 
to lower production or shipping costs, the Philippines would enjoy an 
. . . 
absolute cost advantage in textile manufacturing. If th� processing cost 
exceeds the margin between the cost of imported raw cQtton and yarn, then 
it would be less expensive in money terms to import �he semi-manufacture , 
yarn, and channel economic resources elsewhere. As indicated, howev�r , in 
Table 8 ,  this import margin varies with the exchange rate sele,cted, for if 
the peso is depreciated to a more realistic rate with the dollar the 
rising peso costs of imports will increase the difference between cptton 
and yarn costs. 
At the official rate of exchange , the proc�ssing cost has been 
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TABLE 8 
COMPARISON OF THE COST OF IMPORTED COTTON NECESSARY TO PRODUCE ONE KILO OF YARN 
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Margin Between the Cost of Imported 
Cotton Necessary to Produce 1 Kilo 
of Yarn and the CIF Value of Imported 
Cotton Yam on the Basia. of Varying
Exchange Rates P2 = $1 P3 = $1
P4 =-· $1 (V • ' IV) ·
4th Qtr. p 1 .18 p . 30 p 1.48 P 2 .66 p 1 .18 
3rd Qtr. 
P 1 . 77 
1 .34 
P 2 .36 
1 .24 
1 . 78 
1.47 .37 1 .84 2 .46 .62
2ndo·Qtr. 1 .37 
1st Qtr. 
.34 1�71 2 .60 .89
.821.37 .34 1. 71 2.53 1.23 1.64 
1958 
. 91 




1. 11 2 . 14 
1.80 2.71 
. 65 .86 
1.36 1.821.44 
2nd Qtr. 1 .61 
1st Qtr. 
2.01 2.95 .94 1.41 1.88 
1 .53 .38 1.91 2 .32 .41 . 62 . 82 
1957 
.38 
4th Qtr: 1.85 2.73 .88 1 .32 1. 76 1.4� 





1.92 2.64 . 72 1 .08 1.44.38 
1.42 1. 74 2 .69 1.90 
. ' 
(a) Based upon the official rate of exchange. Prepared by Bureau of Customs, Central Bank datao. 
(b) Unbleached and not mercerized weaving yarn. The average ount of the imported yarn is not 
available, but it presumably is somewhat higher, that is finer, than locally manufactured weaving yarn. 
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consistently higher than the import margin for even the lowest cost Philippine 
spinners. If the peso is permitted to fall to four to the dollar, the re­
sults are reversed and the processing cost is less than the import margin in 
nine of the twelve quartersi. At a three to one exchange rate, local spinning 
appears to be at a cost disadvantage compared to yard importing in every 
quarter except the most recent. 
Conclusions based on the data in Tables 7 and 8, however, require certain 
qualifications . Table 7 cost estimates are subject to errors from accounting 
inconsistencies and falsified reporting, as well as the lack of precision in 
dealing in aggregates . Table 8 suffers from a similar lack of precision, 
because total import values and costs are used without knowledge of their 
actual grade and count classification. Since cotton is imported into the 
Philippines for spinning purposes, there should be no discrepancy between the 
grade of cotton in Table 7 as a raw material and, Table 8 as an import . A 
discrepancy is more likely between the average count of yarn, imports and 
domestic yarn production, for there is no necessary equivalence between them. 
It is believed that yarn imports have generally been of higher count and more 
expensive than the local manufacture. Selected foreign yarn quotations indi­
cate that the variance between the cost of the average yarn import and the 
cost of the lower count, representative of domestic production, may be in the 
order of 20%. If a downward adjustment were made in the cost of imported 
3-:rhe difference between the Table 7 raw mateliial cost and the Table 8 
CIF import value may be due to taxes and domestic handling costsi. It is 
difficult to explain the interfirm differences in raw material cost . 
¼.g.  In February, 1959, the FOB value of Hong Kong 20 's weaving yarn
on cones was P 1 .97 per kilo (Bureau of the Customs) or P 2 . 07 per kilo with
an estimated P . 10 for freight and insurance per kilo. Table 8 average CIF 
yarn cost , P 2.53, was P . 46 or 22% higher. In November, 1959, the FOB 
quotation of Japanese 20i1s was P 2 .02 per kilo at the official exchange rate
(Japan Textile News, December, 1959, p.  15), or roughly P 2 . 12 delivered to
Manila. Table 8 average CIF yarn cost, P 2 . 66 was P . 54 or 25% higher. 
147 
yarn in Table 8 to correct for this probable overstatement, the margin 
between imported cotton and imported yarn would be reduced. This would in• 
crease the attractiveness of textile importing , as opposed tD manufacturing. 
This analysis illustrates how exchange control and an unrealistic rate 
of exchange complicate planning for industrial development. Domestic and 
imported cost comparisons are contingent upon · ·ptlatulated rates of · exchange , 
which may be the crucial determinants in'oevaluating an itriustry's or firm's 
survival ability. The uncertainty in the Philippines concerning the con­
tinuation of the seller's market, created by exchange control, has contri• 
buted to the emphasis upon a rapid recovery of investment through import 
manipulation rather than long run production planning. The general con­
.clusion concerning the Philippines' ability toocompete with foreign producers 
·must consequently be conditioned on the exchange rate. Unless the peso were 
to fall to at least four to one, the present processing cost is too great to 
justify .cotton spinning in the Philippines on a cost basis. The cost struc­
ture, o.f course, is not static, but there is no good evidence that Philippine 
costs will decrease significantly faster than in other countries. 
Textile weaving in the Philippines can beo·oevaluated by a similar com-. . 
parison between the processing cost, the peso cost of weaving one yard of 
grey, and the import margin between the CIF: value of the raw material, yarn, 
and grey cloth. Table 9, presents a comparison between the cost of the 
amount of imported yam necessary to produce one yard of grey and the cost 
of the imported fabric itself. This import margin has varied, at the offi• 
cial exchange rate, from P .01 to P .08 per yard during the final quarter of 
1959 when import quotas rose more rapidly for grey than for yams. The 
margin is, of course , double at the depreciated four to one exchange rate, 
and varies up to P . 16 per yard for cotton fabric , 2004, at the end of 1959. 






COMPARISON OF THE COST OF IMPORTED YARN NECESSARY TO PRODUCE ONE YARD OF GREY CLOTH 
.
AND THE IMPORTED COST OF GREY CLOTH IN THE PHILIPPINES , 1959i(a) 
I II III IV V 
Margin Between the Cost of 
Number of Imported Yarn to Produce 
Cost of Imported Pounds of Cost of Imported Cost of 1 Yard of Grey & the Cost 





d Yard of Produce 1 Yard Type of Grey 
f
er Basis of Varying Exe. Rates 






p .26 p . 33 p .07 p . 10 p . 14 






. 27 .02 .03 . 04 1.07 
2004 30 1 s .26 
1959 .08 .12 . 16 
.04 .06 . OB 
.03 . 04 .06 
. 29 4th Qtr. 1.11
1.11 
. 31 
3rd Qtr. . 29 
2nd Qtr. 1.07 . 28 
4th Qtr. 
20 1s . 29 2023
1959 . 29 .33 .04 .06 






3rd Qtr. .98 .28 
2nd _ Qtr. ,.97 .28 . 29 .01 
(a) Japan Textile News, selected issues. 
(b) Based upon the Japanese FOB export pr.ice converted to pesos at the official exchange rate, plus 
P .05 per pound of yarn and P .01 per yard for estimated freight and insurance. 
(c) The technical constructions of these fabrics are as follows: 2003, 30 X 36, 72 X 69 , 38 , 4.41 
2004, 30 X 36, 72 X 69 , 44, 3. 79 
2023, 20 X 20 , 60 X 60, 36, 3.35 
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The greateri.expense of preparing yarn for shipping, as opposed to grey, nar• 
rows the import margin and reduces the attractiveness.iof non-integrated weav• 
. .
ing in the Philippines •i. 
The processing cost for·grey cloth can be calculated in a manner similar 
to that of Table 7 for only one ·firm, the sa:me integrated mill whose spinning 
costs are included there. This . is the only integrated firm·ireporting complete 
. .
financial data to the Department of Finance for tax exemption puq,oses, which 
is broken down into spinning, weaving, and finishing. On the basis of this 
firm's cost allocations, the cost of processing yard into one yard of grey 
cloth was as follows: 
Direct Labor P . 0343 
Overhead . 0428 
Direct Processing Cost . 0771 
Adminis.trati ve .Q199 
Cost of Money (estimated) . 0310 
Total Processing Cost P . 1280 
The above firm's weaving output consisted exclusively of two fabrics, styl_e 
2023 and a style similar -to 2004, thus permitting comparability with Table 9. 
Three additional integrated _i(private) mills voluntarily supplied data on their 
direct weaving costs. Their quotations, sliglltly higher than those above, 
follow: 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
similar.ito
Fabric Style 2023 2003. 2003 
Direct Laboriper Yard P . 04 P . 0260 ·i
' ' 
..
Overhead per Yard . 06 . 0669 
Direct Processing_ Cost 
per Yard P . 0852 P . 10 P . 0929 . 
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If the administrative expenses and the cost of money are include4 , the 
processing cost for the fabrics in Table 9 might reasonably be est:t!Qat�di·at 
from P .13 to P .15 per yard. The conclusions concernipg spinning co��s- •re , 
therefore , applicable to weaving as well. Even the integrated finis appear 
to have an absolute cost inferiority vis-a-vis imported grey unless tqe peso 
falls to at least four to one. At an exchange rate of P-4 to $1 ,  the 
Philippine mills would intermittently enjoy an absol�te cost advantage , 
depending upon the particular fabric and its price fluctuations. 
Table 10 compares the Philippinesi' cost structure with Japan and the 
United States. The total labor cost per hour in the production of sheeting 
is $1.66 in the United States and $.36 in Japan, 
5 
compared to the Philippine 
textile worker 's average cost of P .69 ,  
6 
or $.34 at the official exchange 
rate , and $.17 at P 4 = $1. The lower cost of the Philippine textile worker 
is accompanied by such lower productivity that labor represents a higher 
portion of total cost than in Japan and about the same as in the United 
States. 
Productivity and Machine Efficiency 
Productivity here will refer to output in relationship to labor input , 
the principal component of cost after the raw material. Machine efficiency 
will refer to output in relationship to another input factor , pl•nt and 
equipment. 
Philippine labor productivity is very low in compari�on to '. Japan and the 
United States , the two countries for which comparable informationi- is most 
5u.s. Department of Collil�rce, Comparative Fabric Productioni. Costs in the 
United States and Four Other Countries (Washingtori: Government Printing
Office, 1961) , p. 42. 
6Average daily wage rate of P 4.47 plus estimate� value . of fringe ,benefits 
per day, P 1.02, divided by eight hours per day. Chapter VIII. 
�· 
. . . . .  � ' -- - ,.. 
57�5 
92. 7  
, , ,  
. 1 Four Other Countries (Washington
..
: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 35. The grey sheeting con•o· 
struct:l.oon is· 20 .x 18 , 44 x 40, 4,  4.25.  
TABLE 10 
COMPABA'l:IVE COSTS OP PRODUCING COTTON SHEETING 
IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES (1959-1960) 
(U.S. cents per linear yard) 
· 
United States( a) Japan<a) Philippines (b) 
Cents % of Total Cents 41 of Total Cents 1 of Total 
2£.t - . .  . _
per Yd. Costo· per .Yd. · Cost per Yd. Cost 
. 
Net Cotton Cost 8.40 
· 
7 .81 68 .6 8.04 41.9  
Labor and Fringe Benefits 3.92 26.8 : . .  1 .  72 15. 1  s.oo 26.0 
Faccory Overhead 1 . 24 8.4 .88 7 .7  3.77 19.3 
Total Direct Cost 13. 56 10.41 91.4 16.81 87. 5  
General Overhead 1.04 7. 3 .98 8.6 2�38 12.5 
Total Cost of Fabric 14.60 100. 0  11.39 100.0  19� 19 100.0  
. .
(a) U.S. Department of Conm�ree, Comparative Fabric Production Costs in the United -States and 
(b) The net cost of cotton is the 4th quarter, 1959, cotton costo, Column 4, Table 8. The spin­
ning cost .eomppnent is derived from the median cost� of yarn manufacture . The weaving cost , Table 7.  
component is derived from the costs of the integrated firm whose costs are in the text. For purposes .
of thisotable, 40% of overhead has been estimated to be indirect labor and the cost of fringe benefits, 
and it has been transferred to labor cost. The official rate of exchange has been us ed to convert • · 
pesos to dollars. . .... 
.... VI 
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readily available. Productivity data is available for five of the private 
spinning mills in Table 7 and the ITM spinning mill. International compari-
7
sons are as follows: 
United States ( 1960) (Average Count l8-20) 73.09 kilos of yarn
per man-day 
Japan (1960) (Average Count 18-20) 49.37  kilos of yarn 
per man-day 
Philippines (1959) 
Private Mills (Averaged. Count 20. 7) 10.89 kilos of yarn 
per man-day 
ITM (Average Count· 12) 3.92 kilos ' ofiyarn 
per man-day 
The measurement of productivity should properly be based on all relevant 
inputs, rather than on labor alone, because they are interdependent. This 
approach is precluded by lack of empirical data and the theoretical problems 
of weighting, but an examination of two other inputs , machinery and management , 
may help to explain the wide labor productivity discrepancy above. 
The type of machinery and equipment has relatively little influence on 
spinning productivity, because production per unit of modern equipment and the 
7The productivity figures for the·United States and Japan are derived 
from information in the U.S. Department of ColWl.:rce, Comparative Fabric
Production Costs in the United States and Four. Other Count·ries, 1961, pp. 19,
42. The spinning labor requirements for the manufactu·re of sheeting were used 
because of the comparability of the yarn count. Similar data fo� the United
States is available in the u.s. Department of Labor, Case Study Data on.iPro• · 
ductivity and Factory Performapce1 Coarse .iCotton Gray Goods (Washington:
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1953) , pp. 50-51, and for the United States and
Japan �n William H .  Miernyk, ''Postwar Productivity Changes in Japanese Cotton
Spinning,i" Monthly Labor Review, 83 (July, 1960) , 700-04. The productivity
figures presented by Miernyk are substant.fally lower than those of the former 
sources, although the relationship between Japanese and American productivity
is similar. 
The Philippine productivity figures are ba·sed on annual production, 
average n\Dllber of employees, and an average of 300 working days per year. 
Information is , ·from the Department of Finance and firm data. 
A difference in several counts between yarn specifications has little 
effect on unit labor requir�ments. Galenson, p. 184. 
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number of workers reciuired per unit of e·quipment do not vary much. 8 In any 
case, the Philippine mills are equipped with the most modern Western and 
Japanese spindles, so any effect of the qualitative character of the capi• 
tal input should serve to enhance the Philippine workers' relative 
productivity. 
More important than the physical differences between countries' equip• 
ment may be the real or imagined, relationship between labor and capital 
resources. According to the traditional argument, the textile machinery,, 
designed for Western labor costs, is overly capital intensive in relation 
to the factor endowment of the underdeveloped country. But even with modern, 
automatic textile mac9ireiry the labor-capital i.nput relationship is not 
fixed, and the manager can add labor until_ its marginal physical product is 
very low. The use of the supposedly scarce factor, capital, would thus be 
' 
maximized although this would be reflected in low labor productivity. 
9 
Analysis of textile ma.chine efficiency provides evidence that productioni. 
policies have emphasized maxim.ization of . output per unit of capital input 
rather than labor inputi. Machine efficiency has been measured by comparing 
actual output for November, 1959 , to the theoretical maximum output,  given 
10
the speed of the machines and the actual number of hours they ran. 
8u.N. Department of Economic Affairs, Labour Productivity of the Cotton 
Textile Industry in Five Lftin•American Countries (New York: United Nations, . .
1951) , P• 6. 
9E.g.  ''The most important reason for the employment of a superfluous 
number of workers is the production policy followed by some Chilean mills, 
whereby the greatest possible output must be obtained from the machinery, 
even if this means the employment of nruner.ous workers and the lowering of ''the output of labor. Ibid., p.  51. 
lOro compute spinning efficiency it was necessary to obtain the follow­
ing production data for each yarn count : spindle BPM, twist multiplier, yarn 
production, and spindle hours operated. Front roll speedi= spindle RPMi! 
twist multiplier count, and spindle hour capacityi= front roll speed x 60 
minutesi: 36 x 840 x counti. 
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95% 
Efficiency for the firms which supplied the information for the p.ecessary 
computations is as follows: 
Nature of QEerations 
(Date First Operations) 
Spinning Weaving 
Spinning Mill::;(195 7)d1, 79% 
Spinning Mill (1959) 77% 
Spinning Mill (1958) 96% 
Spinning Mill (1959) 421o 
Spinning Mill (195d7) 61% 
Integratedd: Mi 11 :;_ (1956) 78% ·d92% 
Integrated Mill (1956) 65% 90% 
Integrated Mill (1958) 86% 83% 
Integrated Mill (1958) 84% 
Integrated Mill (1956) 94% 
Median Private Mill 78% 91% 
Public Mill 3 1% 62% 
Although there is no international standard for comparison, machine 
efficiency appears high in relation to theoretical capacity, particularly 
in light of the industry's youthful age. Labor productivity, as gauged by 
the standards of possibility noted for the United States and Japan, is 
relatively much lower than machine efficiency, as gauged by 100% capacity. 
In spite of the above comparison, the traditional argurne�t for . .maxi• 
mizing the output of the scarce factor, capital, at the expense of the 
abundant one, labor, is not clearly valid in the Philippines for three 
reasons. As discussed earlier, capital for officially endorsed industries 
is neither scarce nor expensive. Capital equipment has, on the contrary, 
been cheap because of the overvaluation of the peso. On the other hand, 
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labor is not inexpensive. The workers are untrained @d social welfare 
legislati<;>n maintains wages above a supply and demand equilibrium. The 
Philippine textile worker is responsible for a much larger component of 
textile manufacturing costs than is his Japanese counterpart. Thirdly, 
although ef�iciency is high during operating hours, industry operations 
have been as low as 50% of capacity · for extended periods. ·. If labor produc­
tivity were ·really sacrificed in order to maximize the efficiency of capital, 
during short run periods of capital idleness the marginal physical produc­
tivity of labor could be increased by laying off workers and leveling 
operations. There is no in:lication that this has been considered in the 
industry. 
Professor Harbison proposes that a different input, organization, "is 
· . 11probably the principal factor determining productivity of lalx> r . "  Pro-
ductivity is low in the underdeveloped countries because managerial resources 
are low in relation to the plentiful supply of ·labor. He suggests a concept 
of substitutability between organization, as a quantitative factor of pro­
duction, and labor. The earlier discussion of management's widespread 
neglect of industrial administration may be a key �o the textile industry's 
low productivity. Although Table 10 indicates· that factory and general over­
head account for a larger fraction of total cost in the Philippines than in 
the United States, the Philippine mills are burdened, in this respect, by 
nonproductive kinsmen, political relations experts, and the necessary ex­
pense of the foreign staff. Unfottunately, \ the quantitative data necessary 
to test Professor Harbison's proposition could not be obtained, altl!lough it 
11rrederick Harbison, ''Entrepreneurial Organization as a Facor in 
Economic Development,o" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70 (April, 1956), 371. 
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is believed to be at least a partial explanation of the imustry's low pro0 
ductivity. 
One simple contributing cause of low labor productivity and higher 
machine efficiency rates is the bias of the foreign technicians who have 
functioned as production managers. Trained in the West or Japan, they have 
been oriented towards efficiency in production. They seldom have an under­
standing of the potentials for factor substitutability, and they consistently 
lack anything but crude cost data. Many of the� overtly measure their suc­
cess by the efficiency of their machine operations, with little or no regard 
to labor productivity. 
If Philippine textile productivity is low at this early stage in its 
development, what are the prospects for improvement? Philippine productivity 
bears a more favorable comparison with the pre-war performance of other 
countries. Its 1959 annual output of 3 ,-267 kilos of yarn per.dworker compared 
to 2,825 for the u.s.s.R. (193 7, 23 count), 5 ,872 for the United States (1939i, 
12 3·22 count), and 2,664 for Japan (pre-war , 18.3 count) •
1
The productivity 
of, at least , the latter two countries has increased substantially since that 
time, especially Japan with its productivity rapidly converging toward that 
of the United States.
14 
Long term improvement in Philippine spinning produc­
tivity may be feasible, but the improvements experienced by Japan and the 
15
United States will be difficult to duplicate. The Philippines is starting 
12.oalenson, p. 184. 
1311.1 kilos of yarn per 10 hour day x 300 days x 80%. Fessenden S. 
Blanchard, P• 62 . 
l�iernyk, p. 700. 
15 "In the cotton textile industry there is little improvement in a mill 
overative's skill after one year, and in Hong Kong six months is considered 
to be an adequate period of training.d" Reed J. Irvine, "Should Infant 
Industries Earn Their Keep.?" (unpublished paper, April 21, 1959) .  
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operations with the most efficient productive plant, whereas some of the 
improvement in other countries is due to the replacelllent of less efficient 
spindles. The Philippines is not only farther behind the industrialized 
·countrieso' productivit-y than Japan was behind the United States in 1939, but 
the latter two countries a�e continuing to improve their productivity. 
Machine efficiency can also be measured by the amount of production per 
installed spindle or loom, but no criteria for comparative purposes have 
been discovered and the figures standing alone are not meaningful. Never• 
theless, an improvement is evident from year to year in cotton yarn produc­
tion. Production climbed from 160 pounds per spindle in 1957, to 172 pounds
16
in 1958 and 196 pounds in 1959, partially because the old and inefficient 
spindles of the government mills were becoming proportionately less important. 
Two other dimensions of efficiency will be considered brieflyo-• qual­
ity of output and the scale- of operations. There is general agreement that 
there has been some qualitative inferiority of Philippine textile products, 
vis-a-vis similar imported products, and an absence or inadequacy of spe­
cialized processes such as sanforizing and mercerizing. ' It is believed that 
the differential • in quality has been exaggerated by the textile users, 
principally knitting mills and garment makers, in order to retain the wind­
fall profit$ inherent in exchange allocations •o. The manufacturers, neverthe• 
less, have not been quality conscious because 'they c�uld easily sell their 
.. .-
output at premium prices regardless of quality. 
17 
Whether economics of scale in cotton textiole manufacturing exist is 
controversial, but. there is some agreement that- the minimum economical size 
l61ndustrial Development Center data. 
�7The Latin American textile manufacturers also have forced their'omar­
ket to accept whatever quality of products they have been able to or cared 
to produce. U.N. Department of Economic Affairs, Labor Productivity of the 
Cotton Textile Industry in Five Latin-American Countries, pp. 11-12. 
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of a spinning mill is 10,000 spindles.i
18 
To integrate spinning and weaving, 
the minimum loom room would require at least 300 looms. The average size 
of the Philippine spinning mill isi·irelatively small, 15,000 spindles, but 
at the end of 1959 all except three exceeded 10 ,000 spindles and one of these 
19
had approved expansion plans. The weaving mills generally meet scale re0 
quirements except for the eight small specialty producers with from nine to 
eighty loomsapiece . Assuming that scale economies are negligible over 10,000 
spindles, there is only a very small fringe of the industry which is inef­
ficient by scale criteria. However, higher estimates of the optimum plant 
size do exist and they would place the entire Philippine industry in a 
20
substandard cate·igory. 
frices and Profits 
., 
The lack of domestic competition in the textile industry and �estrictions 
on imports have · sustained prices at a level which has afforded large excess 
profits to the manufacturers. Aggregate private industry accounting profits 
21
have been as follows : 
1957 1958 1959 
Profit Rate - on Sales 14.9% 15. 6% 21.1% 
Profit Rate on Equity 26. 2% 25.9% 24. 2% 
The accounting profit figures should probably be augmented by irregulari, 
18E; . g. , see Becker,  170•178. 
19Table 2 ,  Chapter III. 
2� .G. , Francisco Lopez estimated that the optimum size of a spinning 
mill in the Philippines was 25,000 spindles, higher than al_l but two mills 
at the end of 1959 . Lopez, Chemistry in the Philippines,  p. 278. 
2Lrhere are some ·irregular omissions due to reporting failures. 
Central Bank of the Philippines .  
- -
159 
"anonadlous" income arising outside the books of account as well as compensa-
22
tion to the family-members in excess of a wage for managerial services. 
Excess profits can be calculated either as a ratio to sales or to 
23
owners' investmentd, as indicated in the following formulas: 
-R • C • D • ( i • Vl excess profit rate on sales l ' R 
R • C • D • 'i : ¥) = excess profit rate to �quity 
where R • aggregate annual sales revenue, C • aggregate current costs al­
locable to year 's  revenue, D • aggregate depreciation allocable to year's 
revenue , i • current long term interest rate net of risk returns, and V = 
value of owners' equity. Although the long term interest rate may be some• 
what higher in the. Philippines than in the United States, if the 61. interest 
rate recOU111ended by Professor Bain for the American economy is used , the 
excess profit rates for the textile industry are as follows: 
19s1 1958 1959 
Excess Profit on Sales 11 .6t 11d.21. 15d.5% 
Excess Profit on Equity 20. 21. 19.91. 18.2'%» 
There was an excess profit rate on sales equal to Lll•li./ 
per cent of eales. This ratio, as a measure of the ratio 
of aggr�gate excess profits to aggregate sales, also ef­
f!,ctively measures the ratio- 9.f average price to average
LeconamiS:,.7 costd. Thus, the lll•l3.7 per cent excess profit
r.1,te �JJ. sales indicates effectively that averaged-costs are 
L85•8
¼4 
per cent of the average price at which sales were 
made. 
The excess profit rate on equity of from 18 to 20% is an aggregate for 
the industry, ranging in 1959 from zero (accounting profit of 3 .21 less 61.) 
to a maximum of 281.. Nevertheless, on the average the industry has enjoyed 
221 .G. over half a million pesos , 381 of the total selling and adminis­
trative expenses of one integrated firm, was for "bonuses". 
23Joe �•  Bain, Industrial Organization (New York: John Wileyd· & Sons, 
Inc. , 19 59) ,' pp. 363•69. 
2 4Ibid. , P• 366.  
160 
a supernormal retum, and it becomes necessary to identify the cause and 
appraise the value of the excess profits. 
The cause of excess profits has been primarily the high prices �  
maintained by the restrictions of market supply. 
25 
Although there has been 
some deliberate curtailment of output by the industry itself, this has been 
far subordinate to the price effect of variations in the infilow of imports 
permitted by the Central Bank. Excess profits, therefore, have been made 
possible by an authority, which has been extemal to the entrepreneurial 
group and which has the power of continuing or withdrawing its support of 
the industry. 
It may be argued that excess profits have been necessary to compensate 
the entrepreneur for his innovational activity and for bearing the peculiar 
risks of uncertainty caused by gover1nnent variants. Reliable profit rates 
in other branches of Philippine industry are not available to serve as a 
standard against which the textile industry can be compared , although there 
is some indication that textile profit rates have been relatively high.
26 
Therefore, one is forced -:to speculate whether the rate of excess profits 
251t was argued in Chapter IV that the tax exemption privileges was not
responsible for the high profit rate, because the industry would have been 
able to pass on the taxes in the form of higher prices. 
,. 
26Rates of return on industr
.
ial capital are available from two sources ,  
but they are too inconsistent for meaningful comparisons. Professor Higgins, 
citing Central Bank figures, reported that the average rate of return in 
tax exempt industries has been 16. 6%, including 6 . 3% in textiles, 60.5% in 
veneer and plywood, 43.2% _in wood and wood fixtures, 33.5% in rubber products. 
Higgins, Report to the Gove::x:noient of the Philippines (1957) , pp. 38-39. 
• J J I
Several years earlier a study reported an average rate of return on 
0investment of 12.5% in ten industries garments (10.4%)i, thread (9.5%) , -
tanneries (20.1%), plastic products (18. 3%), beverages (18. 6%) , mining (6.9%), 
food manufacture (11.4%) , veneer and . plywood (18.8%) , pulp and paper (6 . 7%) , _
and metal products (17.0%) . Philippine Council for U.iS. Aid, Industriali .




has been adequate or redundant in relationship to what the govermnent has 
attempted to achieve. Assumiug that the objective was simply to achieve 
national self sufficiency, then the rate of excess profit has clearly been 
a sufficient inducement for that goal has been realized. 
If the rate of excess profit had been lower entrepreneurial activity 
might have been channeled into other industries. The IDC has reported that 
interest in textile investment has varied with the state of the market •and 
profit expectations. Nevertheless, first knitting and then textile manu• 
facturing rapidly reached capacity or overcapacity and new applicants had 
to be rejected. In 1958 when industry spokesmen, were predicting the in­
dustry's  collapse due to excessive textile imports, average excess profits 
were 20% on equity and new construction was continuing apace. The rapid 
growth of textile manufacturing has satisfied the Philippines' urgent de-
..
sire for industrialization, but this tempo could have. been reduced somewhat 
. . 
by lower profits. Excess profits cannot be justified on the basis.iof manu• . ,  
facturing risks or the uncertainty of a market, for· these were known. On 
tl:e contrary, the entrepreneurs have demanded excess profits because of the 
uncertainty concerning gove111mental protection of the industry and each 
firm's relative position in it . If a stable and objective gover1wntal 
policy toward industry were effected, the businessman could shift his empha• 
sis from the capture of short run or windfall profits to a long term commit• 
ment to profit planning through manufacturing activity. 
The Philippine consuu,ers have clearly received no direct benefits from 
the textile industry in the form of lower prices. The price index of cloth• 
ing has been the most rapidly rising component of the cons,uner price index 
since the start of the private textile industry •i. R;sing clothing prices 
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were not caused by international price movements , but p�imarily by import 
restrictions. Below the price index is compared to cotton textile imports: 
Consumer Price Index Cotton Textile Imports 
In Manila ( 1955 = 100)28 Excluding Raw Cott��
All Items Clothitig (l000's  of pesos) 
1959 107.0 121.3 p 5 7.3 
1958 108.0 116 . 7  80 . 7  
195 7 104.5 113 .6 117.8 
1956 102 . 7  108 .1  85 .5 
1955 100.0 100 .0 13 7.4 
1954 101.0 103d.5 125d.6 
1953 102. s 108.4 114 . 7  
195 2 106. 1 114 .6 104 06 
195 1 113 .4 144.3 
1950 104. 7  112.9 
1949 101.6 93.8 
The textile firms have apparently been able to enjoy stable or rising 
prices during these years. The historical trend of the ma.nufacturersd0 
prices is available only for the NDC, which at best is only a barometer of 
the private firms' prices. Nevertheless , by the beginning of 1960 the prices 
of NDC prints and grey sheeting were as high or higher than at any time 
during the prior five years. 
The industry has been essentially free of competitionj except for some 
rivalry in the introduction of patterns; marketing has been an allocation ·
procedure. The general method of establishing prices has been to add a 
27The CIF value per yard of imported fabrics had a slight downward 
movement: from 1955-1959. Central Bank. 
28central Bank, Statistical Bulletin, XI, (Dec. , 1959) ,  p. 210 . 
29Table 1 ,  Chapter III. 
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"reasonable" markup to estimated costs and to vary this upwards if per­
mitted by market demand. When the minimum cost plus price could not be 
obtained firms have been very reluctant to reduce their margin in order to 
maintain output. Some finished goods are kept in inventory for long periods 
awaiting price improvemm ts, and this is reflected in a low rate of inven-
tory turnover for the industry as a whole. 
30 
3�or 1959 the aggregate i�ventory turnover for the industry (cost of
goods sold f the average ending inventory for 1958 and 1959) was 3�9 and 
the range from . 5  for tqe NDC to 6.2. There is obvious need for caution
in the acceptance of these computations. Annual inventory turnover in the 
,American cotton textile industry, bowevert is also four. "For Cotton: 
Orders:, New Hopes,i" Busineiss Week, June 20, 19 59 , p. 139. 
CHAPTER X 
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The textile industry historically has constituted a large portion of 
the manufacturing activity of the underdeveloped and lesser developed 
countries. For instance, 45% of the value of products manufactured in 
Japan in 1928 consisted of textile products ,  28 . 5% of total industrial 
production in Russia before World War I was textile production, 
2 
the tex-
tile industry was China ' s  largest factory industry before World War II , 
· 3 
and 30% of all manufacturing employees in Mexico in 1940 were textile 
employees. Although it is frequently stated by Filipinos that the textile 
industry is the largest factory industry in the Philippines , an industry ' s  
significance in relation to macroeconomic aggregates depends on how its 
boundaries are delimited. 
The textile industry , as defined for purposes of this study , does not 
loom as large in the Philippine economy as is frequently believed. Because 
both industry and national statistics are subj ect to significant margins 
of error , a series of comparisons has been developed which as a whole is  
more meaningful than any one of its parts . Employment in the textile in­
dustry in 1959 totaled 15 , 711 ,  compared to an annual increase of population 
of approximately 825,000 , and an annual increment in the ranks of the unem­
ployed estimated at 100 ,000. Textile employment was 3. 7% of the estimated 
1Blanchard , p. 5. 
2Becker ,  p. 7 .  
3Blanchard, p. 23. 
�osk, p. 123 
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manufacturing labor force, 10 years and over.5 The compensation of the 
textile workers equaled from 4.i5% to 5. 5% of the total compensation of 
6
manufacturing workers in the Philippines in 1959. Approximately 5% of 
the total loans and overdrafts, outstanding at the end of 1959 from banks 
7
other than the CentrJl Bank, went to the textile industry-. The textile 
industry reported purchasing 85 . 2  million kilowatt hours of power in 1959 
-- 5.7% of the Manila Electric Company's total volume of production.8 
.. 
The national income at factor cost which originated in the manufacturing 
9
sector was P 1,734 million in 1959; the textile industry 's contribution 
of approximately 3 . 3% of the total was distributed as follows : 
Contribution to Nation�l 
·Income (P 1;000o1 s)lo
Wages P 18,135 
Salaries and Bonuse:s 6 , 145 
Interest 2 , 560 
Rents 217 
Corporation Profit 29,433 
Total P 56,490 
5The employed non-agricultural labor force, October, 1959, was 3,278
thousand. Central Bank of the Philippines, Twelfth Annual Report, p. 86. 
Manufacturing accounts for about one-eighth of all non-agricultural workers. 
Philippine:dStatistical Survey of Households Bulletin, Series No. 3 ,  Vol. 1, 
"Labor Poree," (Manila: Bureau of Census and Statistics, June, 1958), p. 4.  
6compensation of the non-agricultural work force in 1959 was P 3, 178 
million, of which one-eighth i·s estim�ted to be in manufacturing. Central 
Bank, Twelfth Annual Report, 105. In 1959, the average number of employees 
in the industry was 14,880, the average daily compensation was P 5 . 50, in­
cluding fringe benefits, and the estimated average number of days worked was 
270, giving total annual compensation of P 22.1 million. Aggregate· esti• 
mated direct and indirect labor on the firms' income statementsd·dwas P 18.1 
million; 1958 data were used for two firms failing to report to the Central 
Bank in 1959, and 40% of manufacturing overhead was estimated to consist of 
indirect labor. 
7central Bank, Twelfth Annual Report, 140-43, and Chapter VI. 
a .
8.rextile industry purchases from Central Bankddata. Total production 
fran Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical -.Bulletin, XI (December, 
1959), P •  203. 
9 and 10 on next page. 
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Cotton textile manufacturing is thus seen to represent from 3 o 3% to 
5.5% of total Philippine manufacturing activity depending upon the partic• 
ular standard of comparison selected. It is a significant industry and 
probably the largest factory industry in the country. However,  this signi­
ficance has been often exaggerated by those who either did not have the 
facts or who wished to enhance the industry's  prestige. For instance, in 
proclaiming ''Textile Week0 in 1959 , P'l"esident Garcia stated, 0Though com­
paratively young, this industry has firmly established itself as one of the 
country's leading economic pillars by providing employment opportunities 
to 35,000 Filipinos • • • •  ull According to the reports of firms in the 
industry, total employment was less than half of that stated by the Presi• 
dent. 
If the definition of the industry were expanded to embrace related 
sectors such as knitting and garment manufacture, the aggregate would be 
larger and more comparable to the totals of other countries cited in the 
first paragraph of this chapter. For purposes of this study , however ,  the 
0 
-significant dimension is textile manufacturing per se spinning � weaving 
and finishing. Unfortunately it is not possible to contrast the size of 
the textile industry to other industries, since the most recent surveys of 
manufacturing with detailed breakdowns by industry were in 1955 and 1956. 
An industry ' s  significance, however , can..�ot be simply gauged by the 
number of workers it employs or the power it purchases ,  its contribution 
has many facets. This chapter will consider the industry' s  balance of pay­
ments effect, its stimulation of development in other areas , and the 
9central Bank, Twelfth Annual Report, 106 .  
l<>Financial statements filed at the Central Bank with same adjustments 
as in footnote No. 6 .
llThe industry referred to by the President was essentially the same as 
in this study. Textile Week Souvenir PrograJI! (July 6-12i� 1959) , unnumbered. 
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productivity and labor absorption of its capital in�estment. 
· Balance of Payll)ents'· Effect 
The textile industry iso. generally pr•ised in the Philippines because 
of its _contribution in theo:form of emplo,-.ent opportunities and dollar 
savings. But both of these contributions have been widely exaggerated� 
According to the TMAP, ''Today, despite problems facing the industry, it is 
effecting a clear savings in foreignoexchange of more than $35,�00,000 pero· .
year." 
12 
Since one of theo- efficial reasons for furnishing assistance too: 
.' 
the industry was relief of the country's exchange problems, it is necessary 
to evaluate claims of dollar savings. 
Exact computations of dollar savings are not possible because weaving 
and finishing production figures are not available. An estimated possible 
dollar savings is presented in Table 11 based upon 1959 capacity and costs. 
The total estimated savings of $6.8 million requires at least two major 
adjustments. Table 11 savings assumes that operations are at full capacity 
which in fact has not been true.o13 If it is realistically assumed that 
total operations were no higher than 85% of capacity, then total dollar 
savings are reduced to approximately $4.4  million. 
The second adjustment concerns foreign imports...onot requiring dollar 
payments -- machinery and equipment and raw cotton. A minor portion of the 
industry's.capital equipment was admitted dollar free under Japanese repa-. 
14
rations, but a much larger part came from IDC Dollar Aid. Since this 
12textile Week Souvenir Program, unnumbered. 
13see Table 5 ,  Chapter V, . . Below- c�pacity oper�tions are typical of 
Philippine industry; 6,050 of _ 15 ,325 ,key establishments (over 5 eJDPloyees) 
were operating below capacity in 1955o. D�rectory of Key Establishments in 
the Phili ines in Selected Non-A ricultural Industries (Manila: Depart•






ESTIMATED POSSIBLE DOLLAR SAVINGS IN THE TExrILE INDUSTRY IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1959 ..... 
0\(l,000 1 s) 
Average Reasonable Est1roat:ed Estimated Total
1959 1959 Value of 1959 Value of · 19 59 Total Savings in
Equipment Output Output Input Spvings(e) Dollars
SPINNING SECTOR 
Spindles 267. 7(a) 57,580 lbs . C
b) P 53,549(c) P 41,458(d) p 12,091 $ 6,045 
WEAVING SECTOR 
Looms 4. 7 (e) 121,940 yds. (f) P 40 ,240(g) P 34, 143(h) P 6, 097 $ 3,048 
FINISHING SECTOR 
3 Shift Annual Capacity 264,000 yds. Pl00 , 188(j) P 87,120(l)264,000 ydso P 13,068 $ 6,534 
DOLLAR COSTS OF OPERATIONS 
Depreciation of Imported 
Machinery and Equipment(k) 
Spare Parts<1) 
Supplies(l) 
LESS: DOLIAR COSTS 
TOTAL NET DOLLAR SAVINGS 
. .. - . .... _,. . ,, .... . . . . .. 
... ·.
:(a) Table ·2 , Chapt�r III. 
(b) Table 5, Chapter V. 
·(.c) P .93 per pound. 1959 median price less 20% 
for count adjustment , Table 8, Chapter IX. 
(d) P • 72 per pound, 1959 median cost, Table 8 ,· .Chapter IX. 
(e) Value of output leas- value of input"
(£) 26,000 yards pe:r loom year. 







·.(g) P • 33 per- yard• Table 9, Chapter IX. 
(h) P ... . 28 per yard. Table 9 ,  Chapter IX. 
(i) Central Bank data. 
(j) Input .of grey plus 15% .• 
(k). Total gross· book value- dep�eciated .over 10 
years, Chapter VI 
(1) Central Bank datao 
169 
aid comes from a special dollar fund created by the Central Bank in an 
amount equivalent to the dollar value of American surplus commodities , it 
can not properly be considered dollar free. For purposes of calculating 
dollar savings , the IDC Dollar Aid must be considered as a drain on the 
international dollar reserve. On the other hand , the cost of the spinning 
input , American surplus cotton, from Table 11 can . be added to dollar sav­
ings -- P 41 .5 million or $20.8 million at 100% operation and $1 7.7 million 
at 85% operations. The inclusion of the cotton cost as an exchange savings 
is contingent upon the continuingd_davailability of American surplus cotton 
and Philippine acceptance of the terms of purchase. It has been noted that 
such transactions were terminated for twelve months in 1959 and 1960 because 
of disagreement over terms, thus permitting inclusion of only about- · half of 
1959d1 s cotton cost as an exchange saving. 
Dollar savings , therefore, depend on the level of operations , the 
' ' ' 't 
,
height of international prices , and the supply of Public Law 480 cotton. 
In 1959 if operations had be�n at 100% and do.ilar•free cotton were. avail­
able during the entire year, exchange savings of approximately $2 7.6 million 
would have been effected by the textile industry. Under the conditions 
actually prevailing the dollar savings must have been in the order of $13.3 
million, contrasted to the announced "'clear savings in foreign exchange of 
more than $35 .3 million per year." 
Projecting dollar savings into the future involves many more uncer­
tainties than the 1959 computations, but estimates have been made. ''By 
1961d, total value of textile imports to be replaced by the output of the 
local industry is expected to reach $100 million. Allowing some $30 million 
for chemicals and spare parts, operations of local mills two years from now 
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15are expected to effect an annual savings of $70.9 million. " Such esti• 
mates can serve as goals under optimum conditions , but they should not be 
considered facts with which to justify the various forms of preference 
extended to the industry. 
Dollar savings of other import reducing industries are not known, 
but the textile industry 's dollar savings can be compared to the country 's 
total international reserve of $162.9 million in 1959.
16 
By this standard , 
the textile industry savings of from $13 to $28 million was an extremely 
significant one, although precariously contingent ·upon the use of surplus 
cotton. 
The balance of payments position has not been aided by an inflow of 
capital , for investment in the·.textile industry has been essentially 
resident capital. 
Stimulus to Development in Other Areas 
The development of textile rnan11facturing has had direct and conspic• 
uous employment and balance of payments effects. But the significance of 
such a narrowly defined industry may rest largely outside of its own 
boundaries , in the influence it exerts on other areas of development. 
This extra-industry influence may be either a tangible stimulus to new 
areas of investment, the linkage effect , or an intangible stimulus to the 
social institutions or practices within the country, the social effect. 
According to Professor Hirschman , there are two development induce­
ment mechanisms related to manufacturing activity: 
1. The input-provision, derived demand, or backward 
linkage effects, i.e. , every nonprimaey economic activity, 
15-rextile Week Souvenir P5ogram, unnumbered. 
16central Bank, Twelfth Annual Report , P•  44. 
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will induce attempts to supply through domestic production 
the inputs needed in that activity. 
2. The output�tilization of forward linkage effects, 
i .e. ,  every activity that does not by its nature cater 
exclusively to final demands, will induce attempts to 
utilize its outputs as inputs in some new activities.i17 
Hirschman cites a study by Chenery and Watanabe which categorizes 
the textile industry as high in both forward atd backward linkage. 
18· For 
textiles, the ratio of interindustry purchases to total production (back• 
ward linkage) was 67% and the ratio of interindustry sales to total demand 
(forward linkage) was 57%. 
The primary backward linkage possibility is domestic cotton cultiva­
tion, the industry's  main raw material. "By providing a reliable market, 
processing industries originally based on imported agricultural materials 
such as cotton textiles and beer have stimulated in Columbia the domestic 
production of cotton and barley. "  
19 
More than a passive market for local 
cotton cultivation, the Philippine textile ind\Sitry has been so dependent 
on imports that national efforts have been aroused to forge the backward 
link. 
The possibilities of forward linkage are limited fpr the Philippine 
textile industry because the clothing manufacturers and knitting mills 
were established earlier. The apparel industry is a ''final manufacture" 
which might more properly be said to have induced textile manufacturing 
as a backward link, although this has been very weak' compared to other 
inducement factors. At least one manufacturer is contemplating forward .
17Hirschman, p. 100. 
18Ibid. ,. PP• 105-197, citing R. B. Chenery and T. Watanabe, "Inter•
national Comparisons of the Structure of Production," paper presented at 
the Cleveland meeting of the Econometric Society, December, 1956 (dittoed)i. 
19Ibid . ,  Po 112. 
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integration into garment production, but the gen�ral potential for forward 
stimulation of this character seems . . . 'negligi�le on the Philippine scene. . .. ·, . . . ' 
The textile industry ha_s induced several "satellite" industries of 
relatively minor importance. A number of firms started producing chemical 
and dyes locally, and in 1959 the textile industry purchased P 1,275,000, 
16% of its requirements of such supplies, 
20 
from domestic manufacturers. 
Small machine shops have concent�ated somewhat on textile machinery parts 
but their total significance has �een limited also. 
Except for the backward linkage possibility into cotton cultivation, 
the industry has not had a great effect nor large potential as a stimulus 
to development in other areas. However, neither has it b�en a negative 
stimulus to investment and manufacturing activity. The cottage industry 
sector, which it might have destroyed with adverse economic repercussions, 
was reduced in significance much earlier by textile imports. 
According to one political scientist, ''rhe price of industrialization 
is primarily cultural rather than monetaryi-� and there is reason to be• 
lieve that the price is still too high for most Filipinos." 
21 
The cultural 
resistance to industrialization is an intangible but real problem, which 
pr�pts an examination of the textile industry's social effect. Three 
aspects of this complex effect will be mentioned, partially to illustrate 
the social ramifications of the Philippine industrialization program of 
which the textile industry is only a segme�t. 
The textile indu�try has contributed to a shifting distribution of 
power and prestige in the Philippines, divorced fr� the traditional 
20central Bank data. 
21Thomas R .  McHale, '�he Philippine Cultural Matrix and Economic 
Development, "  Par Eastern Economic Review, September 17, 1953, p .  372 • 
.I 
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agricultural strongholds and transcending individual family groups. The 
industry trade association is an important example of a ne w  type of in• 
terest group, rising in competition with the old, and representing the 
manufacturers. Its effectiveness is hampered by its multiple membership, 
for the new industrialists have emerged from various ethnic groups. 
Nevertiheless, traditional rivalries have often been subordinated to new 
financial bonds and a type of countervailing force is developing in the 
,. .  
economy. Not only are Chinese clans and Filipino families cooperating 
. , 
in joint efforts, they are demanding political influence vis-a-vis the 
agricultural p,roducers. 
22 
A second general social effect has been operativei.upon the values 
and loyalties of the industry' s fifteen thousand employees. It is pos­
sible only to speculate upon the change in their perspective caused by 
their introduction to the nonpersonal factory group, with its fixed 
leaders and new allegian�es. 
Finally, the industry has helped to stjmulate widespread interest 
in new educational areas. There are new steps on the educational ladder 
of social mobility, as business administration and engineering courses 
are gaining popularity alongside the traditional professional areas. The 
requirements of the textile mills for technical personnel have caused a 
striking response of new curriculums and student interesti. 
Evaluation of the social effect of the textile industry, or 
22cooperation between th� Filipino and Chinese members of the TMAP, 
however, has not been completely harmonious. - In June, 1959, four firms 
established the Filipino Textile Mills Association of the Philippines to
"promote and develop a kindred spirit among the owners. and· p·ersonnel · of .Filipino owned textile mills in the Philippines with the end view of
fostering a 'Filipino First' policy among them . "  Manila chronicle, June 
12, 1959. The Filipino firms retained their membership in the TMAP
because of the realization that political stre�gth. required unity. 
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industrialization in ge1'eral, hc;,wever, calls for the a�te�tioµ of the 
sociologist, who µntil now �s l:>een preocc\lpied with the rural barrio. . . . ' .
Economists insist that indusitrialization is wor�ing a significant trans­_
formation of a portion of the social fabric, but their eyes are not trained 
to detect the extent or the subtlety of the process. 
Productivity and Labor Absorption of Capital 
The textile industry is co,111■ .. -nly considered a desideratum in the 
Philippines because of its alleged low capital intensiveness and high labor 
intensiveness. This is believed to maximize the value added in manufacture 
from the scarce element, capit�l, and to absorb large numbers of the unem­
ployed labor force. Table 12 attempts to contrast the capital•output 
requirements and employment ratios for textile manufacturing to other in• 
·dustry sectors.
23 
It shows that neither presumption is certain, at least 
in comparison to the 1956 i�dustrial structure of the Philippines. 
The textile industry 's capital-output ratio of 3.3 compared to a 
ratio of 1.27 for all manufacturing indicates that textile capital is less 
productive than average. Interindustry comparisons are hampered by the 
lack of definitions of other industries, particularly their degree of inte­
gration. In industries which only process the final goods, the profits 
permitted by the seller 's market assume a larger portion of �alue added 
and lower the capital-output ratio. In the textile industry, for instance, 
profits accounted for over half of the value added. The capital-output 
ratios in Table 12 are average, n« · incremental ratios, ·and their use for 
23'rhe ratios in Table 12 are subject to various technical criticisms, .
chief perhaps being the definition of "value added" and the distortion 
caused by intermittent underutilization of capacity. Their chief advantage 
is their availability, but their use requires caution. 
4.9 
3 .3  
7.5 
3.3 
14. 3  
TABLE 12 
CAPITAL-OttfPti'.r AND EMPLOYMENT RATIOS FOR 














Private Textile Industry 
Spinning Mills 
1.27 2.5 7 .4  
3 .0  
10.2  2 .7  12.9
10. 2  2 • .  4 12.6
Integrated Mills 3.3  10. 2  2 .8  13.0  
Food, Manufactured 1.36 6.0  2 .3  8 .3  
5.0 
Beverages . 59 6 .1  1.4 
Tobacco Products • 78 1 .6  
Footwear and Garments 1.27 1 .5  1.4 2 .8  
Wood Products 1 .34 2 .7  1·.o 3.8 
Paper and Paper Products 1.42 6 .1  3 .0  9 . 0  
Basic Industrial Chemicals 5 .07 25.5 ·S .2  30. 7  
Glass and Glass Productso·· 1 .33 8 .5  1 .9  10.4  
Basic Metal Products 2 .30 2 .0  16. 7 
2• .2Machinery 2 . 17 4 .9  7 . 1  
Transportation Equipment 2 . 72 6.8 4 .0  10.8  
(a) Ratios for all indu.otries except the textile industry are from 
Clarence L. Barber, ''The Survey of Manufacturers as an Aid to Economic Plan•
ning,o" The Philippine Statistician, VII1 (December, 1959), 219-233. His 
C
ratios are based upon data published in the 1956 Annual Survey of Manufactures 
(Manila : Bureau of Printing, 1958)o. The numerator of the capital/output 
ratio is the total of fixeil assets � (presurnably net) and inventory. The de­
nominator of the ratio·is a calculated "net·ovalue added. by manufacture," which 
is sales less raw materi�ls, energy consumption, and contract work. The
ratios for the textile industry are based upon the 1959 financial statements 
filed at the Central Bank. The time periods are, therefore, not comparable. 
"Net value added" was calculated in a different manner than in Professor 
B.trber 's article; it is the total of direct labor, estimated indirect labor 
·(40% of rnan11factur1ng overhead), salatiesoand bonuses, rents, interest, profits, .
and, for purposes of c�parability, estimated depreciation (40% of manufactur• 
ing overhead) . Fixed assets for the textile industry are net of depreciation 
and exclude construction in process. Since assets are valued aso�£ the year ' s  
end, not all were productive duringo·the year. Values are in thousands of 
pesos. 
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planning purposes is consequently limited. They do not indicate that ex-
,.. . 
.-
pans ion of the textile industry would require more capital in relation to 
output than other industries, although they suggest that with few excep­
tions this might be true. Only one industry, basic and industrial .ichemi­
cals, and one sub-group, galvanized steel products (not shown), have 
capital-output ra�ios which are higher than the textile industry. There­
fore, it can be concluded that the productivity of textile capital has been 
less than that in other Philippine manufacturing, and capital productivity 
cannot be a basis for the indus try ' s  justificatiion. If the comparison is to 
other large scale factory industries, which might have grown during these 
years or might be encouraged in the future , then Table 12 �s much less 
meaningful. 
There is other evidence that textile manufacturing is more heavily 
capital intensive than is e0Ui11only assumed. One study presents the ratio 
of average fixed assets to value added for five industries in the United 
Kingdom and India. Altlllough the figures are partially preliminary and 
definitely not comparable, they showi.ithat the relative position of the 
textile industry is high: 
24 
Industry United.iKingdom (1955) India 
Cement 1.6  2. 9 (1953) 
Iron and Steel 3.2  4. 2 (1952) 
Paper and Pulp 3.9 6�.3 (1952) 
, • j
Textiles (other than·J%'ayon) 4.0 4.0 (Bombay, 1942)
2.8 (Ahmedabad, 1942)
Sugar and Glucose 4. 1 2.3 (1953) 
The employment ratios in Table 12 raise-·.questions concerning the second 
�roposition that the textile industry is highly labor intensive. Thirteen 
thousand pesos were required to create one job in the textile industry, com• 
pared to P 7,400 in total manufacturing. Nevertheless, there were 23 out· of 
24George Rosen, Industrial Change in India (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free 
Press, 1958), p. 123. 
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a total 151 industries and _subgroups with higher capital per employee than 
the textile industry. The proposition that the textile industry has high 
labor intensiveness, therefore, seems to be less untrue than the proposi­
tion that it is characterized by low capital intensiveness. The study of 
Indian industry indicates that the textile industry is more labor intensive 
(9,900 rupees of fixed capital per wor�er, 1952) than such major manufac­.o
turing industries as steel (20,020 rupee_s, 1952) and paper (16 , 190 rupees,
. ··25 · 1953) . Relative intensiveness of capital and labor use depends on the 
.. . . ..
comparisons selected. Compared·· to Philippine manufacturing in 1956 the 
textile industry has not been very labor intensive, but its labor intens• 
ity has probably been greater than would have been true of _oalternative 
investments in other basic industries. 
At the 1959 exchange rate, the Philippine textile industry operated 
at a clear cost disadvantage in relationship to other manufacturing and 
trading countries. · In _ addition to the variety of benefits derived f.rom 
the industry, the country suffered a loss because the costs of domestic 
production were higher than the costs of comparable imports. If the 1959 
.
annual production of grey cloth were 105 million yards, as estimated, 
26 
and the absolute cost·odifference between Japan and the Philippines were 
approximately $.07 �r-!:P . 14 per yard as indicated in Chapter IX, Table 10, 
then the annual loss due to manufacturing grey rather than importing was 
about P 15 million. This loss can be considered an absorption of scarce 
resources similar to investment in plant and equipment; if it were not for 
domestic textile manufacturing an additional P 15 million would have been 
freed, potentially for productive investment. If this sum is added to total 
. . .





capital investment, the total capital per employee i� Table 12 would rise 
£ran P 12 ,900 to P 14,300_.. A eiln�lar a<J.ju�tment would raise �he capital• 
oatput ratio fran 3.3 to 3 .7.  The value of these adjustments is limited 
by the absence of comparaJ>ility to other i0:dustries, but they empha�ize 
what is often neglected by Philippine business and gover,uoent officials 
•• that there is a real cost in fostering industries which are not able to 
meet international competitive standards • 
CHAPTER .XI 
CONCLUSIONS 
When this study was concluded at the end of 1959, entrepreneurial 
enthusiasm in textile maaufacturingohad been superfluous. National re� 
quirements were exceeded by the industry's installed finishing capacity ..
and its installed or approved spi1llling capacity; installed or approved 
weaving facilities were close to or in e�ess of national requirements. 
Since the Central Bank controlled plant expansion . through the process of 
dollar allocations and had the power to prevent overcapacity f.rom spread­
ing, its apparent reconciliation with, the NEC in 1960 aroused hopes for 
. .. 
coordinated industry planning. Some costs in the form of overextension of 
capacity and imbalanced production have been incurred by the delay in this 
accord, but these deficiencies can be rapidly eliminated if the population 
growth continues to augment national req�irements at the current tempo. 
In the Philippines, where the Tariff Act of 1909 remained effective 
for 48 years, aew emphasis has to- be placed upon the tariff mechanism .as a 
means of protecting the multiplying infant industries, such as the textile 
industry, as shifts in taxes and exchange rates alter their competitive 
positions. The textile industry clearly required protection in 1959, either 
by means of continued restriction of exchange grants or through higher 
tariffs. Cited as a corroborating example is the American cotton textile 
industry, which developed during the artificial seller 's  market created by 
the War of 1812, under circumstances analogous in some respects to the 
Philippine experience. 
1 
The New Englander enjoyed large _oexcess profits 
1see Irwin M. Stelzer, "The Cotton Textile Industry" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation; Cornell University, Department of Economics, 1954) , pp. 2-7. 
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because of the widening cost-price margins caused by the suspension of 
finished textile imports f�om the United Kingdom and the freeing of southern 
cottoa for domestic use. Idle merchant capital was officially encouraged to 
. .
find new outlets in manufacturing. Then upon the termination-of hostilities, 
the American market was flooded with English textiles , and the return of 
prosperity required a 25% tariff on cotton imports. The TMAP has sought 
similar support for the Philippine textile industry. 
Although the textile industry does have an international cost inferior­
ity , it is aot as serious as is sometimes believed. As is indicated below, 
the estimated average production costs of Chapter IX are well below those 
stated by the TMAP in its plea for higher tariffs: 
Yarn Production Cost Per Kilo (20 count) 
Chapter 1x<2> TMAP % Difference 
Raw Material P 1.71 P 2 . 29 33.9% 
Domestic Processing 1.42 1. 65 16. 2  
3 . 13 3.94 25.9 
Grey Cloth Production Cost Per Yard (Style 2003) 
Chapter IX '!'MAP % Difference 
Raw Materiali(
J) P . 30 P . 35 16 . 7% 
Domestic Processing . 14 .25 78�6 
.44 . 60 45.5 
The tariffs recc-11oended "to protect the existing local textile industry 
from unfair cOiilpetition of imported goods" exceeded even the rates 
2Raw material cost is the 1959 median cost of cotton necessary to 
produce one kilo of yam, Table 8 ,  Chapter IX. Processing cost is the 
median yarn processing cost , Table 7 ,  Chapter IX. 
lchapter IX raw material cost is the cost of yarn productioni, P 3. 13 
per kilo, less administrative expenses from Table 7,  Chapter IX, for pur• 
poses of comp�rability, converted to pounds and divided by 4.5 yards per
pound. The·iTMAP raw material cost is the yarn production cost, less an
estimated administrative expense of 1S%, converted_i to. pounds and divided 
by 4.5. 
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necessary to equalize the landed import cost and the excessively high 
domestic production costs estimated by the TMAP. Granting the validity of 
the TMAP ' s  cost structure, equalizing tariffs would have been 173% on grey 
and 190% on finished fabrics rather than the 420% and 440%.. figures proposed, 
which may reflect an upward bias for bargaining purposes, but which also 
cause the inferiority of the industry 's position to be exaggerated. De• 
valuation of the peso would reduce the tariff requirements, since local 
costs would rise less than the cost of imported goods. The tariffs neces• 
sary in 1959 to equalize median domestic production costs plus 10% and the 
landed cost of imported equivalents, using Chapter IX data, would have been 
approximately 47% for yarn and 33% for grey, and less at lower rates of ex­
change. 
·
While the industry can be considered a successful "dollar saver", 
especially if American surplus cotton continues to be available, its export 
potential is poor. Some possibilities exist for the reduction of production 
costs, but the cotton and labor components, which represent about two thirds 
of thei_itotal cost, are not promising in this respect , and the industry, 
already equipped with the most modern physical plant, will find increasing 
its relative rate of progress over other Far f;astern countries very diffi-
.. 
cult. The industry, however, should continue to prosper in�efinitely by 
supplying the local market, assuming that the government affords it adequate 
subsidization in the form of protection from foreign imports in return for 
..
the various political, economic, and social benefits it confers upon the:• 
country. 
In conclusion, the results of this analysis of the textile industry 
will be reviewed in relation to the objectives stated in the introductory 
chapter. 
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(1) To ascertain the force_s which caused the textile industry to 
emerge so abruptly in the· Philipp_i_nes_. Since in4ustrialization has beeni· . . . . . . . 
accorded high priority -among the goals of �conomic plan�ing in the Philip-
.. . 
pines, a primary objective has been to determine what has stimulated the 
textile industry ' s  rapid growth. 
Three governmental inducement mechanisms which figure prominently in 
the portfolio of economic planners, but have had little effect upon the 
textile industry, are tariffs, government participation in indus�ry, and tax 
exemption for endorsed industries. The use of tariffs as a protective de­
vice has been nullified until recently by the United States-Philippine Trade 
Agreement, and tariffs have been significant only as a manifestation of the 
industry's privileged position and the concern for its future development. 
The goveroment has been a direct participant in textile manufacturing as 
a pioneer, but its demon·stration effect has been negligible, perhaps even 
negative. Generous tax exe.Dlption has been granted to most of the industry, 
and this privilege enhanced the profitability of textile manufacturing, but 
it alone was an insufficient stimulus until combined with other inducement 
factors. 
The major stimulus to the textile industry 's development was the impo­
sition of exchange and import control. Controls released �Oi14llercial capital, 
guaranteed a secure seller's market, and afforded great windfalls in the 
grants for raw materials due to the peso 's overvaluation. But the increment 
in the net productivity of capital in textile manufacturing would not have 
prompted such a vigorous entrepreneu�ial r�action if it had not been coupled
.. .. . " .  . .. ' ' I . , ' ' ·. ·•! ' ' ' 
with the discriminatory control legislation, which- pushed the alien importers, 
pr1rnarily Chinese, out of their traditional areas of economic activityi. 
' ' 
Economic nationalism prompted Congress to Filipinize the iwpa. t trade, while 
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controls facilitated the process by making it centrally feasible and by 
minimizing the risk for the neophyte Filipino importers. The foreign trad• 
ing cOJmDunity was compelled to seek new economic opportunities, but invest• 
ment in land or natural resources was discouraged by law and in equity 
capital by tradition. Combined with the highly attractive positive in-
. • 
ducements of the market, the natural response was backward integration into 
manufacturing by some of the alien importers. As long as the gover1nuent 
endorsed such integration, as it did in textiles, by allocating dollars for 
equipment and raw materials, the transition was relatively simple and the 
·profit potential great. This, of course, was particularly true in textile 
manufacturing with its simple technology and wide market. 
More general inducements existed in the economic, political, and social 
atmosphere of the 1950 1 s which, at least, permitted · .the industry's emergence, 
but are more difficult to evaluate. By 1950 social overhead in the form of 
power availability and transportation facilities was reconstructed •d . The 
. . 
system of textile distribution had _ been reestablished as imports flowed into ·d
the country to remedyd: the textile shortages of the occupation period. The 
.,,..
evolution of a "transitional" Filipino group in Manila aided the social re• 
ceptivity of the country to manufacturing ventures and contributed to thed1 
appearance of the few Filipino entrepreneurs in the industry, as well as the 
middle managers and salaried employees. 
Given this envir�nment and thed'dwidespread determination to industrial­
ize, textile manufacturing was probably an inevitability. Its accelerated 
development of the .. indus try's great profit potential, which sparked a cluster 
of followers. 
4 
• • ,, • • : ,•,·� I \
4The actual situat;ion must not be oversimplified as a.a exclusive re• 
action to the discr1m1dnatory impleme,;itation of controls. The first mill was 
established by a native born Filipino to supply yarn to the knitting trade 
and one of the first four integrated mills was Filipino. Nevertheless, the 
predominance of aliens is bel�eved to justify the generalization. 
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(2) To weigh the seriousness of-three bottlenecks posited by the 
theory of economic develop�nt as imp�d.iments to-indu�trialization in the 
lesser developed nations -- the shortages of capital, managerial resources, 
and a skilled labor force. 
Capital has not constituted an important bottleneck for the textile 
industry, except for the problem of mobilizing a sufficiently wide equity 
base to support its debt financing. Because of the traditional reluctance 
to entrust equity capital to non-kinsmen, the corporations have been familial 
and conse� ntly limited in their initial investmente . This has been reme­
died by the regular reinvestment of the industry ' s  high, excess profits and 
marked trading on the equity. For industries with public endorsement and 
support· there is adequate institutional credit available ati· low rates of 
interest. The textile industry has been a star of the Philippine drive for 
industrialization, favored by the Philippine gove�ument and the American 
foreign aid administration. Credit has been made available to the reasonable 
limits of its equity base, and its entire debt structure, peso and dollar 
components, has apparently been directly or indirectly furnished by the 
govero,oent. 
Because of the concentration of finaneial resources on the textile 
industry, generalizations based on this exa•ople are hazardous. An under• 
developed country can husband sufficient capital to finance selecte·d in• 
dustries, especially if its resources are augmented by foreign aid, but 
capital may still be deficient for the economy as a wholei. The textile 
industry has been the recipient of apprb:,rimat:ely one !=hird of the entire 
American gover11ment 's financing assistance to the Philippines, thus leaving 
only two thirds fori·ithe rest of the economy. But thei. rest of the economy 
has not been able to absorb more in industrial projects of the coohilt'rcial 
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standards established by the financing institutions. Both dollar and peso 
credit has been unemployed due to lack of sound investment proposals. This 
suggests that in countries depending on private enterprise for industriali• 
zation and allocating a share of :their capital resources to finance private 
enterprise, the real shortage may be entrepreneurs rather than capital. 
The shortage of managerial resources bas been partially concealed for 
the textile industry by the lack of emphasis upon efficiency, the familial 
reluctance to share authority with nationals, and the ease with which pro• 
duction responsibility could be transferred to foreign personnel. An appeal 
of a textile mill is the facility with which it can be established; it is 
easy to start producing but difficult to produce efficiently. Since quality 
and costs have been subordinate to output, managerial shortages have been 
considered a secondary problem. Managerial positions have often been as­
sumed by family members in accordance with the traditional pattern, in 
spite of deficiencies in training or capability, thus temporarily veiling 
managerial requirements. Great reliance has been placed upon foreign 
technicians, who often ha,ve replaced the hierarchy of manufacturing person­
nel in a Western mill am who virtually single-handed�y have been able to 
achieve respectable perfomance in machine efficiency. 
These stopgaps for a national shortage of technically trained middle 
management, however, are beceming increasingly les,s effective as domestic 
..
competition ,. .ddevelops in the industry. Nevertheless, they indicate that in 
textile manufacturing indigenous .manag8l'Dent is not a bottleneck as long as 
the industry is protected and the. country is willing to import a .foreign 
management group. 
The remarkable institutional response, particularly of the private 
universities, to thed·dindustry's needs for engineering personnel demonstrates 
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how rapidly a free society, . such as the Philippines, . can shift its resources 
to satisfy management needs. Unique Philippine characteristics have faci-.. 
litated this responsei•• the emergence of transitional Filipinos, viewing 
education as an accepted vehicle of social mobility but sensitive to the new 
opportunities in industry, and the private universities seeking new curriculums 
with profit potential. For an industry with as simple a technology as tex­
tile man,,facturing, development need not await the creation of a reservoir 
of trained managers. Just the reverse is possible, if necessary. The 
industry can be established and run by foreign technicians until local 
management is trained to take over. Efficiency can be sacrificed if the 
urgency of industrialization so dema�ds. 
The third bottleneck , the shortage of a skilled labor force, has been 
obviated by the nature of the industry's labor requirements. In spite of 
the large fixed assets per employee in relation to other Philippine manu• 
facturing, the need for trained personnel has been restricted to managerial 
levels. The labor force has been unsophisticated and unskilled for indus• 
trial employment. Within a few months the foreign technicians have been 
able to convert their young employees into functioning, although inefficient, 
productive workers. The COIWlon belief of development planners that textile 
manufacturing avoids the skilled labor bottleneck is verified by this study , 
and its appeal as a starting point for industrialization substantiated. It 
provides a simple vehicle for indoctrinating a large se.gment of workers in 
the social responsibilities of factory employment, without confronting the 
more extensive training requirements of many other manufacturing industries. 
(3) To evaluate the social and economic contribution of the industry 
as opposed to the efficiency of its operations. Have the costs of encourag­
ing textile manufacturing in the Philippines been justified by the benefits 
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accruing to the economy? 
It is not sufficient merely to observe the impress�ve .imills filled 
with modern machinery and workers, nor to cite production figures and dollar 
savings, as many Filipinos have done. The economic justification for the 
industry depends upon whether its contribution to the national income, solu• 
tion of the balance of payments disequilibrium, reduction of unemployment, 
and creation of social benefits are as great as would be produced by altenia• 
tive resource investment. Scarce resources in the Philippines may be 
categorized as physical and hurnaa. The human resources in scarce supply 
are entrepreneurial am technical. It is believed.ithat the textile im­
porter-manufacturers were especially susceptible to the �etus backward 
into textile production, and that consequently entrepreneurial resources 
.·were not diverted away from other sectors by the textile industry.i Likewise, 
the industry has augmented rather than diverted the nation 's limited supply 
of technical personnel. However, the industry may be subj ect to criticism 
if its use of the "physical" resources in short supply has been relatively 
inefficient; the most important physical resource is capital, foreign and 
domestic, which, although no bottleneck for the textile industry, is limited 
for the economy as a whole. 
Textile manufacturing was initiated in the Philippines without any 
conscious evaluation of its contribution to national income CODlpared to 
other investment possibilities. None of the NDC' s  original purposes in­
cluded economic cost considerations. There was no real appraisal of the 
economic justification for textile manufactu�ing when the Commonwealth 
establ.ished it as an objective beforei· the war. After the republic was 
founded, various measures were used to foster the private industry 's  de­
velopment into a permanent fixture in the economy, but comparative analysis 
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of its value was still restricted to vague faith in autarky and the absorp­
tion of unemployment. 
Efficiency, as measured by an absolute money cost comparison with other 
producing countries, is not .conclusive evidence of an industry 's  national 
economic value, even by the single criterion of contribution to national 
income. A principal objective of industrialization is to increas:e the 
national income. An industry with relatively high costs and inefficient 
performanr� may still make a positive contribution to national income, if 
the loss due to national specialization does not exceed the value- added by 
the industry. However, an industry with an international cost inferiority 
should be automatically suspect and subjected to rigorous scrutiny before 
receiving national endorsement. It would appear probable that other indus• 
trial projects would exist which, while affording similar employment and 
autarky advantages, might be internationally competitive.. An industry with• 
out the prospects of eventual money cost equality with other producing 
countries requires a national conmitment to perpetual subsidization by the 
economy. 
.
Although analysis of the textileiindustry ' s  performance and contribution 
to national income was lacking in the Philippines , there was ample indication 
from the NDC example that the industry was a high-cost producer. This was 
particularly conspicuous during the Tariff Couanlssion studies of 1954 and 
1955, but it was also evident prior to the entry of the private firms. The 
industry has magnified its cost inferiority in order to realiz e inordinate 
protection without fear of prompting a reappraisal. of its national value. 
This study has substantiated that the Philippines has a cost inferiority vis• 
a-vis imported textiles at the estimated equilibrium range of the exchange 
rate, although this inferiority is less than e01W1only assumed. 
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The industry ' s  contribution to the national income of P 56 million in 
1959 is still positive after deductions of P 15 million, the production 
cost inferiority, and P 7 million, excess profit in addition to the former 
deduction. Nevertheless, the lower average capital-output ratios of other 
manufacturing sectors raise the suspicion that greater controibutions to 
national income would have been realized by alternative uses of the scarce 
ingredient, capital. Engineering estimates of the incremental capital­
output ratios for a range of possible industrial enterprises would provide 
useful guide-lines for public policy which now prevent conclusive evalua• 
tion of the textile industry's relative contributi·on to national income o 
The economic j ustification for the textile industry may implicitly .
depend upon a conviction that domestic cotton will eventually provide the 
industry 's  prime raw material. The us� of Philippine cotton would not only 
release the balance of payments benefits from their precarious dependence 
on American surplus cotton, but it presumably would reduce the industry 's  
capital-output ratio and increase its net contribution to national income. 
The low yields and high costs of domestic cotton cultivation have pres·ented 
an unfavorable money cost comparison with imported cotton, although there 
were encouraging improvements in yield in 1958 and 1959, which were expected 
to be enhanced by eventual decontrol. On the basis of cost and quality., 
however, it was unlikely that the industry would voluntarily shift to domes­
tic raw materials. Backward linkage seemed to require direct or indirect 
government encouragement. The j ustification for such support depended upon 
-. 
·5chapter x. · Of the P 29 million accounting profit, approximately P 22 
million w�s excess profit by Chapter IX criteria. This was made possible 
by the scarcity.ocontrived by the Central Bank and should be deducted from 
the industry 's factor cost to determine its net contribution to national 
income. Fifteen million pesos of the excess profits are identified witho· 
the production cost inferiority to emphasize its significance. 
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whether the allocation of resources to cotton cultivation would be more pro­
ductive than their use in other sectors. Dome,ti_c cotton 's mon�y cost in• 
feriority made it appear an unfavorable candidate for government support by 
the contribution-to-national-income criterion. The existence of textile 
manufacturing did not present priroa facie evidence for such endorsement. 
But as noted earlier an industry 's contribution to national income is 
only one criterion in establishing industrial priorities ; the balance of 
payments , employment, and social effects must also be considered. The sig­
nificance of the textile industry according to these latter criteria has 
been exaggerated. The small employment-creating effect in relation to the 
annual incrementsi) in the work force , in spite of the substantial national 
effort devoted to this indu�try ,  reveals that industrialization is not an 
easy solution for the unemployment problem. The social effects have been 
largely ignored. Although Hirschman attributed relatively high linkage 
value to textile manufacturing, observation revealed little impulse effect 
on other industrial sectors. Dollar savings, only a fraction of the in• 
dustry's claim, have been significant compared to the Philippine inter­
national reserve , but the balance of payments problem is a function of the 
overvaluation of the peso, and devaluation rather than autarky presents a 
more reasonable solution. These various criteria require quantitative 
measurement, weighting, and organizing into a priority formula ini·order to 
provide a means of comp4ring industrial projects. 
The NEC has formulated an industrial priority formula to be used for 
the allocation of scarce resQurces and govern��nt •ssi$tance . The following 
economic values are the guideposts of the industrial priority system :i6 
6National Econoniic Council, The Five-Year Economic and Social Develop­
ment Program for Fiscal Years 1957-1961 �  (Manila: ' National Economic 
(continued) 
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a) Value added to national product in the form of income and 
employment;  
b) Strengthening of the balance of payments position of the 
country;
c) Alleviation of the unemployment situation, and development 
of skills ; 
d) Extra values added due to and from external economies ; and 
e) Production of basic and essential goods and services. 
The use of a priority formula is necessary for the rational allocation 
of resources among alternative industries and represents a significant im• 
provement in Philippine economic planning. Too formula unfortunately was 
developed too late for application to the textile industry, but it reveals 
an awareness of the need for a sophisticated t.echnique in the granting ofo­
foreign exchange and awarding of government privil.eges. The most serious· 
obstacle to its effective implementation will be the uncoordinated rivalry 
between various governmental bodies which plagued the textile industry. 
But without such a cODlparative analysis of the criteria of an industry 's  
economic value, it is hazardous to make a final judgment that resources 
have been used poorly or wisely. 
There are certain defects in market criteria in the Philippines, which 
cause a discrepancy between private and social cost and prevent confident 
(cont 'd) 
Council, 1957) , p. 209. For a description of the priority formula see 
Higgins, Economic Development,. 653-63, 682-86. This writer 's  primary.criticism of the priority formula, a deficiency which Professor Higgins
fails to note, is that no adjustment is made for the national loss if an 
industry suffers an international money cost inferiority, as has been true 
in textile production. The NEC formula gives positive weight to the firm 
or industry 's value added, including profits, but limits profits to a maxi­
mum of 15% return on investment. This permits a portion of excess- profits
to be used to enhance an industry 's  priority position even though the 
profits are d�rived from the high prices caused by contrived scarcity. 
Also profits may not beo·· excessive, I?ut protection may permit a domestic 
industry to survive indefinitely although con�urners would enjoy lower 
prices if it;s products were imported. It is believed thato. such a produc­
tion cost inferiority should be deducted from the value added to the na� 
tional product for purposes of ascertaining the project 's  economic value 
compared to other industries. 
i 
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' . 
reliance on marginal decieL ��ing. Labor c_osts wer� held up by legts­
.thlation. in spite of widespread u•employment , 
. . . . . . 
_e peso .W$S . overvalued, and .. . . 
capital was rationed at lqw cost to officially endorsed . borrowers. These 
• ' • • • • • 
• : 
imperfections necessitate _planning beyond tbedmere co�side:ration · of cost• 
price relationships. 
In conclusion, it caa be said that the costs of encouraging textile 
manufacturing in the Philippines have appeared high in relation to the 
. ' 
benefits accruing to the economy. Although the industry's contr-ibution to 
the national income has been positive, the high capital-output ratio and 
apparent need for indefinite protection . suggest the probable existence of 
alternative investments affording greater benefits. The St\ldy of a single 
industry in isolation, however, does not provi_de answers to what the alter• 
natives might be. 
The fact that alternative investment opportunities are not conspicuous 
may be one of three factors enhancing the textile indus try's economic 
justification. In a free enterprise economy, investment depends upon the 
appearance of individual entrepreneurs who are voluntarily willing to as• 
sume the risks of mobilizing the necessary resources. The government can 
encourage but cannot create these entrepreneurs. The deficiency in invest­
ment projects, illustrated by the excess liquidity of tlie financial insti• 
tutions in spite of the high rnarginald·dproductivity of capital, has been 
caused by a shortage of human resources. If the entrepreneurial goals in 
textile manufacturing were not transferable to other investment areas, as 
has been suggested, _x�il� �ndustry .�ight h,ave 
'' 1 • • • 
�hen the alte��ive to t�e: te
• I 
been no investment. 
A second factor strengthening the economic justification of the textile 
industry in the Philippines is that the opportunity cost of the scarce 
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ingredient, foreign exchange, may have been low. Since over half of the 
dollars for capital equipment came fran American foreign aid, which would 
have been unlikely to have been fully used otherwise, the alternative to 
7
the textile industry again might have been no investment.  It is unrealis• 
tic to speak of investment alternatives unless the huma� and physical 
resources absorved in textile manufacturing could , in fact, have been 
transferred to such alternatives. 
Finally , the economic justificatioa of the industry may be derived from 
the independence it affords the nation from the vicissitudes of.oforeign 
trade. To repeat the reasoaing of Dr. Amado Castro, quoted in the second 
chapter : 
8 
On economic grounds there can hardly be any doubts as to 
the desirability of economic independence;  it is essential if 
the Philippine economy which is highly oriented toward foreign 
trade is to remain stable and unaffected by outside fluctua­
tions. And on political grounds the justification is even 
greater • • • •  
Even granting a loss of specialization. and efficiency 
there is the cold dilemma of security vs. great gain: the 
country may prefer aostable ·income at a lower level to highly .
varying returns. 
By shifting the source of supply for its principal prewar impor.t to a 
domestic industry, the country has taken a significant step on the road to 
national autarky. This criterion involves social and political overtones 
defying economic analysis. Therefore, it can only be identified as the 
most popularly compelling justification for the industry. 
(4) To provide a case study of a new indusotry in an underdeveloped 
7The textile industry has not received unanimous support from the
United States. In February, 1960 , U.S. Senator Richard B. Russell called 
for free entry of American textiles into the Philippines and U.S. Senator 
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. said that he was "astounded" to learn that the ICA was 
encouraging a textile industry in the Philippines. Manila Bulletin , 
February 27 , 1960. 
8castro, pp. 6, 390. 
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country to serve as a standard of comparison in order to further under­
standing of the growth process and the formulation of economic policy. A 
host of questions about Philippine economic development has been prompted 
by this study, but the analysis of other industries in the Philippines and 
other underdeveloped countries is required to answer them. Do some Philip­
pine industries have an absolute money cost advantage over foreign indus­
tries or is this prevented by high Philippine wage rates and low productivity? 
What are the rates of excess profit in other industries and have they been 
adequate for inducement purposes? What have been the sources of capital in 
other industrial sectors, their solutions of the management bottleneck , 
their response to the govt::rooient tax incentive program and exchange control? 
The value of the answers derived from the textile experience would be greatly 
increased by confirmation or refutation from knowledge of the experience of 
other industries. 
Finally, this study has emphasized that a condition precedent to useful 
generalizations about industrial development is a thorough study of the soc• 
ial and political environment of the underdeveloped country. Generalizations 
from the Philippine textile industry to other countries is limited by the 
high degree to which its characteristics have been shaped by the interaction 
of non-economic factors. The facility of establishing mills and training 
workers are objective and transferable facts, but the value of the induce• 
ment mechanisms employed in the Philippines has been determined largely by 
the peculiar Philippine setting -- the social position of the ethnic Chinese 
and the economic pressures upon them, the extent and character of American 
aid, the governmental commitment to industrialization by free enterprise, 
the external perspective of management and reliance upon government wind-
. -
falls, the familial limitations on business organization and capital formation. 
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Economic development policy must dea1 with these realities of the 
Philippine. :scene as much as the more easily solved technical and economic 
problems. In other countries, soci$1 and political realities of a differ­
ent nature undoubtedly e�rt an equally_ profound influence on their paths 
of industrial development. 
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